



Regular Article

Does foreign aid harm political institutions? ☆

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ABSTRACT

The notion that foreign aid harms the institutions of recipient governments remains prevalent. We combine new disaggregated aid data and various metrics of political institutions to re-examine this relationship. Long run cross-section and alternative dynamic panel estimators show a small positive net effect of total aid on political institutions. Distinguishing between types of aid according to their frequency domain and stated objectives, we find that this aggregate net effect is driven primarily by the positive contribution of more stable inflows of 'governance aid'. We conclude that the data do not support the view that aid has had a systematic negative effect on political institutions.

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1. Introduction

The impact of foreign aid on aggregate economic outcomes has spawned a vast literature, much of it polemical. Even so, the set of recently published empirical studies concerning the effect of aid on growth draws broadly similar conclusions. Applying different methods and data, they find a positive and statistically significant effect of aid when considered over the long-run (Arndt, 2015a; Arndt et al., 2010; Juselius et al., 2014; Brückner, 2013; Clemens et al., 2012; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010).¹ While this strand of literature shows some convergence, important questions remain. One of these is whether foreign aid has a negative effect on political institutions. While one might find a positive overall effect of aid on economic growth, this could be compatible with a decline in governance quality that may have negative implications over the very long-term.

A popular version of the thesis that aid undermines governance is spelled out by Moss et al. (2008).² They propose that governments less dependent on internal sources of revenue tend to be less accountable to their citizens and face weaker incentives to nurture effective public institutions. Put differently, aid may undermine incentives to tackle collective-action problems that constitute institutional barriers to development (Booth, 2011). A number of scholars consider the hypothesis that aid weakens the quality of political institutions to be pertinent (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Deaton, 2013). Nonetheless,

empirical treatments of this question provide mixed answers. In the economics literature, both Djankov et al. (2008) and Busse and Gröning (2009) find a direct negative effect of aid on institutions. However, Tavares (2003) reports that aid decreases corruption while Knack (2004) finds that it has no impact on measures of democracy. Empirical evidence from political science also does not reach a consensus (e.g., see Wright, 2009); (de Mesquita and Smith, 2013).

The present paper takes advantage of new and more extensive data on aid flows covering a period of over 25 years. We ask two main questions: (1) What has been the relationship between aid inflows and political institutions over the period 1983–2010? And (2) does this relationship vary according to the type of aid flow? The former question addresses the first order challenge of measuring the (average) direction and magnitude of the links between aggregate aid and institutional outcomes. The latter question is motivated by the heterogeneity of aid (e.g., Mavrotas and Nunnenkamp, 2007). Here, two specific aspects are in focus. First is the extent to which aid flows are predictable (stable) or transitory in nature. A large literature has found that aid volatility is high and is likely to undermine its effectiveness (Arellano et al., 2009; Bulr and Hamann, 2008). In part, this may reflect donor fragmentation, which has been shown to harm recipient-government bureaucratic quality (Djankov et al., 2009; Knack and Rahman, 2007). Furthermore, Brückner et al. (2012) show that the evolution of institutions depends on whether changes to income are permanent or temporary. This is particularly germane given the body of evidence that aid can raise aggregate incomes. Consequently, we use a simple decomposition of aid flows to investigate whether the effect of aid on institutional outcomes differs between high and low frequency domains.³ The second aspect of

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¹ These empirical results also are consistent with simulation evidence from a general theoretical model (see Arndt, 2015b).

² For a recent review of this literature see Ravallion (2014).

³ We are grateful to an anonymous referee and the JDE Editor for recommending this analytical path.

heterogeneity concerns differences in the objectives of aid. As [Clemens et al. \(2012\)](#) note, among others, the stated objectives of aid are highly diverse – often encompassing multiple sectors and different time horizons. As a result, we explore whether the link between aid and institutions depends on the objectives of aid, hypothesizing that there may be a stronger link where aid is explicitly targeted at governance or institutional development outcomes.

To help answer our two questions, [Section 2](#) begins with a discussion of the potential mechanisms through which aid may have an effect on institutional development. This suggests that the (net) direction of such effects is ambiguous and that not all aid is the same. Different types of aid – e.g., given by different donors or for alternative objectives – are likely to hold different political economy implications. [Section 3](#) describes our empirical strategy, focusing on a range of relevant technical challenges, particularly those associated with the time-series cross-section nature of the available data. We recognize upfront that no single empirical strategy is unproblematic. Therefore, we verify the relationship between aid and institutional outcomes using a range of methods. Specifically, we follow previous studies and use long-run cross-section estimates (e.g., [Knack, 2004](#)). These are supplemented by various dynamic panel estimators, which are run over panels ranging from two to eight years in duration.

