

Does It Fit? Tweeting on Monetary Policy and Central Bank Communication*



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Abstract

- This note proposes an index to measure the relationship between **monetary policy communication** and **market sentiment**, where **market sentiment** is proxied by a **Twitter-based metric**: the **Central Bank Surprise Index**.
- A **higher similarity** between **central bank announcements** and **Twitter-based market sentiment** implies **fewer surprises**, i.e. more consistency between monetary policy messages and market reactions.
- This measure is computed for **three major central banks**: the **Federal Reserve**, the **European Central Bank** and the **Bank of England**.
- Among other things, we look at three famous announcements:
 - a) **Mario Draghi's conference** call on **July 26, 2012**
 - b) **Mario Draghi's conference** call on **June 27, 2017**
 - c) the "**Economic Prospects for the Long Run**" speech held by Ben S. Bernanke on **May 18, 2013**.
- The first two cases are known for being a **source of surprises**.
- Consistently we observed **very low similarity scores** in the cases **a)** and **b)**.
- In the **third case** we observed a **high similarity score**.

Data Collection

- We focus on official communication about monetary policy committee decisions from the three most important central banks:
 - Bank of England
 - European Central Bank
 - Federal Reserve.
- From their official websites, we retrieved transcripts of meetings in which a monetary policy decision was announced.
- Our sample comprised:
 - 1) 143 transcripts of Bank of England meetings from 2006 to December 2018
 - 2) 230 transcripts of European Central Bank meetings from 1998 to December 2018
 - 3) 54 transcripts of Federal Reserve meetings from 2012 to December 2018

- Our objective is to **transform daily tweets** about the **monetary policy decisions** of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank into a **numerical measure** of **similarity**.
- This indicator reflects the **distance** between **market expectations** and the **information** provided in **central bank transcripts**.

Bank	Keywords	Number of tweets	Timeframe
Bank of England ¹	@bankofengland, #bankofengland, #boe,	325,462	Since 2011
European Central Bank	@ecb, #draghi, #ecb,	609,447	Since 2011
Federal Reserve	@federalreserve, #Yellen,	952,806	Since 2011

The Central Bank Surprise Index


- As we are interested in how the similarity between **bank conference calls** and the **market's response** after the call influences market prices.
- We gathered the **tweets published** in the **interval between 48 hours before** and **48 hours after a speech**.
- The tweets were **split** into **12-hour segments** around the speech.
- The intervals are illustrated in the following Table.
- Thus, we have **eight groups of tweets** to measure **against** the **content of the speeches**.

Tweet Intervals (delta hours from the speech)		
[-48, -36)	a_lag_4836	48 to 36 hours before the speech
[-36, -24)	b_lag_3624	36 to 24 hours before the speech
[-24, -12)	c_lag_2412	24 to 12 hours before the speech
[-12, 0)	d_lag_1200	Up to 12 hours before the speech
[0, +12)	e_fwd_0012	Up to 12 hours after the speech
[+12, +24)	f_fwd_1224	12 to 24 hours after the speech
[+24, +36)	g_fwd_2436	24 to 36 hours after the speech
[+36, +48)	h_fwd_3648	36 to 48 hours after the speech

The Central Bank Surprise Index (cont'd)

- We then **measure similarity between documents** as the **cosine** of the **angle between** the **two corresponding vectors**.
- We observe a rather **stable similarity index** in the case of the **Federal Reserve Bank** over the period 2012-2017.
- On the other hand, a **slight decrease** can be observed for the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.
- If we narrow our analysis to the post-2012 period for the ECB and the **Bank of England**, we find a more stable index.




Evolution of the Central Bank Surprise Index Over Time



The Central Bank Surprise Index (cont'd)

- The values of the measure of similarity appear to be **quite different** for the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank and the ECB.
- In the case of the **ECB** in particular, we note **lower similarity index** in the **days before** a meeting and **higher** in the days **after a meeting**.
- This suggests that although markets find it **more difficult to forecast** the ECB's policy directions **prior to the announcement**, especially **on the day of the announcement**, a **closer consensus** is **reached afterwards**.
- The **pattern is similar** for the **Bank of England**, although the **differences before** and **after the announcement** are not as stark as in the case of the ECB.
- Finally, **little difference** is observed for the **Federal Reserve**.

Average Similarity: [-48h, +48h]



Median Similarity: [-48h, +48h]

