

EE320 Chapter 8

Optimization without Constraint: More-Than-One-Independent-Variable Case

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1 Review

Recall from one-independent variable optimizations without constraints:

$$\begin{aligned}y &= f(x) \\ dy &= f'(x)dx\end{aligned}$$

FOC for an optimum necessary condition

$$\frac{dy}{dx} = f'(x) = 0 \text{ or first-order differential condition for any } dx \neq 0 \text{ and } dy = 0$$

SOC to check sufficient condition

$$\frac{d^2y}{dx^2} = f''(x) < 0 \text{ maximum}$$

$$f''(x) > 0 \text{ minimum}$$

$$f''(x) < 0 \text{ indetermined (max,min,inflection point)}$$

$$\Rightarrow d^2y = d(dy) = d(f'(x)dx) = (df'(x))dx = f''(x)dx$$

2 Two-choice-variable optimization

Suppose that we have a function with 2 choice variables: $z = f(x, y)$

First-order-necessary condition is :

$$\begin{aligned} dz &= f_x dx + f_y dy = 0 \\ \therefore dz &= 0 \text{ when } f_x = f_y = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Theorem: A differentiable function $z = f(x, y)$ can only have a maximum or minimum at an interior point (x_0, y_0) if it is a stationary point. That is, if the point $(x, y) = (x^*, y^*)$ satisfies the two FOC equations:



$$\begin{aligned} f_x(x_0^*, y_0^*) &= 0 \\ f_y(x_0^*, y_0^*) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

ex. $z = f(x, y) = 10x + 10y + xy - x^2 - y^2$


$$\begin{aligned} \text{FOC: } \frac{\partial z}{\partial x} &= 10 + y - 2x = 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad y = 2x - 10 \\ \frac{\partial z}{\partial y} &= 10 + x - 2y = 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad 2y = x + 10 \end{aligned} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} x^* = 10 \\ y^* = 10. \end{array}$$

stationary point is $(x^*, y^*) = (10, 10)$
(critical point)

Next, find whether those points give max, min or saddle point.



$\frac{\partial z}{\partial x} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial z}{\partial y} = 0$ are necessary but not yet sufficient for max/min.



3 Second-Order Conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
 d^2z &= d(dz) \quad \text{suppose } z = f(x, y) \\
 &= \frac{\partial}{\partial x} dz dx + \frac{\partial}{\partial y} dz dy \\
 &= \frac{\partial}{\partial x} (f_x dx + f_y dy) dx + \frac{\partial}{\partial y} (f_x dx + f_y dy) dy \\
 &= (f_{xx} dx + f_{xy} dy) dx + (f_{yx} dx + f_{yy} dy) dy \\
 &= f_{xx} dx^2 + f_{xy} dy dx + f_{yx} dx dy + f_{yy} dy^2 \\
 d^2z &= f_{xx} dx^2 + 2f_{xy} dy dx + f_{yy} dy^2 \\
 &= [dx \quad dy] \begin{bmatrix} f_{xx} & f_{xy} \\ f_{yx} & f_{yy} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dx \\ dy \end{bmatrix} \\
 &\quad \downarrow \\
 &\text{Hessian matrix or principal minor}
 \end{aligned}$$

one-variable case:

$f'' < 0$ max
 $f'' > 0$ min

$$d^2z = \underbrace{f_{xx}} dx^2 + 2 \underbrace{f_{xy}} dy dx + \underbrace{f_{yy}} dy^2 \begin{matrix} > 0 \\ < 0 \end{matrix}$$

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Note $q = au^2 + 2huv + bv^2$

$$= au^2 + 2huv + \frac{h^2}{a}v^2 + bv^2 - \frac{h^2}{a}v^2$$

$$= a(u^2 + \frac{2h}{a}uv + \frac{h^2}{a^2}v^2) - (b - \frac{h^2}{a})v^2$$

$$q = a(u + \frac{h}{a}v)^2 + (\frac{ab-h^2}{a})v^2$$

$q > 0$ when $a > 0$ and $ab - h^2 > 0$

$q < 0$ when $a < 0$ and $ab - h^2 > 0$

$$q = d^2z, \quad u = dx$$

$$a = f_{xx}, \quad v = dy$$

$$b = f_{yy}, \quad h = f_{xy}$$

$$d^2z = f_{xx} \left(dx + \frac{f_{xy}}{f_{xx}} dy \right) + \left(\frac{f_{xx}f_{yy} - f_{xy}^2}{f_{xx}} \right) dy^2$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} dx & dy \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} f_{xx} & f_{xy} \\ f_{xy} & f_{yy} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} dx \\ dy \end{bmatrix}$$

$$|H_1| = f_{xx}$$

First leading principal minor $|H_1| = f_{xx}$ $|H_2| = f_{xx}f_{yy} - f_{xy}^2$

Second leading principal minor $|H_2| = f_{xx}f_{yy} - f_{xy}^2$

Second-order sufficient condition

Given that FOC is satisfied

$$f_{xx} < 0 \text{ and } f_{xx}f_{yy} > f_{xy}^2$$

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 \ominus
 \oplus

1. maximum when $d^2z < 0$ iff $f_{xx} < 0$

$$f_{yy} < 0$$

$$f_{xx}f_{yy} > (f_{xy})^2 \text{ or } |H_2| > 0$$

2. minimum when $d^2z > 0$ iff $f_{xx} > 0$

$$f_{xx} > 0 \text{ and } f_{xx}f_{yy} > f_{xy}^2$$

\oplus
 \oplus
 \oplus

$$f_{yy} > 0$$

$$f_{xx}f_{yy} > (f_{xy})^2 \text{ or } |H_2| > 0$$

Optimization.

