

Why Do Manufacturers Issue Coupons? An Empirical Analysis of Breakfast Cereals by

Nevo and Wolfram (2002)

This paper explores the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers' coupons for 25 ready- to-eat breakfast cereals. It finds that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available. However, the result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions. Lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales, suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase.

Equation (1)

$$SHELF\ PRICE_{bct} = \gamma_{b(c)} + \phi_{c(t)} + \delta_{t(b)} + \theta DOLLARS\ OFF_{bct} + \varepsilon_{bct},$$

where

- SHELF PRICE_{bct} is the average shelf price for cereal brand b in city c during quarter t
- DOLLARS OFF_{bct} is the expected value of the coupon available for cereal brand b in city c during quarter t. The variable takes on a value of zero when there is no coupon available.
- We also estimate versions of equation (1) in which we substitute PROB OF COUPON_{bct}, which reflects the probability that there is a coupon for a given city, brand, and quarter. γ_b and γ_c capture brand- and city-specific factors that affect demand or the cost of selling cereal. δ_t is included to capture the trend in cereal prices over the time period we consider. We also present estimates that allow the brand-fixed effects to vary by city (we estimate γ_{bc}), the city-fixed effects to vary across quarters (we estimate ϕ_{ct}), and the quarter effects to vary by brand (we estimate δ_{bt})

Equation (2)

$$Y_{bct} = C + \sum_{\ell=1}^m \Phi_{\ell} Y_{bc,t-\ell} + \gamma_{bc} + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{bct},$$

where

$$Y_{bct} = \begin{bmatrix} PROB\ OF\ COUPON_{bct} \\ SHELF\ PRICE_{bct} \\ VOLUME_{bct} \end{bmatrix}$$

To conclude, The overall results suggest that coupons are driven by some combination of (1) strategic interactions between manufacturers, (2) incentives given to the people within firms who make decisions about coupons, and (3) the effects of coupons on repeat purchases. The authors are less convinced that explanations based on the vertical relationship between cereal manufacturers and retailers are important.