

EXTERNALITIES

(ANOTHER SOURCE OF MARKET FAILURE)

EXTERNALITY OCCURS WHEN THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT (A PERSON OR A FIRM) **DIRECTLY AFFECTS** THE WELFARE OF ANOTHER AGENT IN SUCH A WAY THAT **IS** **"OUTSIDE"** THE MARKET MECHANISM.

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY : THESE ACTIVITIES IMPOSE **DAMAGES** ON OTHERS

EX: AIR POLLUTION, WATER POLLUTION, IRON BARS INSTALLED ON YOUR HOUSE, NOISE POLLUTION, ROBBERY, SMOKING IN A PUBLIC AREA, DEFORESTATION, LOUD MUSIC AT NIGHT FROM YOUR NEIGHBORS, GANGSTERS, DRINK AND DRIVE, TRAFFIC CONGESTION

POSITIVE EXTERNALITY : THESE ACTIVITIES BENEFIT ON OTHERS,

EX: GROWING TREES, MUSIC IN THE PARK, JANITOR SERVICES, TEACHERS SHARING KNOWLEDGE TO STUDENTS, FIRE-PROOF ROOFS, NATIONAL PARKS, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, CSR, CHURCH SERVICES, TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS FROM FDI, BEE FARMS & FLOWERS FARMS, WATER ABATEMENT, ASKING GOOD QUESTIONS IN CLASS.


NATURE OF EXTERNALITIES

- ① CAN BE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE
- ② CAN BE PRODUCED BY PERSONS OR FIRMS
- ③ CAN BE FROM CONSUMPTION OR PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES

	CONSUMPTION	PRODUCTION
+ve EXTERNALITY	SITTING NEXT TO A PRETTY GIRL	SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
-ve EXTERNALITY	DRINK & DRIVE	AIR POLLUTION NOISE POLLUTION

④ EXTERNALITIES ARE "RECIPROCAL IN NATURE."

EX: 2 AGENTS
 STEEL FIRM
 FISHERY FIRM
 THIS IN SIGHT



IS PROVIDED BY "RONALD H. COASE" (CHICAGO SCHOOL)

A NOBEL PRIZE WINNER

HIS FAMOUS CONTRIBUTION IS "COASE'S THEOREM"

⑤ PUBLIC GOODS { ARE } SPECIAL TYPES OF
EXTERNALITY . { OR
CAN
BE }

VIEWED AS

EX:

MOSQUITO CONTROL
IN A VILLAGE

IF ALL MEMBERS IN THE
VILLAGE RECEIVE BENEFITS,
THEN MOSQUITO CONTROL
IS CONSIDERED AS "PUBLIC
GOOD"

IF ONLY FEW MEMBERS GOT
BENEFITS, MOSQUITO CONTROL
IS CONSIDERED AS "EXTERNALITY"

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES : GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS


CONSIDER STEEL FIRM VS. FISHERY FIRM.
SUPPOSE THAT THE STEEL FIRM DUMPS POLLUTION INTO A RIVER THAT HARM'S A FISHERY FIRM DOWNSTREAM.

STEEL FIRM CARES ONLY ABOUT HIS PROFITS, NOT FISHERY'S PROFIT.
FISHERY FIRM "STEEL FIRM'S PROFITS".

MB = MARGINAL BENEFITS TO STEEL FIRM FROM PRODUCING STEEL.
MPC' = MARGINAL PRIVATE COSTS TO STEEL FIRM

MD = MARGINAL DAMAGE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY FISHERY FIRM

MSC' = MARGINAL SOCIAL COST (WHICH = MPC' + MD)



OBSERVATION #1 TO MAXIMIZE PROFITS, STEEL FIRM WOULD PRODUCE AT THE QUANTITY WHERE $MB = MPC'$

SO, Q_1 IS HIS PROFIT MAXIMIZING OUTPUT LEVEL

OBSERVATION #2 HOWEVER, FROM SOCIETY'S VIEWPOINT, Q^* WHERE $MB = MSC'$ SHOULD BE PRODUCED!

Q^* = SOCIALLY DESIRABLE OUTPUT LEVEL.

OBSERVATION #3 THE STEEL FIRM PRODUCES "TOO MUCH": $Q_1 > Q^*$ (WHY?)

B/C' STEEL FIRM TAKES INTO A/C' ONLY HIS PRIVATE COST WHEN HE MAKES PRODUCTION DECISION.

MD IS NOT TAKING INTO HIS CONSIDERATION.

OBSERVATION #4 THE PREFERRED AMOUNT OF STEEL FROM FISHERY'S PERSPECTIVE = 0. (WHY?)

B/C' TO MAKE MD=0, Q MUST BE EQUAL TO 0!

OBSERVATION #5 Q^* (WHERE $MB = MSC'$) IS THE BEST COMPROMISE BETWEEN STEEL FIRM AND FISHERY FIRM.

OBSERVATION #6

WE OBSERVE THAT "ZERO PRODUCTION OF STEEL"

IS NOT SOCIALLY DESIRABLE!

(NO STEEL $\rightarrow$ NO CARS, NO CHAIRS, AND ETC.
WHICH IS NOT WHAT WE WANT TO BE)


WE HAVE TO LIVE W/ SOME AMOUNT OF POLLUTION.

OBSERVATION #7

(DWL)

DWL OCCURS IF $Q > Q^*$.

FOR EXAMPLE, AT Q_1 ,



$$DWL = \frac{1}{2}gh$$

OBSERVATION #8

IF Q CAN BE REDUCED FROM Q_1 TO Q^* ,

STEEL FIRM WOULD FACE LOSS = $\text{AREA } a d g e - \text{AREA } a c g e = \int_c^d g$ (SINCE $TR > TC$)
THE LOSSES

FISHERY FIRM WOULD GAIN = $\text{area } b f e$ OR $= c d h g$

SINCE GAINS TO OUTWEIGHTS LOSSES TO
FISHERY STEEL FIRM,

THEN MOVING FROM $Q^* \leftarrow Q_1$ IMPROVES EFFICIENCY.

LOSS IN PROFITS

$\leftarrow Q_1$
 $\leftarrow Q^*$
THIS IS
WE FORCE HIM
TO MOVE FROM