one-variable case

$$y = f(x)$$

$$\max_x f(x)$$

$$\text{FOC: } f'(x) = 0. \Rightarrow x^*$$

$$\text{SOC: } \begin{array}{ll} f''(x) < 0 & \text{max} \\ f''(x) > 0 & \text{min.} \\ f''(x) = 0 & \text{inflection} \\ & \text{point.} \end{array}$$

2-variable case.

$$y = f(x_1, x_2)$$

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} f(x_1, x_2)$$

$$\text{FOC: } \left. \begin{array}{l} f_1 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_1} = 0 \\ f_2 = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_2} = 0 \end{array} \right\} x_1^*, x_2^*$$

$$\text{SOC: } f_{11} < 0 \text{ and } f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 > 0 \\ \Rightarrow \text{max.}$$

$$f_{11} > 0 \text{ and } f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 > 0 \\ \Rightarrow \text{min}$$

3. otherwise, saddle point

ex. $f(x, y) = 10x + 10y + xy - x^2 - y^2$

FOC:
$$\begin{cases} f_x = 10 + y - 2x \\ f_y = 10 + x - 2y \end{cases} \quad \hat{x} = \hat{y} = 10.$$

SOC:
$$\begin{aligned} f_{xx} &= -2 \\ f_{xy} &= 1 \\ f_{yx} &= 1 \\ f_{yy} &= -2 \end{aligned}$$

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} -2 & 1 \\ 1 & -2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$|H_1| = |f_{xx}| = -2 < 0$$

$$|H_2| = \begin{vmatrix} f_{xx} & f_{xy} \\ f_{yx} & f_{yy} \end{vmatrix} = f_{xx}f_{yy} - f_{xy}^2 = 4 - 1 = 3 > 0$$

$(10, 10) \Rightarrow \text{max}$

ex. $f(x, y) = -2x^2 - 2xy - 2y^2 + 32x + 42y - 158$

$x^* = 5$

$y^* = 8$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} |H_1| &< 0 \\ |H_2| &= 12 > 0 \end{aligned} \right\} \text{max}$$

ex. $f(x, y) = -x^2 + xy - y^2 + 3x$

$$\begin{aligned} (2, 1) \quad z^* &= 3 \\ |H_1| &< 0 \\ |H_2| &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

4 Concavity and Convexity: 2-independent-variable-case


Consider a function with 2 choice variable: $f(x_1, x_2)$

⇒ global max

Definition the function is (strictly) **concave** iff for any pair of distinct points M & N on its graph or surface, line segment MN lies either below or entirely below

⇒ global min

Definition the function is (strictly) **convex** iff for any pair of distinct points M & N on its graph or surface, line segment MN lies either above or entirely above



or $\underbrace{\alpha f(x) + (1 - \alpha)f(x')}_{\text{“Height of MN”}} < \underbrace{f(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)x')}_{\text{“Height of arc”}} \Rightarrow$ strictly concave
 for $\forall \alpha \in [0, 1]$
 $\alpha f(x) + (1 - \alpha)f(x') > f(\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)x') \Rightarrow$ strictly convex

If we use derivative conditions;

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Consider

$z = f(x_1, x_2)$ - twice continuously differentiable $\rightarrow d^2z$ is defined.

$z = f(x_1, x_2)$ is strictly concave iff d^2z is everywhere definite negative
 or $d^2z < 0$ $f_{11} < 0$ and $f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 > 0 \quad \forall x_1, x_2$

$\Rightarrow z^*$ is max.

$z = f(x_1, x_2)$ is strictly convex iff d^2z is everywhere definite positive or
 $d^2z > 0$ $f_{11} > 0$ and $f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 > 0 \quad \forall x_1, x_2$

$\Rightarrow z^*$ is min.

