

# Time Preferences: Present-biased preferences

EE416 Sem2/2019

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- The person who is “partial naivete” is \_\_\_\_\_ that she'll have a present bias in the future, but she \_\_\_\_\_ its magnitude.

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- With  $(\beta, \delta)$  preferences:
- Since  $\beta$  captures the magnitude of the person's present bias, we can think of the person as having \_\_\_\_\_.

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- Sophisticates have \_\_\_\_\_
- Naifs have \_\_\_\_\_
- Partial naifs have \_\_\_\_\_
  - They underestimate the extent of their present bias.
  - They perceive that their discount factors are \_\_\_\_\_

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- Definition of Partial naifs
- A person with perceptions  $\hat{\beta}$  believes that in the future she will \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_. Given this prediction about future behavior, she chooses her \_\_\_\_\_ to maximize her current preferences, which depend on \_\_\_\_\_.
- Also assume that the future selves are also sophisticates.

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- Example: Suppose you must complete a task within three days:
  - If complete on day 1,  $u_1 = -3, u_2 = u_3 = 0$ .
  - If complete on day 2,  $u_2 = -5, u_1 = u_3 = 0$ .
  - If complete on day 3,  $u_3 = -8, u_1 = u_2 = 0$ .
  
  - This is equivalent to having the immediate cost schedule:
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# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- ❖ Behave like sophisticates with  $\hat{\beta}$
- ❖ On day 1, what are your beliefs about day-2 behavior?
  - I will be present bias with \_\_\_\_\_.
  - $U^2(2|\hat{\beta}) =$  \_\_\_\_\_
  - $U^2(3|\hat{\beta}) =$  \_\_\_\_\_

	$\tau = 1$	$\tau = 2$	$\tau = 3$
At t = 1: $U^1(\tau)$			
At t = 2: $U^2(\tau)$		_____	_____
At t = 3: $U^3(\tau)$			

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- ❖ Behave like sophisticates with  $\hat{\beta}$
- ❖ On day 1, what are your beliefs about day-2 behavior?
  - ❖ Expect to complete task on day 2 if:
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- ❖ Behave like sophisticates with  $\hat{\beta}$
- ❖ On day 1, what are your beliefs about day-2 behavior?
  - ❖ Expect to wait on day 2 and complete task on day 3 if:
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_
    - ❖ \_\_\_\_\_

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- ❖ She chooses her current action to maximize her current preferences, which depend on  $\beta$ .
- ❖ What are your day-1 preferences?

	$\tau = 1$	$\tau = 2$	$\tau = 3$
At $t = 1$ : $U^1(\tau)$			
At $t = 2$ : $U^2(\tau)$			
At $t = 3$ : $U^3(\tau)$			

❖ \_\_\_\_\_

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

- ❖ She chooses her current action to maximize her current preferences, which depend on  $\beta$ .
- ❖ Conclusion:
- ❖ If  $\hat{\beta} < \frac{5}{8}$ ,
  - On day 1,  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - On day 1,  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - I complete the task \_\_\_\_\_

# Partial naivete (O'Donoghue & Rabin, QJE 2001)

❖ She chooses her current action to maximize her current preferences, which depend on  $\beta$ .

❖ Conclusion:

❖ If  $\hat{\beta} > \frac{5}{8}$ ,

➤ On day 1, \_\_\_\_\_

➤ On day 1, \_\_\_\_\_

➤ I \_\_\_\_\_

➤ When day 2 arrives, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, where  $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$