[Section 4](#) provides an overview of our data. We clarify what we mean by political institutions and how it is measured. We also introduce a new disaggregation of aid according to its stated objectives and describe a simple method to decompose aid into lower and higher frequency components. Our main results are reported in [Section 5](#). With respect to the relationship between aggregate aid and a synthetic (mean) measure of political institutions, both the long-run and dynamic panel estimates consistently point to a small positive net effect due to aid as a share of income (Aid/GDP). In keeping with [Dietrich \(2015\)](#), we find that different types of aid hold different implications for governance outcomes. Specifically, low frequency (more stable) flows of ‘governance aid’ have a larger but moderate positive association with political institutional outcomes. Aid that is more volatile seems to be less effective. Also, we find no clear systematic effects associated with aid given for other purposes. Taken together, this helps explain why the net effect of aid on institutions appears to be small but positive.

[Section 6](#) explicitly considers a number of more specific aspects of robustness. These are: differences in the effects of aid over alternative sub-measures of institutions; heterogeneity in responses via interaction effects (e.g., over time); and whether our findings may reflect latent trends in institutions. Overall, our results hold up to these checks. [Section 7](#) concludes.

2. Mechanisms

Previous studies have suggested a variety of mechanisms through which foreign aid may influence the quality of political institutions. Here we provide a brief overview of these ideas and reflect on their implications.⁴ A common point of departure is the notion that governance quality is chosen by incumbent political elites to optimize their expected utility, subject to relevant constraints. It follows that changes in aid flows can alter the political calculus, potentially inducing a shift in the optimal choice of institutions. While different studies emphasize alternative aspects of the choice over institutions, two general mechanisms can be distinguished.

First, following the social compact literature (e.g., [Moore, 2004](#)), higher quality institutions are often associated with enhanced and/or more cost-efficient domestic revenue collection. The relevant logic is that increases in aid can substitute for domestic revenue, in turn enabling institutional quality to decline. This mechanism provides a foundation for treatments of aid as a rent with similar properties and

institutional effects to natural resource discoveries. Such a view is explicitly found in the selectorate theory of politics due to [de Mesquita et al. \(2003\)](#), also echoed elsewhere (e.g., [de Mesquita and Smith, 2013](#); [Djankov et al., 2008](#); [Morrison, 2007](#)).

Few proponents of this mechanism would suggest that a negative link running from aid to institutions holds unconditionally. Rather, it is most often applied only to non-democratic regimes. That is, initial conditions matter. Further considerations warn against a simplistic version of this mechanism. Characterizations of aid as a resource rent tend to require that aid is fungible. While some degree of fungibility is plausible, evidence suggests that expenditures financed out of aid are more constrained than those out of domestic revenues. This relates to conditions imposed by donors on both aid allocations (across recipients) and its uses (between sectors).⁵ These distinctive features of aid lead [Altincekic and Bearce \(2014\)](#) to reject the thesis of a political foreign aid curse. Furthermore, if aid is an important component of the budget and the volume of inflows is effectively conditional on governance outcomes, then aid may act to constrain institutional deterioration or even encourage improvements. In the latter case, the logic is that the utility cost to the leader of having better institutions is (more than) offset by a larger revenue stream.

The second mechanism focuses on political survival, which is often taken to be a function of the resources leaders command and the amount of discretion over their use. In this sense, access to aid flows can influence the balance of political competition. By way of example, [Licht \(2010\)](#) finds that aid can help consolidate the support base of recently-elected leaders. [Faye and Niehaus \(2012\)](#) point to a donor-elite match effect, whereby (incumbent) administrations more closely aligned with donor interests tend to receive greater aid during competitive elections. Alternatively, [Scott and Steele \(2011\)](#) note that certain donors have acted as ‘democratic sponsor states’, explicitly deploying aid to foster institutional change via multiple channels. These include support to extra-governmental activities, which may stimulate popular demand for institutional change. In turn, in order to remain in power, leaders may seek to accommodate grassroots demands for change, fuelled by aid-financed activities.