ex. $z = x_1^2 - x_2^2$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} f_1 = 2x_1 = 0 \\ f_2 = -2x_2 = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} x_1^* = 0 \\ x_2^* = 0 \end{array}$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} f_{11} = 2 \\ f_{22} = -2 \\ f_{12} = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} f_{11} = 2 > 0 \quad \checkmark \\ f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 = (2)(-2) - 0 = -4 < 0 \quad \times \\ \forall x_1, x_2 \quad \text{strictly concave} \Rightarrow \text{global min.} \end{array}$$

ex. $z = x_1^2 + x_2^2$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} f_1 = 2x_1 = 0 \\ f_2 = 2x_2 = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} x_1^* = 0 \\ x_2^* = 0 \end{array}$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} f_{11} = 2 \\ f_{22} = 2 \\ f_{12} = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} f_{11} = 2 > 0 \quad \checkmark \\ f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 = 2(2) - 0 = 4 > 0 \quad \checkmark \\ \forall x_1, x_2 \quad \text{strictly convex} \Rightarrow \text{global min.} \\ \text{at } (0,0) \end{array}$$

ex. $z = 2x^2 - xy + y^2$ (convex)

Application: Duopoly

There are 2 firms with identical cost $TC_i = cQ_i$, where $i = \underline{1, 2}$ and market demand $P = a - bQ$, $Q = Q_1 + Q_2$ Find Q_1, Q_2 that maximizes each firm's profit.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Firm 1: } \Pi_1 &= P(Q) \cdot Q_1 - cQ_1 \\ &= [a - b(Q_1 + Q_2)]Q_1 - cQ_1 \\ \Pi_1 &= (a - c)Q_1 - bQ_1^2 - bQ_1Q_2 \end{aligned}$$

$$\max_{Q_1} \Pi_1 = (a - c)Q_1 - bQ_1^2 - bQ_1Q_2$$

FOC $\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_1} = (a - c) - 2bQ_1 - bQ_2 = 0$

$$\Rightarrow Q_1^* = \frac{(a - c) - bQ_2}{2b}$$

firm's best response function

$$Q_1^* = \frac{(a - c) - b\left(\frac{(a - c) - bQ_1}{2b}\right)}{2b}$$

Firm 2: $\Pi_2 = P(Q) \cdot Q_2 - cQ_2$

FOC $Q_2^* = \frac{(a - c) - bQ_1}{2b}$

firm's best response function

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{(a - c) - \frac{(a - c) - bQ_1}{2}}{2b} \\ &= \frac{2a - 2c - a + c + \frac{1}{2}bQ_1}{4b} \end{aligned}$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} Q_1^* &= \frac{a - c}{3b} \\ Q_2^* &= \frac{a - c}{3b} \end{aligned} \right\}$$

$$\Pi_1 = (a - c)Q_1 - bQ_1^2 - bQ_1Q_2$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial Q_1} = (a-c) - 2bQ_1 - bQ_2$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1^2} = -2b \quad \checkmark \quad \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1 \partial Q_2} = -b \quad \checkmark$$

$$Q_1 = \frac{a-c + bQ_2}{4b}$$

$$4bQ_1 = a-c + bQ_2$$

$$Q_1 = \frac{a-c}{3b}$$

SOC: π_1

$$f_{11} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1^2} = -2b$$

$$f_{22} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_2^2} = 0$$

$$f_{12} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1 \partial Q_2} = -b$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1^2} < 0$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1^2} \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_2^2} - \left(\frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial Q_1 \partial Q_2} \right)^2 = (-2b)(0) - (-b)^2 = -b^2 < 0$$

ex. Given the following information, market demand $P = 150 - Q$, $Q = Q_1 + Q_2$, $P = P_1 = P_2$ and $TC_1 = 60Q_1$, $TC_2 = 60Q_2$. Find optimal quantity that each firm should produce. Also check for their SOC.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1 &= (150 - Q_1 - Q_2)Q_1 - 60Q_1 \\ &= 150Q_1 - Q_1^2 - Q_1Q_2 - 60Q_1 \\ &= -Q_1^2 - Q_1Q_2 + 90Q_1 \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial Q_1} = -2Q_1 - Q_2 + 90 = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} Q_1^* &= \frac{Q_2 - 90}{-2} \\ &= \frac{90 - Q_2}{2} \end{aligned}$$

$$\pi_2 = (150 - Q_1 - Q_2)Q_2 - 60Q_2$$

$$\therefore Q_2^* = \frac{90 - Q_1}{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Q_1^* &= 30 \\ Q_2^* &= 30 \end{aligned}$$

SOC $\frac{\partial^2 \pi_2}{\partial Q_2^2} = -2 \checkmark < 0$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_2}{\partial Q_1^2} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_2}{\partial Q_1 \partial Q_2} = -1$$

$$f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 = (-2)(-2) - (-1)^2 = 4 - 1 = 3 > 0$$

Application: Duopoly-extension

1. Cournot: Move at the same time
2. Stackelberg: One seller can move first

Suppose that there are two firms and they face the market demand $P = 30 - Q$, where $Q = q_1 + q_2$. Their marginal cost structures are the same: $MC_1 = MC_2 = 3$. Consider the following scenarios:

