inequalities. They have also not met their obligations to achieve progressive realization of social, economic, and cultural rights under international human rights agreements. In so doing, states are powerless to prevent ongoing and endemic violence against women. International antitrafficking initiatives are counterproductive as well. The lack of protection and alternative livelihoods afforded to women victims makes it difficult to prosecute traffickers and has hardly affected the flourishing of the illegal trade. Above all, the narrow focus on trafficking, especially for sex work, has allowed states to consistently ignore the broader issue of the abuse, exploitation, and unfair and unequal treatment of migrant workers, especially in the domestic service sectors, where women and girls predominate.

CHAPTER 5 | New Spaces of Gender Violence

Economic Transition and Trade Liberalization

Introduction

Transitions to capitalism and liberalization of trade have facilitated the integration of economies without protecting local production, people's livelihoods, gender equality, and human rights. The destabilization of social and economic life by macroeconomic policies, including structural adjustment policies, is associated with growing inequalities and increasing levels of violence against women in several regions, including Europe and the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa, and Asia (UNICEF 1989).

The growth of trade has facilitated the globalization of export-oriented, labor-intensive industries. The creation of "free trade" or special economic zones, exempt from many government regulations, exacerbates gendered inequalities and creates unregulated environments in which violence against women thrives. These industries have largely employed women's labor, often young, migrant women from rural areas hired on temporary contracts at lower wages than men with minimal benefits. Violence against women workers, including abuse of reproductive rights, sexual harassment, rape and sexual violence, and, most egregiously, "femicide," the gender-based murder of women, has been prevalent in many of these free trade zones in developing countries, where extractive industries involved in exporting natural resources for advanced production elsewhere and new manufacturing industries for global consumer markets have been established (SRVAW 2005b, 2006b, 2011). Violence against women can be seen as a response by men to larger, changing socioeconomic conditions, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 5). Rapid change in entitlements to employment and assets, and acquisition of newfound resources and power can produce gendered imbalances that greatly increase violence against women. This has been the case in the transitions to capitalism in Eastern Europe and China after 1989 (Chan et al. 2008).

The first part of this chapter explores cases of both manufacturing and extractive export industries from Mexico, Guatemala, the Pacific Islands, and Africa and their impact on violence against women. The second part considers the role of international financial institutions that have extended development loans for export industries that have exacerbated sexual and gender-based violence. The chapter concludes by reflecting on initiatives that could forge *nonviolent economies* that improve gender-equal livelihoods and opportunities as a way to diminish violence against women.

Violent Transitions: Gender, Markets, and Trade Liberalization

The market transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989 have led to widespread increases in poverty, unemployment, hardship, income inequality, stress, and violence against women. These factors have also indirectly raised women's vulnerability to violence by encouraging more risk-taking behavior, more alcohol and drug abuse, the breakdown of social support networks, and the economic dependence of women on their partners (UNICEF 1999; True 2003). Box 5.1 discusses the case of Russia: the high levels of domestic violence, as well as other forms of violence, in the post-communist transition and the societal acceptance of this violence as women's economic and social status has declined in the post-Soviet era.

Some have viewed Eastern Europe, including Russia and Central Asia, as "test regions" for judging the impact of neoliberal macroeconomic policies (Elson 2002). Rather than revealing positive impacts of market reform, almost all the countries in these regions have exhibited regressions in women's economic and social status (see SRVAW 2006c). The biggest regression globally in the economic status of women has been in Eastern Europe, according to Social Watch's 2008 Gender Equity Index. In addition to increases in rape and domestic violence, this region has seen hundreds of thousands of young women trafficked for prostitution and other indentured labor each year due to the consequences of economic liberalization, as seen in Chapter 4. Yet most analyses of the impact of globalization and liberalization have focused on the public sphere exploitation of women workers by multinational corporations or the impact of state austerity policies on women, rather than the increased violence against intimate partners as a result of economic transition and integration—and the rapidly changing,

