

## Oligopoly & Monopolistic Competition (Chapter 12) in Pindyck

- Oligopoly :
- Market with a few sellers.
  - Products may or may not be differentiated. homogeneous case
  - When number of competitors is small, their actions become mutually strategic.
  - Game theory is employed to study these strategic interactions among firms ( $N \geq 2$ ) heterogeneous case

# Introduction to Game Theory → EE481, EE441, EE457, ...


## Components of a game :

Players (P) : 2 or more players ( $N \geq 2$ )

Actions (A) : Actions or Strategies available to each player.

Payoffs (P) : Outcomes based on your decision(s) and the decision(s) of other(s)


Information (I) : Rule of the game : how the game is conducted,  
 for example : who moves first?  
 The game is played only once or repeatedly?




## Types of games

• Simultaneous move game Vs. Sequential move game

• One-shot game Vs. Repeated game



• Non cooperative game Vs. Cooperative game  
 (Game in which players do not cooperate.)  
 (ex. coalition game of forming government by many political parties.)



UP	( 10, 2 )	( 8, 3 )
Player 1 (row player)		

• The first number in each cell determines the pay off for


Player 1 (Row Player)		
DOWN	(12, 4)	(10, 1)

the pay off for player 1.

The second number determines the payoff for player 2

### Game tree

Suppose Player 1 moves first and Player 2 moves second.



### # Solving a game

#### Advertising Game

- Consider 2 players: Firm A vs. Firm B
- Actions by each firm: Advertise, Do not advertise.
- Simultaneous move game.

$\pi$ : million baht

		FIRM B	
		ADV	DO NOT
FIRM A	ADV	10, 5	15, 0
	DO NOT	6, 8	10, 2
		ADV	DO NOT

Q: What will be the outcome of the game?

A:  $(s_A^*, s_B^*) = (ADV, ADV)$

$(\pi_A^*(s_A^*, s_B^*), \pi_B^*(s_A^*, s_B^*)) = (10, 5)$

Firm A has a dominant strategy : ADV  
 Firm B  $\longleftarrow$   $\longleftarrow$   $\longleftarrow$  : adv.

If a firm has a dominant strategy, it will use that strategy to play, always

This process or algorithm is so called  
 "Elimination of dominated strategies"

10.11.17

# solving a game by using Nash Equilibrium Concept

John F. Nash  $\rightarrow$  Mathematician

$\rightarrow$  Ph.D (Princeton)

$\rightarrow$  Nobel Prize Winner 1994 w/ Selten and Harsanyi

(A Beautiful Mind) in Netflix

		Firm B	
		adv	do not adv
Firm A	adv	10, 5	15, 0
	do not adv	6, 8	10, 2

Arrows in the table indicate best responses: Firm A's best response is 'adv' (10 > 6) regardless of Firm B's choice. Firm B's best response is 'adv' (5 > 0) if Firm A chooses 'adv', and 'do not adv' (2 > 0) if Firm A chooses 'do not adv'.

Consider Firm A :

If B chooses "ADV", A's Best Response is "ADV."  
 since  $\pi^A(\text{ADV}, \text{ADV}) > \pi^A(\text{DO NOT ADV}, \text{ADV})$ .

If B choose "DO NOT ADV", A's Best Response is "ADV"  
 since  $\pi^A(\text{ADV}, \text{DO NOT ADV}) > \pi^A(\text{DO NOT ADV}, \text{DO NOT ADV})$ .

Consider Firm B

If A chooses "ADV", B's Best Response is "ADV"  
 since  $\pi^B(\text{ADV}, \text{ADV}) > \pi^B(\text{DO NOT ADV}, \text{ADV})$

If A chooses "DO NOT ADV", B's Best Response is "ADV"  
 since  $\pi^B(\text{ADV}, \text{DO NOT ADV}) > \pi^B(\text{DO NOT ADV}, \text{DO NOT ADV})$

Nash Equilibrium :  $(s_A^*, s_B^*) = (\text{ADV}, \text{ADV})$

In Equilibrium, both players choose "Adv".  
 $(\pi^A(\delta_A^*, \delta_B^*), \pi^B(\delta_A^*, \delta_B^*)) = (10, 5)$

Nash Equilibrium = Set of Actions/strategies in which each firm does its best given its rival's actions/strategies.

		Student	
		READ BOOK	FACE BOOK
Ton	DIFFICULT		
	EASY		

Nash Equilibrium : I'm doing the best I could given what you're doing & You are doing the best you could given what I'm doing

means that, once both are in an equilibrium, each has No incentive to alter/change/modify the action that he/she is currently using.

### # Prisoners' Dilemma

Two prisoners : Franc Namwhan

		Franc Namwhan	
		CONFESS	DO NOT CONFESS
Franc	CONFESS	$(-5, -5)$	$(-1, -10)$
	DO NOT CONFESS	$(-10, -1)$	$(-2, -2)$


- (1) Nash equilibrium : (CONFESS, CONFESS)
- (2) (DO NOT CONFESS, DO NOT CONFESS) is "Pareto-Superior" outcome but it will not be played in equilibrium as both will have incentive to deviate.
- (3) Notice that "confess" is the dominant strategy of both players.

When a dominant strategy is available, any player will play it.

### # Sequential Move Game

$\pi^A \sim B$

## # Sequential Move Game




Consider A Product Choice Game

Firm A moves first and B moves second.

① By using backward induction:  
looking ahead and reasoning backward, (SWEET, CRISPY) IS a Nash equilibrium.

② First Mover Advantage OR Advantage of Moving First:  
When A chooses "SWEET", it leaves Firm B little choice but to choose only CRISPY. (TO AVOID A CRASH IN THE SAME MARKET)



Nash equilibrium: (L, L)

## # Battle of Sexes

		WIFE	
		BULL FIGHT	BALLET
HUSBAND	BULL FIGHT	(10, 5) <sup>*</sup>	(0, 0)
	BALLET	(0, 0)	(5, 10) <sup>*</sup>

- TWO NASH EQUILIBRIA
- Which one will be played depends players' bargaining power.

## # Matching pennies

①

		②	
		H	T
H	(1, -1) <sup>*</sup>	(-1, 1) <sup>D</sup>	
T	(-1, 1) <sup>D</sup>	(1, -1) <sup>*</sup>	

Unit: Million baht

- No Nash Equilibrium
- Zero Sum Game