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# FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY?



EE 434 Behavioral Finance, SEM1/2021

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
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01

# ALLAIS PARADOX



# Allais Paradox



<https://www.menti.com/pph4yqfryg>



Question 1: Which do you prefer between A and A\*?

Prospect A		Prospect A*	
\$1,000,000	100%	\$ 0	1%
		\$ 1,000,000	89%
		\$ 5,000,000	10%

Question 2: Which do you prefer between B and B\*?

Prospect B		Prospect B*	
\$0	89%	\$ 0	90%
\$1,000,000	11%	\$5,000,000	10%

# Allais Paradox

A large number of people choose  $A$  over  $A^*$  and  $B^*$  over  $B$ .

$$A \succ A^*$$

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
$$B^* \succ B$$

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# Allais Paradox



<https://www.menti.com/fk8zf4ftb4>



Question 1: Which do you prefer between A and A\*?

Prospect A		Prospect A*	
\$1,000,000	89%	\$ 1,000,000	89%
\$1,000,000	11%	\$ 0	1%
		\$ 5,000,000	10%

Question 2: Which do you prefer between B and B\*?

Prospect B		Prospect B*	
\$0	89%	\$ 0	89%
\$1,000,000	11%	\$ 0	1%
		\$5,000,000	10%

# Allias paradox

After removing commonalities, the choices between prospects  $A$  and  $A^*$  or  $B$  and  $B^*$  are exactly the same.

Thus, people should choose  $A$  and  $B$  or  $A^*$  and  $B^*$ .

An axiom known as "\_\_\_\_\_ " is contradicted by the Allais paradox.

# Alias paradox

Suppose a person is indifferent between two prospects, A and B. If we consider another prospect, C, independence implies that this person should also be indifferent between one gamble that combines A with C and another that combines B with C with fixed probability.

02



# RABIN'S CALIBRATION



## Rabin's calibration (Rabin, Econometrica 2000)

People tend to dislike risky prospects even when they involve an expected gain.

e.g. A 50-50 gamble of losing \$100 vs. gaining \$105.


### Standard explanation:

EU theory with a concave utility function.

### Rabin's Point:

This explanation doesn't work, because according to EU theory, anything but virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over large stakes.


# Rabin's calibration (Rabin, Econometrica 2000)



Normal concave utility function is risk-\_\_\_\_\_ for very small stake gambles.

03

# Bernoulli's Error



# Bernoulli's Error

One way to evaluate a prospect is to calculate expected value. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli noted that there was a difference between the actual value of money and the psychological value of money. Bernoulli noticed that people dislike risk, and want to avoid the worst outcomes at great cost, that is, they are **risk-averse**.

This can be explained by **diminishing marginal utility of wealth**. Hence, a **concave utility function** is implicitly assumed in EUT.

Expected Utility Theory has been widely accepted and used for many years, but it has its own issues.

# Bernoulli's Error

Consider this example:

Today **Wanda** and **Loki** each have a wealth of \$5 million.

Yesterday, **Wanda** had \$1 million and **Loki** had \$9 million.

**Are they equally happy?**


# Bernoulli's Error

The expected utility model only takes into account final states of wealth, not changes in wealth.

Wanda and Loki both have final wealth of \$5 mil (same final state). But they had different initial wealth (different changes).

04

# Thought experiments



# Thought experiment A

<https://www.menti.com/dhncr1xqhp>



Problem 1: Choose between...

Sure thing: win \$900

Gamble: 90% win \$1000, 10% win \$0

Problem 2: Choose between...

Sure thing: lose \$900


Gamble: 90% lose \$1000, 10% lose \$0



# Thought experiment A

In Problem 1, most people...  
Choose sure thing  
Explained by risk \_\_\_\_\_

In Problem 2, most people...  
Choose the gamble  
Explained if people are risk \_\_\_\_\_



# Thought experiment B

<https://www.menti.com/hjr6pv8apz>



Problem 3: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given \$1000.  
Choose between...

Sure thing: win \$500

Gamble: 50% win \$1000, 50% win \$0

Problem 4: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given \$2000.  
Choose between...

Sure thing: lose \$500

Gamble: 50% lose \$1000, 50% lose \$0

## Thought experiment B

In this thought experiment, the final payoffs in problem 3 and 4 are exactly the same.

**Sure thing:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Gamble:** 50% \_\_\_\_\_ and 50% \_\_\_\_\_

Findings suggest that people are risk-\_\_\_\_\_ over potential gains, and risk-\_\_\_\_\_ over potential losses.

HOW CAN YOU BE BOTH RISK AVERSE/NEUTRAL IN GAINS AND RISK SEEKING IN LOSSES?



# Thought experiments C

<https://www.menti.com/832zprxsxt>




Would you accept the following bet?

A coin toss where:


If head, win \$110

If tail, lose \$100



# Thought experiments C

People feel the pain of a loss more strongly than the desire of an equally-sized gain.



The slide features a light blue background with decorative elements. On the left, there is a large orange triangle pointing downwards, partially overlapping a green triangle. Below these are several blue and white striped rectangular blocks of varying sizes, some with horizontal lines and others with vertical lines. In the top right corner, there are two overlapping orange circles and a blue line. In the bottom right corner, there is a green triangle pointing upwards, partially overlapping a blue triangle. The word "DANKE!" is written in large, white, bold, sans-serif capital letters on a blue rectangular background in the upper center.

# DANKE!

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