Box 5.1 POST-SOVIET TRANSITION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Like other former communist states that have transitioned from command to market economies, Russia's transition from the Soviet era to capitalism has not been gender neutral (Paci 2002; True 2003). A report by the World Bank states: "GDP has fallen, absolute poverty has increased five-fold and employment and wages have plummeted. Mortality rates have increased sharply while fertility rates have dropped" (Paci 2002, ix). Transition in Russia has had "contradictory effects" on women (SRVAW 2006c, 5). Transition has pushed women from previously high levels of full-time, secure employment into precarious employment in marginal, low-paying and low-status sectors of the economy (Weiler 2004, 69–70). The effects of liberalization in Russia have led to an increase in unemployment, crime, and privatization, as well as cuts to social welfare, all of which have severely affected women and increased their economic dependence on men (Weiler 2004, 64–65). Economic dependence is especially problematic in the context of Russia's high rates of violence against women. Domestic violence is believed to be the most widespread form of violence against women in Russia, although trafficking, rape, sexual harassment, military violence, prison violence, and racially motivated violence are also present (SRVAW 2006c, 8). The collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of state monopoly on liquor production, leading to widespread alcohol abuse and contributing to Russia's endemic domestic violence problem (Weiler 2004, 65). Russian politicians have often toyed with limiting excise taxes on alcohol to increase their popularity in democratic elections without considering the impact on domestic violence against women. This is not surprising since transition has resulted in a general loss of status for women, furthered by growing sexualization and commodification of Russian women to the extent that sexual violence—from harassment to trafficking—has become a major problem (Weiler 2004, 70). The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in her mission noticed the additional burden for women from the multifaceted hardships in the North Caucasus region, where economics, politics, culture, and conflict intersect to undermine women's rights (SRVAW 2006c, 5). Assessing the post-communist increase in violence against women in Russia is tricky. No government statistics are gathered on women assaulted or killed by their partner (Human Rights Watch 1998), and the data that are gathered are usually inconsistent (SRVAW 2006c, 8). Nonetheless, available statistics show that 80 percent of all violent crimes are cases of domestic violence. Approximately 14,000 women are killed by their family members annually, usually by their husbands (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2000, 381). Official data, and likely most predictions, largely underestimate the actual levels of violence because of the lack of reporting of domestic violence incidents (Paci 2002, 75). Human Rights Watch estimated in 1998 that only 5–10

(continued)

Box 5.1 (*continued*)

percent of victims report to police (Human Rights Watch 1998). Although battery and sexual assault are criminalized, social stigma pressures victims to keep silent and "solve it" within the family (SRVAW 2006c, 9). Due to severe housing shortages and privatization, many women cannot leave the family home (SRVAW 2006c, 10). Moreover, there is a serious shortage of domestic violence shelters in Russia: only 5 shelters throughout the federation and 120 crisis centers (SRVAW 2006c, 13). For their part, police are reluctant to report domestic violence crimes that will not receive a conviction.

Under communism, the ultimate goal was to reach a society where all classes, ethnicities, and sexes were equal. Now, under Article 19 of the 1993 Constitution, women and men have equal rights before the law. However, the prevalence of violence against women, particularly arising from the unequal power relations within the household, makes Russia the site of an increasing gap between constitutional equality and real inequality in family relationships (Pascall and Manning 2000, 251). One of the most significant explanations for the surge in violence against women in posttransition Russia is the revitalization of patriarchal values. Preexisting forms of sexism have become more salient in the post-communist transition (Weiler 2004, 58; also True 2003). Previously gender-neutral Soviet policy "appears to have been replaced by the outlook that a woman's primary task is to care for the family and children" (SRVAW 2006c, 5). Even Russian activists refer to domestic violence as "violence in the family"—appealing to neotraditional gender ideologies that argue for women's protection in the home (Johnson 2007, 293). Indeed, in many meetings held by the special rapporteur, authorities referred to an ancient Russian proverb: "a beating man is a loving man!" (SRVAW 2006c, 9).

unregulated, and increasingly unequal environment that supports economic exploitation of women in the private sphere.

Despite being widely touted as a catalyst for development and prosperity, there is increasing evidence that trade liberalization, together with a whole host of other neoliberal economic reforms on which it is dependent, is heightening the prevalence of various forms of violence against women and girls. Export processing zones (EPZs) have helped countries diversify their traditional commodity export base. For example, Mauritius (which is now targeting financial services) used the zone strategy to shift from sugar to manufactured exports, Sri Lanka from rubber and tea to garments, and Costa Rica from coffee and bananas to garments and microprocessors (International Labour Office 2003, 2). But as the next section discusses, the volatility of commodity export markets, and the civil conflict over resources they often exacerbate, has been traded for a manufacturing export industry driven by multinationals off the backs of poor, migrant women.

Manufacturing Export Processing Zones and Abuse of Women Workers

In the 1970s and 1980s, manufacturing industries have set up in the special economic zones of developing countries to lower labor and other costs of production. Women, typically young migrants from rural areas, became the majority of the workforce in these EPZ industries, where normal labor conditions and benefits did not apply (Buchanan 1995; Fernández-Kelly 1983, 1993; Peterson 2003). Export industries such as textiles, footwear, and food processing, where 80 percent or more of the workers are women, have also been the ones most subject to cost cutting and restructuring because they are continually subject to import competition and seek to maintain competitiveness in global trade. As such, women workers employed in these industries are often more vulnerable than men to changes in the trading environment (True 2009a, 3).[1] The ease of capital mobility contributes to their insecurity and often leads these women to work for lower wages and conditions than they should be afforded.