Three implications emerge from this brief review. First, we find little theoretical reason to expect a simple, uni-directional effect of aid on institutions. The political calculus underlying institutional choices is complex, and aid can affect this calculus in many ways. Existing empirical evidence lends support to such a nuanced view. For instance, [Dutta et al. \(2013\)](#) find that foreign aid acts to amplify existing political-institutional arrangements. [Wright \(2009\)](#) goes further, arguing that foreign aid can support democratization even among dictatorships, as long as the latter have a good chance of winning multi-party elections.

Second, aid cannot be considered a homogenous good. Rather, the institutional effects of aid are likely to depend on the type of aid delivered and associated conditions. For instance, a variety of studies suggest that democracy assistance programmes may be particularly critical to support institutional change or consolidation (for elaboration see [Finkel, 2003](#); [Savun and Tirone, 2011](#); [Dietrich, 2015](#); [Gibson et al., 2015](#)). Empirically, this implies that a focus on aggregate aid flows may be deceptive.

Third, the credibility of aid is likely to matter. For instance, if aid supplies are primarily driven by the short-term strategic interests of donors, any associated institutional conditions or ostensible commitments to long-run institutional development are unlikely to be credible. As noted previously, empirical evidence suggests the volatility of aid flows imposes a welfare cost on recipients. [Celasun and Walliser \(2008\)](#) suggest that aid volatility shifts aid expenditures toward recurrent expenditure rather than investments. Additionally, [Kangoye \(2013\)](#) finds a positive link between higher aid unpredictability and

⁴ For reviews of the relevant literature see [Licht \(2010\)](#); [Scott and Steele \(2011\)](#); [Ravallion \(2014\)](#); [Bader and Faust \(2014\)](#); and [Dietrich \(2015\)](#).

⁵ See [Wright and Winters \(2010\)](#) for a review of recent literature regarding the fungibility of aid and conditions imposed on allocations.

levels of corruption. This substantiates our interest in decomposing aid into higher and lower frequency components.

3. Empirical strategy

To analyze the relationship between foreign aid and institutional outcomes, our starting point is the following general specification:

$$\text{INST}_{jt} = \rho \text{INST}_{j,t-m} + \beta \text{AID}_{j,t-n} + \gamma' Z_{j,t-p} + \mu_j + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (1)$$

$m \in \mathbb{Z}^+; n \in \{0, \mathbb{Z}^+\}; p \in \{0, \mathbb{Z}^+\}$

where INST is a continuous measure of institutions; j indexes countries; t is time; AID is a measure of aid inputs (normalized by income); Z is a vector of control variables; μ and ϕ respectively capture country and period fixed effects; and ε is residual error. This represents a basic autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) structure, which is recommended for general use in time-series cross-section settings containing either stationary or non-stationary series (Beck and Katz, 2011; De Boef and Keele, 2008; Judson and Owen, 1999).⁶

Versions of this specification have been used in previous similar studies. Knack (2004), for example, employs a cross-section version of Eq. (1) to investigate the relationship between aid and democracy. To do so, he defines $t - m$ to correspond to the initial period and subtracts initial institutions from both sides, yielding the long period change in democracy as the outcome. Djankov et al. (2008) use a similar specification to investigate the determinants of changes in institutions, but do so over shorter periods (5 year panels), thereby exploiting time series variation in the data. In the aid-growth context, Clemens et al. (2012) primarily rely on a first differenced version of (1). The rationale for first differencing is that time invariant country fixed effects, excluded from the Djankov et al. (2008) model and necessarily absent in cross-section models, are purged from the data.

The different approaches to estimating Eq. (1), or some transformation thereof, hold advantages and disadvantages. The very multiplicity of specifications and models previously employed in the context of cross-country time series (panel) data attest to the absence of a single or predominant 'best' methodology. A crucial problem is that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates tend to be biased when both a lag of the dependent variable and unit fixed effects are included (Nickell, 1981). This bias is expected to be especially large in short panels (e.g., $T < 10$), which are often encountered in cross-country empirical work.

Alternative estimators or corrections have been proposed to address dynamic panel bias. Even so, none is universally recommended. For short panels, a potential response is to exclude either the unit fixed effects or the lagged dependent variable. Fixed effects may be adequately captured by a full set of control variables, as well as the initial observation of the dependent variable. Even so, care must be taken due to unobserved country heterogeneity. This is relevant here since country-specific factors may be correlated with aid inflows (among other things). The endogeneity of aid has been discussed at length elsewhere (Arndt et al., 2010); and a popular response is to use instrumental variables techniques. In an early paper, for example, Knack (2001) uses infant mortality (in 1980), initial population, initial GDP per capita and specific regional dummies as external instruments to identify the effect of aid on the quality of governance. This strategy echoes Burnside and Dollar (2000) and has been followed in more recent studies (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008). In time series panel settings, similar instrumental variables have been employed (e.g., Wright, 2009), while other studies have relied on so-called internal instruments of GMM estimators (Busse and Gröning, 2009; Dutta et al., 2013).