- 1) Both move simultaneously
- 2) Firm 1 leads/moves first
- 3) Firm 2 leads/moves first
- 4) Both try to lead

$$\begin{aligned} &\max f(x_1, x_2) \\ &\text{FOC: } \begin{cases} f_1 = 0 \\ f_2 = 0 \end{cases} \quad \left. \begin{matrix} x_1^* \\ x_2^* \end{matrix} \right\} \\ &\text{SOC: } \begin{cases} f_{11} < 0 \\ f_{11}f_{22} - f_{12}^2 > 0 \end{cases} \quad \left. \begin{matrix} \text{max} \\ \text{min} \end{matrix} \right\} \text{ otherwise, saddle point.} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{cases} P = 30 - q_1 - q_2 \\ MC_1 = MC_2 = 3 \end{cases}$$

revenue cost $\downarrow \frac{\Delta TC}{\Delta q}$

(1) Cournot: $\pi_1 = P \cdot q_1 - C_1$ $TC = MC_1 \cdot q_1$


$$= (30 - q_1 - q_2) \cdot q_1 - 3q_1$$

$$= 30q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1q_2 - 3q_1$$

$$0.5q_2 = 13.5 - q_1$$

$$q_2 = 27 - 2q_1$$

(2) Draw reaction fns



FOC $\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial q_1} = 30 - 2q_1 - q_2 - 3 = 0$

$$q_1 = 13.5 - 0.5q_2$$

$\pi_2 = P \cdot q_2 - C_2$

$$= (30 - q_1 - q_2) \cdot q_2 - 3q_2$$

FOC $\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial q_2} \Rightarrow$

$$q_2 = 13.5 - 0.5q_1$$

reaction functions

① directly sub.

$$\begin{cases} q_1 = 13.5 - 0.5q_2 \\ q_2 = 13.5 - 0.5q_1 \end{cases}$$

$$q_1^* = 9, q_2^* = 9$$

$$\pi_1 = 30q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1q_2 - 3q_1$$

$$\pi_1 = 76$$

$$\pi_2 = 76$$

SOC.

* (2) Firm 1 moves first.

$$\pi_1 = (30 - q_1 - q_2) \cdot q_1 - 3q_1$$

Assure perfect knowledge \Rightarrow ① knows reaction fn of ② and take ②'s behavior into a/c.

$$\pi_1 = [30 - q_1 - (13.5 - 0.5q_1)] q_1 - 3q_1$$

$$= 30q_1 - q_1^2 - 13.5q_1 + 0.5q_1^2 - 3q_1$$

FOC $\frac{\partial \pi_1}{\partial q_1} = 30 - 2q_1 - 13.5 + q_1 - 3 = 0$

2's reaction function

$$q_1^* = 13.5 \Rightarrow q_2^* = 13.5 - 0.5(13.5) = \underline{6.75}$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \pi_1^* = 91.125 \\ \pi_2^* = 45.5625 \end{array} \right)$$

$$Q = q_1 + q_2 = 13.5 + 6.75$$

* (3) Firm 2 moves first.

$$q_1 = 13.5 - 0.5q_2 \quad \text{1's reaction function}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_2 &= P \cdot q_2 - C_2 = (30 - q_1 - q_2) q_2 - 3q_2 \\ &= (30 - (13.5 + 0.5q_2) - q_2) q_2 - 3q_2 \end{aligned}$$

FOC $\frac{\partial \pi_2}{\partial q_2} = 0$

$$q_2^* = 13.5 \Rightarrow q_1 = 13.5 - 0.5(13.5) = \underline{6.75}$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \pi_2^* = 86.125 \\ \pi_1^* = 58.5625 \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow \left(\begin{array}{l} 91.125 \\ 45.5625 \end{array} \right)$$

(4) Both firms try to lead.

$$\textcircled{1} \quad \pi_1 = (30 - q_1 - (13.5 - 0.5q_1)) q_1 - 3q_1 \xrightarrow{\text{FOC}} q_1^* = 13.5$$

$$\pi_2 = (30 - (13.5 - 0.5q_2) - q_2) q_2 - 3q_2 \xrightarrow{\text{FOC}} q_2^* = 13.5$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_1^* = -5 = 0$$

$$\pi_2^* = -5 = 0$$

PC.
✓ nonopoly.
✓ monopolistic c-
Oligoly.

Firm $\xrightarrow{1^{st}}$ lead $\Rightarrow q_1^*, q_2^*$
 $\xrightarrow{2^{nd}}$ follow $\Rightarrow q_1', q_2'$

"Game theory." Nash

	lead	follow
①	lead $(0, 0)$	follow $(86.125, 58.5625)$
②	lead $(58.5625, 86.125)$	follow $(76, 76)$

"Nash equilibrium" EE311.