Violence against women is a commonplace abuse of power in EPZ workplaces (Raworth 2004, 25). Take the case of Kenya, where EPZs were developed as a strategy to address widespread unemployment—a direct condition of structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Karega 2002, 4–5). Over 40 EPZs produce around 10 percent of the nation's exports and employ over 40,000 workers (PlusNews 2008), and in EPZ textile industries, women make up the majority of workers (Karega 2002, 4). Here competition between men and women for casual jobs has given rise to a frequent exchange of sex for employment by women heedless of the HIV risk because they are desperate to secure any form of employment (PlusNews 2008). This occurrence is noted as commonplace in other EPZs also (Raworth 2004, 25). In Kenya, EPZ companies use nonregistered organizations to recruit casuals on their behalf. The insecure and ad hoc nature of the work means that many workers are not union members. Employers are reportedly aware of sexual harassment but claim to be powerless to intervene unless women come forward and complain, which they usually do not (PlusNews 2008). A study commissioned by the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) revealed that 95 percent of all women in Kenya who had suffered workplace sexual abuse were afraid to report the problem for fear of losing their jobs, because those women who did report were either fired or demoted (Karega 2002). Over 90 percent of all respondents in the ILRF study had experienced or observed sexual abuse within the EPZs (Karega 2002). The majority of the women interviewed were young (between twenty and thirty years old) and poor, and almost half were single mothers with school-age children dependent on their income (Karega 2002). A study of Sri Lankan EPZ workers by Hancock, Middleton, and Moore (2010, 12) also found widespread verbal abuse, sexual harassment, forced sex, and intimidation but a similar lack of reporting: of the 1,571 women respondents who had experienced harassment or violence, none had reported it officially.

Sexual harassment can occur when supervisors retain the check-in card of female workers, forcing them to go to the supervisor to retrieve it, at which point the supervisor can request that the women remain behind after work (Karega 2002, 24–25). The Clean Clothes Campaign reports the high prevalence of "body searches" of women factory workers, including at the Levi Strauss facility in Sandanski (Bulgaria) (Ascoly and Finney 2005, 43). In Lesotho, daily body searches required women to take off their clothes, and menstruating women had to remove their pads to show that they were not stealing anything (Ascoly and Finney 2005, 43). Where sexual harassment and other violence against women is perpetrated by employers, women's unequal position of power and need for income virtually guarantee their silence. The culture of impunity is further evidenced by the fact that 70 percent of the men interviewed for the ILRF study viewed sexual harassment of women workers as normal and natural behavior (Karega 2002). In Sri Lanka, unequal gender relations and gender norms in Sri Lankan society prevent reporting, because any sexual harassment is attributed to a woman's lack of modesty—women are concerned not only about their job but also about their reputation and future marriageability (Hancock et al. 2010, 12).

Women from China and Vietnam who went to the EPZ in American Samoa confronted Daewoosa factory management after they discovered they were earning below minimum wage and living in rat- and roach-infested rooms with inadequate meals of cabbage soup and rice. The women stopped working due to nonpayment of wages, but on November 28, 2000, they were harassed and beaten by armed security guards. On another occasion, when workers refused to work until they were paid, the company withheld food for two days (Ascoly and Finney 2005, 27). In April 2002, the Samoa High Court ordered the company to pay workers $3.5 million in compensation and provide them with assistance to either return home or go to the United States. The factory owner was convicted of human trafficking the following year (Ascoly and Finney 2005, 27). The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) reported that strikers at the Phils Jeon Garment factory in the Philippine EPZ "Cavite zone" were taken by surprise by ten masked men who, according to the strikers, bound and blindfolded them, loaded them into a waiting truck, and dropped them outside the gate of the Cavite EPZ. Many believe the attacks were sanctioned by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) and its police force, who routinely failed to investigate how the masked men entered the EPZ (WILPF 2007).

Women also face the risk of violence when they leave work late at night after long shifts in EPZs (Raworth 2004, 25; Patel 2010). The International Labour Office (2003) notes this risk and advises that special measures should be taken to ensure adequate transport and security. In Lesotho, women have been raped leaving garment factories late at night, but management refused to provide safe transport (Ascoly and Finney 2005, 43). Likewise, garment workers in Bangladesh reported that working long hours and arriving home late, at two o'clock in the morning, can provoke suspicion and threats by husbands and male relatives, "especially when their employers—hiding evidence of excessive overtime—had punched their official hour cards to show that they left the factory at six in the evening" (Raworth 2004, 28).

