

Product differentiation

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Topic 7. Product differentiation: patterns of price setting

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1. Introduction

- **Aim:** To study an oligopoly model relaxing the homogeneous product assumption, to analyse the effect of product differentiation on price competition intensity and product choice.
- Main implication of the homogeneous product assumption in an oligopoly model of price competition (*à la Bertrand*)
 - Bertrand paradox → Price competition between two firms is a sufficient condition to restore the competitive situation
 $p = c$


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2. Horizontal and vertical product differentiation

- **Horizontal product differentiation:** two products are differentiated horizontally if, when they are offered at the same price consumers **do not agree** on which is the preferred product.
Example:
- **Vertical product differentiation:** two products are differentiated vertically if, when they are offered at the same price consumers **agree** on which is the preferred product.
 - Example:

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
Example



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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : assumptions

- Consumers are uniformly distributed with unit density along a segment of L length



- Two firms (firms 1 and 2) are located along the segment
- The two firms sell a product that is identical except for the location of the firm.
- The two firms have constant and identical marginal cost $c \rightarrow c_1 = c_2 = c$
- Each consumer buys a single unit of the product.

→ Alternative interpretation of the segment as a product characteristic


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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : two-stage game

Stage 1: the two firms choose simultaneously their location (long-run decision)

Stage 2: the two firms choose simultaneously their prices (short-run decision)

We impose maximum product differentiation and so we focus on the determination of the *Nash equilibrium in prices* (Stage 2).



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3. Linear city model with linear transport costs : consumers' utility function

- The utility that a consumer i located in X obtains from the purchase of the good of firm j is given by:

r : reservation price

p_j : price of the product of firm j


x_{ij} : distance (along the segment) between the location of consumer i and the location of firm j

t : transport cost per unit of distance (or alternatively intensity of the preference for a given product)

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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : transport costs


- With linear transport costs per unit of distance :



- Transport cost if the product is bought at firm 1 =
- Transport cost if the product is bought at firm 2 =
- Total cost of the product = price + transport costs
 - Total cost if the product is bought at firm 1 =
 - Total cost if the product is bought at firm 2 =

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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : demands determination



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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : demand properties

- Price elasticity of demand

$$\eta = \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial p_1} \frac{p_1}{d_1} = -\frac{p_1}{p_2 - p_1 + Lt} < 0$$


- Price elasticity of demand and transport costs

$$\frac{\partial |\eta|}{\partial t} = -\frac{L p_1}{(p_2 - p_1 + Lt)^2} < 0$$

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
3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : demands determination

- Total cost of buying at 1 = Total cost of buying at 2
- $$p_1 + tx = p_2 + t(L - x)$$



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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : firm 1 demand



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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Obtaining the Nash equilibrium in prices (I)

- Maximization problem of firm 1
- Maximization problem of firm 2

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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Obtaining the Nash equilibrium in prices (II)

- Solving the system of equations given by the two reaction functions we obtain the price equilibrium: (given locations)
- Profits for both firms are:

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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Obtaining the Nash equilibrium in prices (I)


- Although both products are physically identical, as long as $t > 0$ the price is greater than the marginal cost
- Why?:
 - The larger is t the more differentiated are the products for the consumers $\rightarrow$ the higher is the costs of buying in a further shop.
 - The larger is t the lower in the intensity of competition between firms 1 and 2 (for the consumers located between the two firms).
 - When $t=0$ the products are not differentiated any more $\rightarrow$ price is equal to marginal cost as in the Bertrand model with homogeneous.

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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Analysis of the location decisions (I)

- Two extreme cases:
 - Maximum product differentiation: if $t > 0 \rightarrow p > c$ y $\Pi > 0$
 - Minimum product differentiation: both firms choose the same location $\rightarrow$ no differentiation $\rightarrow$ Bertrand model with homogeneous products


$$p_1^c = p_2^c = c \text{ y } \Pi_1 = \Pi_2 = 0$$



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

3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Analysis of the location decisions (II)

- With a gain of generality we can assume:



where $a \geq 0$, $b \geq 0$ y $L-a-b \geq 0 \rightarrow$ It allows the consideration of captive demands


- If $a+b=L \rightarrow$ minimum differentiation
- If $a=b=0 \rightarrow$ maximum differentiation



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3 Linear city model with linear transport costs : Analysis of the location decisions (III)

- Nash equilibrium in locations is the one in which firm i ($i=1,2$) takes its optimal decision of location and price given its rival's locations and price decisions
- The original result in the Hotelling model (1929): minimum differentiation. Once prices have been chosen, both firms locate in the centre of the segment $\rightarrow L/2$



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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola

- Coca-Cola** and **Pepsi-Cola**, the world leaders on the carbonated colas market, sell horizontally differentiated products.
- Simplifying assumption:** the relevant competition dimension is price ($\rightarrow$ advertising)



- Laffont, Gasmi y Vuong** (1992) analyse price competition between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. They estimated using econometric methods the following demand and marginal costs functions.

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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: demand and costs functions

- Demand functions for Coca-Cola (product 1) and Pepsi-Cola (product 2).

$$Q_1 = 63.42 - 3.98 p_1 + 2.25 p_2$$

$$Q_2 = 49.52 - 5.48 p_2 + 1.40 p_1$$

- Marginal costs for Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola

$$c_1 = 4.96$$

$$c_2 = 3.96$$

- Which is the optimal price for Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola?

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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination

- Step 1: solve the maximization problems of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.

- Coca-Cola's maximization problem:


- Pepsi-cola's maximization problem:

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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (II)

- Step 2: solve the system of reaction functions.

Coca-Cola sets a price higher than the Pepsi-Cola one.



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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (III)

- Why Coca-Cola's price is higher than Pepsi-Cola's one?

- Cost asymmetries
- Demand asymmetries

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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (IV)

- Costs asymmetries:

- Coca-Cola marginal cost (4.96) > Pepsis-Cola marginal cost (3.96)

→ Coca-Cola's price > Pepsi-Cola's price

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
4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (V)

- Demand asymmetries

$$\begin{array}{lcl} Q_1 = 63.42 - 3.98 p_1 + 2.25 p_2 & \xrightarrow{p_1 = p_2 = p} & Q_1 = 63.42 - 1.73p \\ Q_2 = 49.52 - 5.48 p_2 + 1.40 p_1 & & Q_2 = 49.52 - 4.08p \end{array}$$

- Graphic analysis → normalize $p=1$

- $Q_1 = 61.69$ y $Q_2 = 45.44$
- $Q = Q_1 + Q_2 = 107.13$



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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (VI)

- The higher Coca-Cola's price is due to:

- Higher marginal cost (cost asymmetries)
- Demand asymmetries that favour Coca-Cola

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4. Application: Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi-Cola: optimal prices determination (VII)

- Do these asymmetries have any additional impact? → price-cost margin

- The price-cost margin of Coca-Cola is higher than the Pepsi-Cola's one
 - Demand asymmetry in favour of Coca-Cola
 - Higher market power for Coca-Cola

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5. Concluding Remarks

- Product differentiation solves the Bertrand paradox:
 - It allows firms to set price above marginal cost
 - It allows firms to obtain positive profits

- Firm will intend to differentiate their products (from those of its competitors) as much as possible, the aim is to reduce the intensity of price competition:
 - Actual product differentiation
 - Perceived product differentiation: increase consumers' preference for the products of the firm