Application: Multiproduct firm

1. Suppose a firm produce two goods where both of them are selling into perfectly competitive markets. Given all the following information of market structure: $P_1 = 6$, $P_2 = 9$ and $TC = 2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2$. Find Q_1 and Q_2 that maximize its profit Π

$$\square \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = TR_1 + TR_2 - TC$$

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = 6Q_1 + 9Q_2 - (2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2)$$

PC.

$$Q_1^*, Q_2^* : \text{FOC. } \begin{cases} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_1} = 6 - 4Q_1 - Q_2 = 0 \\ \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_2} = 9 - Q_1 - 4Q_2 = 0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} 4 & 1 \\ 1 & 4 \end{cases} \begin{bmatrix} Q_1 \\ Q_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 6 \\ 9 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\Downarrow \\ Q_1^* = 1, Q_2^* = 2.$$

$$\text{SOC. } \left. \begin{matrix} \Pi_{11} = -4 \\ \Pi_{22} = -4 \\ \Pi_{12} = -1 \end{matrix} \right\} \begin{matrix} \Pi_{11} < 0 \\ \Pi_{11}\Pi_{22} - \Pi_{12}^2 = (-4)(-4) - (-1)^2 > 0 \\ \frac{16 - 1}{16 - 1} = 15 \end{matrix} \Rightarrow (1, 2) \text{ yield max. profit}$$

Suppose instead that this particular firm operate as a monopoly for both goods. Consider all the following information: $P_1 = 35 - Q_1$, $P_2 = 33 - Q_2$ and $TC = 2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2$. Find Q_1 and Q_2 that maximize Π

$$\Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = TR_1 + TR_2 - TC$$

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = (35 - Q_1)Q_1 + (33 - Q_2)Q_2 - (2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2)$$

M

$$Q_1^*, Q_2^* : \text{FOC } \begin{cases} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_1} = 35 - 2Q_1 - Q_2 = 0 \\ \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_2} = 33 - Q_1 - 4Q_2 = 0 \end{cases} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} 6Q_1 + Q_2 = 35 \\ Q_1 + 6Q_2 = 33 \end{cases}$$

$$35Q_1 - Q_1^2 - 33Q_2 + Q_2^2 - 2Q_1^2 - Q_1Q_2 - 2Q_2^2$$

$$-3Q_1^2 - Q_2^2 - 35Q_1 - 33Q_2$$


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$$\begin{bmatrix} 6 & 1 \\ 1 & 6 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Q_1 \\ Q_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 35 \\ 33 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{matrix} Q_1^* = 5.05 \\ Q_2^* = 4.66 \end{matrix} \left. \vphantom{\begin{matrix} Q_1^* \\ Q_2^* \end{matrix}} \right\} \text{max profit}$$

SOC

$$\left. \begin{matrix} \pi_{11} = -6 \\ \pi_{22} = -6 \\ \pi_{12} = -1 \end{matrix} \right\} \begin{matrix} \pi_{11} < 0 \\ \pi_{11}\pi_{22} - \pi_{12}^2 > 0 \end{matrix}$$

multi product: $q_1 \rightarrow p_1, q_2 \rightarrow p_2$



Application: Multiplant firm

Consider a firm that operate in perfectly competitive market with $P = 25$ and has two factories which each has the following cost structures $(TC_1) = 2Q_1^2 + 5Q_1 + 10$ and $(TC_2) = 2Q_2^2 + 3Q_2 + 15$. Find Q_1 and Q_2 that maximize firm's profit: $\Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = TR_1 - TC_1 - TC_2$

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = 25(Q_1 + Q_2) - (2Q_1^2 + 5Q_1 + 10) - (2Q_2^2 + 3Q_2 + 15)$$

FOC

$$\begin{matrix} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_1} = 20 - 4Q_1 = 0 \Rightarrow Q_1^* = 5 \\ \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_2} = 22 - 4Q_2 = 0 \Rightarrow Q_2^* = 5.5 \end{matrix} \left. \vphantom{\begin{matrix} Q_1^* \\ Q_2^* \end{matrix}} \right\} \text{max}$$

SOC

$$H \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} -4 & 0 \\ 0 & -4 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{matrix} \pi_{11} = -4 \\ \pi_{11}\pi_{22} - \pi_{12}^2 > 0 \end{matrix}$$

Application: Multimarket Monopoly or Price discrimination

Suppose that a firm has certain market power over 2 goods. The total revenue for goods 1 and 2 is $R = R_1(Q_1) + R_2(Q_2)$ and $C = C(Q)$ where $Q = Q_1 + Q_2$. Find FONC and SOSOC for maximum profit Π

$$\Pi = R_1(Q_1) + R_2(Q_2) - C(Q) = R_1(Q_1) + R_2(Q_2) - C(Q_1 + Q_2)$$

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2)$$

FONC

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_1} = R_1' - C' \frac{\partial Q}{\partial Q_1} = 0 \Rightarrow R_1' = C' \Leftrightarrow MR_1 = MC$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Q_2} = R_2' - C' \frac{\partial Q}{\partial Q_2} = 0 \Rightarrow R_2' = C' \Leftrightarrow MR_2 = MC$$

$MR_1 = MR_2 = MC$

Solve for (Q_1^*, Q_2^*) : Firms need to produce until: $MR_1 = MR_2 = MC$

SOSOC

$$\Pi_{11} = R_1'' - C''$$

$$\Pi_{22} = R_2'' - C''$$

$$\Pi_{12} = \Pi_{21} = \frac{\partial}{\partial Q_1} [R_2' - C'(Q)] = -C''(Q)$$

SOSOC is satisfied when (1) $R_1'' - C'' \stackrel{\Pi_{11}}{<} 0 \checkmark$

2. $R_2'' - C'' \stackrel{\Pi_{22}}{<} 0$

(3) $\Pi_{11}\Pi_{22} - \Pi_{12}^2 > 0 \checkmark$

$\Rightarrow Q_1^*, Q_2^*$ give maximum profit.