Ciudad Juarez—The Femicide Capital

The cases of femicide in Ciudad Juarez—the EPZ on the US-Mexico border where *maquiladora* (the Spanish term for the multinational manufacturing factories employing more than 50 percent women workers) are located—are the most egregious form of violence against women associated with EPZs. They manifest the severe, destabilizing effects of neoliberal globalization. It is estimated that many of the more than 400 young women who have been murdered or have disappeared in Ciudad Juarez since 1993 were employed in these factories.[2] Thousands of young rural women with formal education but no family responsibilities came to Mexico's tax-free border cities when the 1992 NAFTA agreement liberalized trade with the United States and the Mexican government created these zones to attract foreign investment. The maquiladora system replaced the *bracero* program, in which Mexican workers, particularly men, were brought to the United States as contract workers and then repatriated at the end of the season. The effect of this had been to move a significant percentage of the Mexican male population to the northern states of Mexico, near the border (Fernández-Kelly 1983).

The young women *maquiladora* workers were treated as dispensable and constructed as "cheap labor" relative to the men, leading to high male unemployment in the border cities and towns (Livingstone 2004, 60). This construction inherently devalued the young women workers. Studies show that their influx resulted in lower wages for all, which, combined with male unemployment, led to a generalized resentment toward young women workers. Both the multinational firms and the state authorities concerned failed to protect these women from targeted, violent abuse (Camacho 2005, 259; also Weissman 2004–2005; Staudt 2009). Camacho (2005, 267) argues that just as women were emerging as new, consequential political and economic actors, their citizen and human rights to personal security were dispensed with.

The femicides in Ciudad Juarez were the subject of the UN Human Rights Commission's first inquiry under the optional protocol of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) undertaken by the CEDAW Committee (CEDAW 2005; SRVAW 2006b). The report of the committee revealed the inherent vulnerability to violence of women in the border city: "they were young, come from other parts of Mexico, living in poverty, working in *maquilas* where protection for their personal security was poor, subject to deception and force" (CEDAW 2005, para. 63–64). The committee observed that the women did not enjoy their basic social and economic rights, including the right to decent work, education, health care, housing, sanitation infrastructure, and lighting (para. 289). The panel recommended that Mexico ensure compliance with the human rights provisions of CEDAW (para. 290) (Chinkin 2008, 37). However, as Box 5.2, about the Cotton Field decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, shows, the struggle to recognize the femicides that have occurred in Ciudad Juarez and to end state impunity toward this violence against women is ongoing.

Ciudad Juarez is not entirely unique as an export processing zone infamous for femicide and violence against women. Similar patterns of violence have been observed in other states, including neighboring Central American states such as Guatemala and El Salvador (SRVAW 2004, 2005b; Cabrera 2010). Many women work in informal sectors and *maquilas* in urban areas that escape regulation and where human rights violations such as physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and penalization of pregnant workers are common (SRVAW 2005b, 7, 11). MADRE, an international women's human rights organization, reports that over the last decade 5,000 women and girls have been murdered in Guatemala, and UN Rapporteur on Violence Against Women Yakin Ertürk reported that the majority of victims were poor women between thirteen and thirty years of age, who were abducted, gang raped, tortured, mutilated, and killed (SRVAW 2005b, 9). The most frequent victims were housewives (24 percent), domestic workers (13.6 percent), and students (11 percent) (SRVAW 2005b, 10). Ertürk also found that the body parts frequently injured were the head and thorax, a modus operandi reminiscent of torture methods used in the counterinsurgency (SRVAW 2005b, 10). Only 2 percent of the femicides registered in Guatemala between 2005 and 2007 have been solved (Cabrera 2010, 41). On April 9, 2008, the Guatemalan

Box 5.2 THE "COTTON FIELD" CASE: A BITTERSWEET VICTORY FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS

The establishment of multinational *maquila* factories in Ciudad Juarez has led to significant economic growth in the city. However, with high levels of male unemployment and migration of young women from rural areas to work for low pay in the factories, this growth has not improved the social and economic livelihoods of all residents. Extreme forms of violence against women have occurred in an environment of increasing violence and inequality. Local and state impunity for this violence has brought widespread international censure.

On November 6 and 7, 2001 the bodies of eight women and girls, who had been sexually tortured, were discovered in an old cotton field in the city (a site of a previous era of global capitalism). The discovery shocked local and international communities, who had known about the disappearances and homicides of women in Ciudad Juarez since 1993. The Mexican state imprisoned and tortured two men for the homicide and rape of the women. One died in prison shortly thereafter (the other was later acquitted for lack of evidence). A year later, in 2002, the mothers of three of the women (two of them minors, or "girls"), Laura Berenice Ramos Monarrez, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal, and Claudia Iveth Gonzalez, petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) requesting an investigation of the crimes given the Mexican state's impunity and ineffective response. Each case had to be filed separately rather than as one case for eight victims, and the Mexican government pressured the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) to reject the cases. The mothers, and those who supported and represented them in the cases, experienced intimidation, harassment, and violence (De Cicco 2009).

After having published two key reports on violence against women in Ciudad Juarez and on access to justice for women living with violence, the Inter-American Court agreed to hear the three cases as one, "the Cotton Field" case in 2007. The court argued that the cases had to be heard together because they "occurred in the context of impunity for violent acts that disproportionately affected women as a group, which had allowed these acts of violence to continue, creating a pattern of conduct."

On December 10, 2009, the IACHR issued the judgement of the "Cotton Field" case (*Case of Gonzalez et al. ["Cotton Field"] v. Mexico*) condemning the Mexican state for violating the human rights of three young women who were disappeared, tortured, and murdered in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, as well as for violation of the human rights of their mothers and next of kin (Red Mesa de Mujeres and CLADEM 2010). The decision established fifteen remedies that the state had to implement to close the case, including reparations, remembrance of victims, and measures to prevent discrimination and violence against women with regard to the rights violated.

(continued)

Box 5.2 (*continued*)

However, the court decision is a form of reparation in itself for women's human rights. The court concluded that a context of violence against women exists in Ciudad Juarez, and in so doing, it established a precedent and methodology for determining what constitutes violence against women perpetrated by the state. The crimes were defined as "femicide" by the legal briefs, the expert witness reports, national reports from the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress, and evidence from civil organizations and amicus curiae documents. Article 21 of the Mexican General Law on Access of Women to a Life Free of Violence states that femicide is "the extreme form of gender violence against women, resulting from the violation of their human rights in the public and private sphere, comprising a series of misogynous conducts that can lead to the impunity of the State and society, and may culminate in the homicide or other forms of violent death of women." The court used the term "gender-based murders of women," also known as femicide, but did not find it necessary to decide on whether the murders of women in Ciudad Juarez constituted gender-based murders other than those of the murders of the three women in this case. The court "stated that since 1993 homicides involving women have increased in the city and that a culture of discrimination against women has been influential in this." It found that "the State's intentions, methods and response to these crimes were evidence that the victims were discriminated against on the basis of their sex." Specific evidence of this was found in:

- The authorities' inefficient responses and indifferent attitudes to the investigation of these crimes;
- The fact that in case of female homicides that involved elements of sexual violence, levels of impunity were highest of all;
- The extraordinarily high levels of violence, including sexual violence involved in homicides against women; and
- The ongoing perpetration of violence against women in Ciudad Juarez (Red Mesa de Mujeres and CLADEM 2010, 23–32).

Violence has been escalating in Ciudad Juarez, and campaigns have sought to discredit human rights organizations and propound "the myth of femicide." The year 2009 registered the highest number of murders of women in the city. Red Mesa de Mujeres and CLADEM are engaged in ongoing monitoring of the Mexican state's compliance with the Cotton Field decision and remedies, many of which remain unfulfilled two years later.

Congress passed a law against femicide and other forms of violence against women, which includes tougher prison sentences and recognizes economic violence in the denial of access to work and access to property (Cabrera 2010, 41). However, the enduring environment of impunity and the steadily increasing incidence of femicide in Guatemala reveal the normalization of institutionalized gender inequality and violence (Manz 2008, 154).

Gendered Violence and Extractive Export Industries

Trade liberalization has heightened various forms of violence against women workers in extractive export industries, as well as manufacturing industries. International financial institutions' (IFIs) funding of extractive industries accentuates rather than reduces the risk and prevalence of violence against women in the communities where these industries are supported. The World Bank has acknowledged that less developed countries' reliance on primary commodity exports is one of the leading causes of violent, armed conflict (World Bank 2003). Extractive industries employ women in unregulated and unsafe working conditions and contribute to the rise of sexual violence, prostitution, and conflict. Regardless, in 2010 the World Bank spent $50 million on its Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector project, in contrast to $3.2 million spent on all its gender-based violence prevention projects in 2010 combined (D'Almeida 2011b). According to Monti Aguirre, a Latin American campaigner at US-based NGO International Rivers, "resource extraction development projects supported by IFIs nearly always leave women out of the benefits side of the equation" (quoted in D'Almeida 2011b).