Chapter 8

ex. $P_1 = 22 - 2Q_1$, $P_2 = 10 - 0.5Q_2$ and $TC = 2Q + 5$. Find Q_1, Q_2, P_1 and P_2 that maximize firm's profit.

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = (22 - 2Q_1)Q_1 + (10 - 0.5Q_2)Q_2 - (2Q_1 + 2Q_2 + 5)$$

$$Q_1^* = 5, Q_2^* = 8, \text{ SOC } \checkmark \quad \left[\begin{array}{c} \Pi_{11} \\ \Pi_{11}\Pi_{22} - \Pi_{12}^2 \end{array} \right]$$

Application: Input decision of a firm

Let $Q = f(K, L) = 5K^{0.5}L^{0.25}$, $P = 4$, $w = 10$, $r = 5$. Find K^* , L^* max profit.

$$\Pi = \underbrace{P \cdot Q}_{\text{Revenue}} - \underbrace{TC}_{\text{Cost}}$$

$$TC = r \cdot K + w \cdot L$$

$$= 4 \cdot (5K^{0.5}L^{0.25}) - (10K + 5L)$$

$$\max_{K, L} \Pi(K, L)$$

$$\text{FONC: } \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial K} = 10K^{-0.5}L^{0.25} - 5 = 0 \Rightarrow 2K^{-0.5}L^{0.25} - 1 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial L} = 5K^{0.5}L^{-0.75} - 10 = 0 \Rightarrow K^{0.5}L^{-0.75} - 2 = 0$$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} K^* = 4 \\ L^* = 1 \end{array}}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \max f(x_1, x_2) \\ \text{FOC: } f_1 = 0 \Rightarrow \text{SOC} \\ f_2 = 0. \end{array}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{SOSC} \quad \Pi_{KK} &= -5K^{-1.5}L^{0.25} \Rightarrow \Pi_{KK}(K^* = 4, L^* = 1) = -\frac{5}{8} < 0 \\ \Pi_{LL} &= -3.75K^{0.5}L^{-1.75} \Rightarrow \Pi_{LL}(K^* = 4, L^* = 1) = -\frac{15}{2} < 0 \\ \Pi_{KL} &= 2.5K^{-0.5}L^{-0.75} \Rightarrow \Pi_{KL}(K^* = 4, L^* = 1) = -\frac{5}{4} \end{aligned}$$

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{5}{8} & \frac{5}{4} \\ \frac{5}{4} & -\frac{15}{2} \end{bmatrix} \quad |H_1| < 0, |H_2| > 0 \therefore \Pi(4, 1) \text{ is max.}$$

5 Comparative-Static Aspects of Optimization

We can use partial differentiation to study how a change in exogenous variables affect the equilibrium outcome in the model.

ex. Consider a perfectly competitive markets. P_1 and P_2 are exogenous variables. The total revenue of the firm is $R = P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2$, and its cost is $C = 2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2$. Find how equilibrium quantity of goods 1 and 2 will be affected after a change in market prices P_1 and P_2 .

$$\max_{Q_1, Q_2} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2) = P_1Q_1 + P_2Q_2 - (2Q_1^2 + Q_1Q_2 + 2Q_2^2)$$

$Q_1^*, Q_2^* : \text{FOC}$

$$Q_1^* = \frac{4P_1 - P_2}{15} \quad \checkmark$$

$$Q_2^* = \frac{4P_2 - P_1}{15} \quad \checkmark$$

$$\begin{array}{cc} \frac{\partial Q_1^*}{\partial P_1}, \frac{\partial Q_1^*}{\partial P_2} & \leftarrow \\ \frac{\partial Q_2^*}{\partial P_1}, \frac{\partial Q_2^*}{\partial P_2} & \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cc} \frac{\partial Q_1^*}{\partial P_1} = \frac{4}{15} & \frac{\partial Q_2^*}{\partial P_1} = -\frac{4}{15} \\ \frac{\partial Q_1^*}{\partial P_2} = -\frac{1}{15} & \frac{\partial Q_2^*}{\partial P_2} = \frac{1}{15} \end{array}$$

Chapter 8

ex. Consider $R = P \cdot Q(K, L)$ where $P, w,$ and r are exogenous. Find $\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial P}, \frac{\partial K^*}{\partial P}$. Given, $C = wL + rK$

Revenue Cost.
 $\max_{K,L} \Pi(K, L) = P \cdot Q(K, L) - (wL + rK)$

FONC $\Pi_K = P \cdot Q_K - r = 0 \Rightarrow P \cdot Q_K = r \Rightarrow K^*$
 $\Pi_L = P \cdot Q_L - w = 0 \Rightarrow P \cdot Q_L = w \Rightarrow L^*$

$\Rightarrow K^* = K^*(P, w, r), L^* = L^*(P, w, r)$

If P changes, while w and r remain constant; what will happen to K^*, L^* ?