In their report *Broken Promises*, Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International (2011) analyzed the gender differential impacts of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline in Chad and the impacts of the West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) in Nigeria, Ghana, and Togo. The World Bank and European Investment Bank (EIB) partially financed both pipelines, providing financial security to the consortiums of oil and gas multinationals. The study found that women have suffered disproportionately from the projects. Women were noticeably absent from all stages of the projects, including community consultations about the projects. In preparation for the WAGP, "[Friends of the Earth] Nigeria could not find a single woman who was selected for community consultation in project planning or execution; the views of women were not represented at the community level or to pipeline's company representatives" (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 16). The short-term boom in unskilled labor opportunities went to men (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 7). As a result of this gender bias in employment, prostitution increased, as did domestic violence and women's sexual subordination to men (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 8). In the case of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, the 10 percent value of the land compensation for loss of crops was allocated to male heads of households, often without being disclosed to women, despite the fact that women make up over 70 percent of the agricultural workforce in those countries (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International

2011, 13, 10, 8). In Nigeria and Ghana, women cannot own land, and in Togo, women have only limited access to formal land rights, usually through their spouses. Consequently, compensation also went exclusively to men (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 17–22). Yet we know that when productive resources, including financial capital and income-generating land, are disproportionately distributed to men, gender inequalities increase and women face greater risk of violence and, at the same time, have less capacity to protect themselves from this violence.

The environmental impacts of projects involving the destruction of forests and fisheries, loss of wildlife, and decrease in soil fertility directly affecting food production, water quality, air quality, medicine, and fuels were devastating for local communities (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011). Not only were promises broken, but also women's livelihoods were worsened due to the loss of lands for subsistence farming and depletion of fish stocks central to female fishing communities (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, iv). The WAGP project depreciated women's already marginalized purchasing power and influence in their communities (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 15).

An earlier Gender Action study of IFIs' oil investments noted the gendered impacts of a pipeline project in Azerbaijan and Georgia and an oil and gas project on Sakhalin Island, Russia (Bacheva, Kochladze, and Dennis 2006). Both projects were funded by the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The pipelines were promoted by project sponsors and the IFIs as "a model of development and poverty alleviation," yet neither had policies to safeguard women's rights (Bacheva et al. 2006, 3, 18). The study outlined similar negative consequences of the projects for women: damage to subsistence sources (loss of material and productive resources), lack of employment opportunities for women, increased migration of male workers (and an associated increase in prostitution), and increases in sexually transmitted infections and stillbirths (Bacheva et al. 2006). The few women employed by the projects that Gender Action interviewed stated that they worked in the workers' camps as cooks or cleaners, with employment contracts from one to three months, and worked for long hours with little pay and no holidays (Bacheva et al. 2006, 18). Local women's groups reported an increase in sexual harassment complaints but stated that women endured the sexual harassment in order to keep their jobs (Bacheva et al. 2006, 18). Gender Action noted that the corollary of increased prostitution was an increase in trafficking and health problems (Bacheva et al. 2006, 18, 19, 29). The study reveals that extractive development projects "almost as a rule increase both the burden for local women and gender inequality" (Bacheva et al. 2006, 3). The case of World Bank funding of infrastructure and incentives for the mining industry in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Box 5.3 illustrates these negative impacts on women and how they exacerbate gendered violence.

Box 5.3 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), gender-based violence is widespread and systematic (Meger 2010). In many cases it is linked with extractive industries, particularly artisanal and small-scale mining, where women and children often make up the majority of laborers (Arend and Ajinkya 2011, 1). Women and their families rely on the income from mining, yet they are paid less and are vulnerable to physical abuse and sexual exploitation at the hands of employers and militia who run the operations. In 2002, the World Bank helped the DRC to revise its Mining Code in order to attract foreign private investment but ignored gender-based violence endemic among mining communities (Arend and Ajinkya 2011, 1). The World Bank also funds various infrastructure projects to strengthen mining as a poverty alleviation strategy, but its strategies are tellingly silent on the linkages to gender-based violence. For instance, the World Bank's $50 million Growth in Governance in the Mineral Sector project identifies gender-based violence as among the human rights violations caused by the mineral trade but does not have any policies or initiatives to address it (Arend and Ajinkya 2011, 2). The World Bank's $120 million Private Sector Development and Competitiveness project, designed to lift postconflict Congo out of extreme underdevelopment, identifies mining, transport, telecom, and energy as the sectors that could help the Congo to achieve economic growth (Arend and Ajinkya 2011, 4). The project encourages those industries that are proven to have a disproportionately detrimental effect on women and that seriously increase violence against women. The lack of gender-sensitive monitoring and sex-disaggregated data are major impediments to assessing the impact of the project on women's access to productive resources, which are often deterrents to violence (Arend and Ajinkya 2011, 4).