$K^* = K^*(P) = K^*(P, \bar{w}, \bar{r})$

$L^* = L^*(P) = L^*(P, \bar{w}, \bar{r})$

For FONC:

Total derivative $\cdot \Pi_K = P \cdot Q_K(K^*(P), L^*(P)) - r = 0 \Rightarrow K^*$
 $\Pi_L = P \cdot Q_L(K^*(P), L^*(P)) - w = 0$ Total derivative.

$\frac{d\Pi_K}{dP} = \frac{d}{dP} [P \cdot Q_K(K^*(P), L^*(P)) - r]$
 $= P \cdot \left[\frac{dQ_K}{dK} \frac{dK}{dP} + \frac{dQ_K}{dL} \frac{dL}{dP} \right] - \frac{dr}{dP}$
 $\frac{d\Pi_K}{dP} = P \cdot Q_{KK} \frac{dK^*}{dP} + P \cdot Q_{KL} \frac{dL^*}{dP} + Q_K$

$\frac{d\Pi_L}{dP} = P \cdot Q_{KL} \frac{dK^*}{dP} + P \cdot Q_{LL} \frac{dL^*}{dP} + Q_L$

$\begin{bmatrix} P \cdot Q_{KK} & P \cdot Q_{LK} \\ P \cdot Q_{KL} & P \cdot Q_{LL} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{dK^*}{dP} \\ \frac{dL^*}{dP} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -Q_K \\ -Q_L \end{bmatrix}$

$\frac{d\Pi_K}{dP} = P \cdot Q_{KK} \frac{dK}{dP} + P \cdot Q_{KL} \frac{dL}{dP} - 0$
 $\frac{d\Pi_K}{dP} = P \cdot Q_{KK} \frac{dK}{dP} + P \cdot Q_{KL} \frac{dL}{dP}$
 $P \cdot \frac{dQ_K}{dP} + Q_K \frac{dP}{dP} - r$
 $P \cdot \left[\frac{dQ_K}{dK} \frac{dK}{dL} + \frac{dQ_K}{dL} \frac{dL}{dP} \right] + Q_K$

check the answers & signs.

Chapter 8

$$\frac{dK^*}{dP} = \frac{-P \cdot Q_{KK} Q_{LL} + P \cdot Q_{LK} Q_{LK}}{P^2(Q_{KK} Q_{LL} - Q_{LK}^2)} > 0 \quad \text{if } Q_{LK} > 0$$

$$\frac{dL^*}{dP} = (-P Q_{LL} Q_{KK} + P Q_{LK} Q_{LK}) / [P^2(Q_{KK} Q_{LL} - Q_{LK}^2)] > 0 \quad \text{if } Q_{LK} > 0$$

∴ L and K are complement

6 Multivariable Optimization

Let a function with 3 choice variables:

$$z = f(x_1, x_2, x_3)$$

$$dz = f_1 dx_1 + f_2 dx_2 + f_3 dx_3$$

✓ FONC: $dz = 0 \Leftrightarrow f_1 = f_2 = f_3 = 0 \Rightarrow x_1^*, x_2^*, x_3^*$

✓ SOSC:

$$d^2z = \frac{\partial}{\partial x_1}(dz)dx_1 + \frac{\partial}{\partial x_2}(dz)dx_2 + \frac{\partial}{\partial x_3}(dz)dx_3$$

$$= [dx_1 \quad dx_2 \quad dx_3] \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & f_{13} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{23} \\ f_{31} & f_{32} & f_{33} \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Hessian Matrix}} \begin{bmatrix} dx_1 \\ dx_2 \\ dx_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Given any Hessian matrix:

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & f_{13} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{23} \\ f_{31} & f_{32} & f_{33} \end{bmatrix}$$

$|H_1| = |f_{11}|$ first leading principle minor.

$|H_2| = \begin{vmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} \end{vmatrix}$ second

$|H_3| = \begin{vmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & f_{13} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{23} \\ f_{31} & f_{32} & f_{33} \end{vmatrix}$ third

max $f(x_1, x_2)$
 FOC: $f_1 = 0, f_2 = 0$
 SOC: max $f_k < 0$
 $f_1 f_2 - f_3^2 > 0$
 min $f_k > 0$
 $f_1 f_2 - f_3^2 > 0$

x_1^+, x_2^+, x_3^-

x_1^+, x_2^+, x_3^+

$d^2 z < 0$ (max)	$d^2 z > 0$ (min)
$ H_1 < 0$ (-) ✓	$\rightarrow H_1 > 0$ (+)
$ H_2 > 0$ (+)	$\rightarrow H_2 > 0$ (+)
$ H_3 < 0$ (-)	$\rightarrow H_3 > 0$ (+)
"negative definite"	"positive definite"
\Rightarrow all principal minors alternate its sign	\Rightarrow all principal minor must be positive

$f_{11} f_{22} - f_{12}^2$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} |H_1| &= f_{11} \\ |H_2| &= \begin{vmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} \end{vmatrix} \\ |H_3| &= \begin{vmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & f_{13} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{23} \\ f_{31} & f_{32} & f_{33} \end{vmatrix} \end{aligned} \right\}$$

Summary $f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n)$

	max	min
FONC	$f_1 = f_2 = \dots = f_n = 0$	$f_1 = f_2 = \dots = f_n = 0$
SOSC	$ H_1 < 0, H_2 > 0$ $ H_3 < 0, \dots, H_n > 0$ or $(-1)^i H_i > 0$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$	$ H_1 > 0, H_2 > 0$ $, H_3 > 0, \dots$ or $ H_i > 0$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$

$(-1)^i |H_i| > 0$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$

ex. $f(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5)$: max. conditions?

$|H_1| < 0$
 $|H_2| > 0$
 $|H_3| < 0$
 $|H_4| > 0$
 $|H_5| < 0$ ✗
 $(-1)^i |H_i| > 0$ $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$
 $i = 1 \Rightarrow (-1)^1 |H_1| > 0$
 $|H_1| < 0$ ✓
 $i = 5 \Rightarrow (-1)^5 |H_5| > 0$
 $|H_5| < 0$ ✓

otherwise, saddle point.

min conditions?

$|H_1| > 0$
 $|H_2| > 0$
 $|H_3| > 0$
 $|H_4| > 0$
 $|H_5| > 0$

Chapter 8

ex. $y = x_1^2 + 6x_2^2 + 3x_3^2 - 2x_1x_2 - 4x_2x_3$

$f(x_1, x_2, x_3)$

$f_1 = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_1} = 2x_1 - 2x_2 = 0$

$f_2 = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_2} = 12x_2 - 2x_1 - 4x_3 = 0$

$f_3 = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_3} = 6x_3 - 4x_2 = 0$

x_1^*, x_2^*, x_3^*

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} f_{11} = 2 \\ f_{22} = 12 \\ f_{33} = 6 \\ f_{12} = -2 \\ f_{13} = 0 \\ f_{21} = -2 \\ f_{23} = -4 \\ f_{31} = 0 \\ f_{32} = -4 \end{array} \right\} H = \begin{bmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & f_{13} \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{23} \\ f_{31} & f_{32} & f_{33} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & -2 & 0 \\ -2 & 12 & -4 \\ 0 & -4 & 6 \end{bmatrix}$$

$|H_1| = 2 > 0$

$|H_2| = \begin{vmatrix} 2 & -2 \\ -2 & 12 \end{vmatrix} = 20 > 0$

$|H_3| = |H| = 88 > 0$

$\left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} \oplus$

$\therefore d^2y > 0$ positive definite (min)

Application: Multimarket Monopoly

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Let } P_1 &= 63 - 4Q_1 \\ P_2 &= 105 - 5Q_2 \\ P_3 &= 75 - Q_3 \\ TC &= 15Q + 20 \end{aligned}$$

Find Q_i and P_i for $i = 1, 2, 3$ that max Π

$$\begin{aligned} &\max_{Q_1, Q_2, Q_3} \Pi(Q_1, Q_2, Q_3) \\ &= (63 - 4Q_1)Q_1 + (105 - 5Q_2)Q_2 + (75 - Q_3)Q_3 - [15(Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3) + 20] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{FONC} \quad \Pi_1 &= 48 - 8Q_1 \Rightarrow Q_1^* = 6 \\ \Pi_2 &= 90 - 10Q_2 \Rightarrow Q_2^* = 9 \\ \Pi_3 &= 60 - 20Q_3 \Rightarrow Q_3^* = 30 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{SOSC} \quad \Pi_{11} &= -8 \\ \Pi_{22} &= -10 \\ \Pi_{33} &= -2 \\ \Pi_{12} &= \Pi_{13} = 0 \\ \Pi_{21} &= \Pi_{23} = 0 \\ \Pi_{31} &= \Pi_{33} = 0 \end{aligned} \left. \vphantom{\begin{aligned} \Pi_{11} \\ \Pi_{22} \\ \Pi_{33} \\ \Pi_{12} \\ \Pi_{21} \\ \Pi_{31} \end{aligned}} \right\} H = \begin{bmatrix} -8 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -10 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$|H_1| = -8 < 0 \quad \checkmark \quad \ominus$$

$$|H_2| = 80 > 0 \quad \checkmark \quad \oplus$$

$$|H_3| = -160 < 0 \quad \checkmark \quad \ominus$$

$\therefore d^2z < 0$ negative definite (max.)

Quiz 3 on Nov 17, 2020 - Ch 8.

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