Migrant Male Workers and Sexual Violence in the Pacific

Trade liberalization and foreign investment in extraction industries typically involve importing foreign male workers. If the local economic context is impoverished, their presence may encourage the development of prostitution and sex trafficking, as well as gender-based violence. For example, the liberalization of the fisheries and forestry industries in the Pacific that import foreign male workers from Asia has encouraged the development of prostitution and sex trafficking on shore and has been linked to gender-based violence, child prostitution, and HIV/AIDS (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2008). Trade liberalization also encourages fiscal policy discipline, new forms of taxation to recover lost tariff revenue, and the reprioritization of public spending toward provision of pro-growth infrastructure and pro-poor services. This restructuring of government budgets in semisubsistence countries has significant gender impacts, as already low-income households face economic austerity. In this situation, women are more vulnerable to domestic violence and may also turn to employment in sweatshop manufacturing, the sex industry, and other precarious places of employment where violence is more likely.

The liberalization of the fisheries industry has led to the development of an unregulated sex industry in many Pacific ports in Fiji, Papua New Guinea[3] and Kiribati due to the nature of male enclaves working in foreign fishing fleets (Sullivan and Ram-Bidesi 2008, 20, 44). In Kiribati, a word has even been coined for the women who are involved in the sex trade with Asian (particularly Korean) seafarers—*te korekorea*—reflecting the incipient nature of the sex trade in South Tarawa (Sullivan and Ram-Bidesi 2008, 31; UNESCAP 2009, 58). While the sex trade can be a source of income for women and their families in Pacific communities, it also has serious and harmful implications for many women (Sullivan and Ram-Bidesi 2008, 22). Women are more susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases and are vulnerable to substance-induced violence at the hands of male seafarers (Sullivan and Ram-Bidesi 2008, 31). Evidence from Kiribati also suggests that girls as young as fifteen are involved in the trade, lured to the source of income in Pacific communities that have few employment opportunities (Vunisea 2005). A case study of Padang province in Papua New Guinea has also linked the development of tuna canneries by multinational firms to an increase in the sex trade and violence against women and girls (Pacific Network on Globalization [PANG] 2008).

In the Solomon Islands, local government officials have accused foreign logging companies of exploiting not only their natural forestry resources but also teenage girls. Loggers from Asian countries working for multinational companies are said to employ these girls to work as domestic live-in servants, subjecting them to sexual abuse and leaving them pregnant when they return home (Radio Australia 2008). Large-scale commercial logging started in the Pacific over forty years ago, but in the early 1980s there was an influx of logging industry multinationals into the Pacific, based mostly in Southeast Asia (Kabutaulaka 1997; PANG 2008, 21). For example, during the period from 1981 to 1983, the number of logging licenses given to foreign companies increased fourfold in the Solomon Islands alone (Fraser 1997, 41). Logging has become one of the central exports of the Solomon Islands, making up about 50 percent of GDP (Kabutaulaka 1997). In Papua New Guinea, logging makes up a significant portion of the GDP, although figures are changeable due to illegal logging. The trade is surrounded with problems, as the overseeing bodies in the Pacific do not have the resources to ensure compliance with tax, environmental, or labor standards. In addition, there have been many concerns involving corruption and conflicts of interest in government.

One of the least reported and acknowledged side effects of the rapid growth of the logging trade is its effects on the society around it. The nature of the work, involving a transient male labor force with good cash incomes, entices young women into domestic work and to sell sexual services to these men. For these women, their work makes them vulnerable to violence and abuse, especially given the lack of legal and social institutions prohibiting them. The evidence that forced prostitution takes place—including child prostitution—has been gathered by a range of Pacific NGOs. In the Solomon Islands, the Christian Care Centre of the Church of Melanesia undertook most of the field work for the United Nations reports on the issue (Herbert 2007; UNESCAP 2009). Their findings make for disturbing reading. Prostitution in the Solomon Islands is largely unorganized and is often coordinated through the woman or girl's family. It frequently takes the form of temporary marriages with very young girls. The Papua New Guinea country study in the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Report provides examples of Malaysian and Korean logging workers buying (part-time) wives and girlfriends from parents with large payments such as gifts of houses and cars (UNESCAP 2009, 58). There is also routine prostitution that takes place at locations around logging sites, in hotels and bars, and even in schools and at beaches (UNESCAP 2006, 37). The women and girls who marry or work in these circumstances rarely see the benefit of their work, as it often goes to extended families.[4] More egregiously, they are often unable to remarry and reintegrate into village life (UNESCAP 2006, 43).

Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International argue that the World Bank has ample evidence of the negative social and environmental impacts of extractive industries, as well as an internal report on the links between extractive industry and armed conflict (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 4). Yet, extractive industry is the model of development, growth, and poverty alleviation that is being championed by IFIs. "The same IFIs that claim to reduce poverty and support women's empowerment in fact fund gender-blind extractive industry projects" that increase poverty and undermine women's economic and social rights in developing countries (Gender Action and Friends of the Earth International 2011, 1). The rhetoric that consistently falls short of concrete action and the evidence-based knowledge that this approach to development is harmful to women render IFIs not only grossly negligent but also complicit in structural and physical violence against women.

Toward Nonviolent Economies

Government intervention is needed to address the harms generated by manufacturing and extractive industries across global regions, and specifically to eliminate the sexual abuse and exploitation of women and girls that have come with the increase in the multinational-led export trade. Prosecuting perpetrators of violence, protecting women from violence, and preventing violence against women under conditions of globalization in transnational border regions where justice and social support systems are weak at best and multiple actors are involved is particularly challenging. However, there are some policy and legal tools available for addressing violence against women in these contexts. The Cotton Field decision and monitoring discussed in this chapter illustrate how even in the most severe cases of femicide activists are working to bring about a change in pervasive local and state impunity toward violence against women.

Governments have the option of shifting away from low-cost models of foreign investment and trade, for instance, supporting manufacturing garment, footwear, or food processing industries based on higher-quality, differentiated, and value-added production with better conditions for employees.[5] Moving into higher-value and higher-quality export production would be beneficial for women, who would continue to enjoy formal employment but with better pay and conditions. This movement into higher-quality production would also involve an investment in human capital and skills training, improving women's knowledge base and future employability, all of which serve as deterrents to violence.

At a minimum, however, equity and employment provisions need to be part of national legal frameworks and trade agreements so that foreign companies in these manufacturing or extractive industries must provide decent working conditions for all workers—female and male—and are held accountable for discrimination, abuse, and violence. Box 5.4 discusses one initiative to promote greater corporate social responsibility for current gender inequalities in the global political economy. The Women's Empowerment Principles promoted by the UN Global Compact and UN Women seek to harness corporate power to change society, as well as business practices and policies, to provide greater economic opportunities for women and to end violence against women at home and at work. Corporations through the power of markets have a major impact on economic development, as well as on the economic and social rights of women and men and their vulnerability to violence (UN/UNIFEM 2010, ii).

Box 5.4 THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT-UNIFEM WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT PRINCIPLES

The Women's Empowerment Principles, or WEPs, are a global corporate code of conduct on women's human rights developed through an international multistakeholder consultation process in March 2009 and launched in March 2010. They focus on corporate responsibility to address the rights of *all* women *across the board* and not just at the boardroom table. There are seven women's empowerment principles, each with key elements and indicators to monitor their impact: (1) leadership for gender equality; (2) equal opportunity, inclusion, and nondiscrimination; (3) health, safety, and freedom from violence; (4) education and training; (5) enterprise development, supply chain, and marketing practices; (6) community leadership and engagement; and (7) transparency, measurement, and reporting. CEOs commit to promoting women's empowerment through these principles. The WEPs emphasize that equality lies in promoting women's leadership (equal outcomes), having work/life balance policies in employment, and ensuring women are included as equals (equal treatment) at work. For instance, a key element drawn from principle 2 suggests that companies "proactively recruit and appoint women to managerial and executive positions and to the corporate board of directors" in order to promote workplace practices and policies free from gender discrimination.

Principle 7 suggests that companies "make public their policies and implementation plan for promoting gender equality; establish benchmarks that quantify inclusion of women at all levels; measure and report on progress, both internally and externally, using data disaggregated by sex" (UN Global Compact/UNIFEM 2010, 3). The United Nations keeps track of how businesses are doing on the initiatives. A working document that contains examples of "best practice" initiatives shows how key multinational businesses in energy, finance, services/tourism, and manufacturing sectors have implemented processes aligning with the principles (UN Global Compact 2010). These practices are voluntary and are not audited by the United Nations or independently, but they raise awareness of the many ways in which businesses can promote gender equality.

The WEPs encourage corporations to deploy their financial power to change society, for instance, by fundraising for ending domestic violence internationally or assisting women-owned enterprises (UN Global Compact/UNIFEM 2010, 5). They complement rather than replace government regulatory approaches that seek to mitigate corporate power and its impacts on gender inequalities and violence.