We recognize that both external and internal instrumental variables procedures to address the endogeneity of aid are controversial (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010; Roodman, 2009). For example, the identifying assumption that income in some previous period only affects institutions via aid appears strong. The broader point is that it may be impossible to find highly convincing instruments for variation in aid flows, especially over short time periods. This concern lies behind the alternative first differencing approach pursued by Clemens et al. (2012), in which aid enters in lagged form and identification comes from variation within countries over time, rather than on cross-sectional variation between countries.

The merits of omitting a lagged dependent variable largely turn on the nature of the data generating process, which can be illuminated by theory. Where the lag is included as an empirical tool to address weak persistence (auto-correlation) in the error terms, exclusion might be justified. In contrast, where the process generating the data is inherently dynamic – meaning that past realizations of the outcome substantially determine the marginal effect of other variables – failure to adequately account for these dynamics is likely to introduce substantial bias. The discussion of Section 2 suggests that this may be relevant.⁷ Similarly, Esarey and DeMeritt (2014) suggest that institutions are likely to exhibit some form of state dependence.

A final issue is the time interval over which assessment should take place. Previous studies using cross-sectional estimates have focussed on the association between long-run changes in institutions and average aid flows over the same time frame (Arndt, 2015a, Arndt, 2015b; Clemens et al., 2012). Others opt for a time series panel approach, where variation in institutions is considered over 5 years (Djankov et al., 2008), 3 years (Busse and Gröning, 2009) or even annually (Wright, 2009). Theoretically, no specific time interval is preferred. Contrary to the aid-growth literature, where aid inputs are likely to cumulate into aggregate macroeconomic effects over long time frames (Arndt, 2015a, Arndt, 2015b; Clemens et al., 2012), formal and visible facets of institutions can change relatively quickly, such as in rapid democratic transitions. Also, the logic of applying governance conditions to aid flows suggests that donors envisage that institutional changes occur over relatively short time frames. Nonetheless, we recognize that institutions tend to be persistent over time, there is short run noise in aid flows, and it is reasonable to expect some lag between aid delivery and implementation of reforms. This militates against a unique concern with contemporaneous or purely short-run dynamics.

Pulling these considerations together, we take an agnostic stance both as to the timing of effects and the appropriate estimation strategy. To answer our first question (the relationship between aid inflows and political institutions over the period 1983–2010), we run both static cross-section and dynamic panel models. The former considers the relationship between average aid inflows and either average institutions or changes in institutions over the full period. These estimates side-step the challenge of correctly specifying the dynamic properties of the data and focus explicitly on between-country variation. Nonetheless, an exclusion of dynamics runs the risk of misreading causal linkages – e.g., higher levels of aid may come about in response to improved institutions. Consequently, we use instrumental variables techniques to validate our results.

A further shortcoming is that a unique focus on long time frames may compress (ignore) effective variation in outcomes – i.e., a long period may contain phases of both improvement and deterioration in institutions. Put differently, substantial information can be lost by only taking a static long run view. Thus, we complement a cross-section approach with dynamic panel estimators, using panels of two, four and six year durations. In all specifications we include a lag of the outcome variable, add a full set of time fixed effects, and lag the aid variable by one period. The main panel estimators we use are: a random effects

⁶ As Beck and Katz (2011) note, while institutional variables may be highly persistent, they are not likely to contain a unit root. This is because available institutional measures are always restricted to a specific range, implying their variance cannot approach infinity.

⁷ In addition to including a lag of institutions as a control variable, we also consider heterogeneity in responses over initial institutions. This is taken up in Section 6.

model (RE); bias corrected fixed effects (BCFE); and system GMM. The RE model includes regional dummy variables and treats the unit fixed effects as uncorrelated with other regressors. Although this model is often taken to be inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, Ashley (2010) shows that this conclusion is not correct if the other regressors are exogenous. The BCFE model uses the simple asymptotic approximation suggested by Bun and Carree (2005), based on a first stage fixed effects dynamic panel model.

The system GMM estimates use first differencing to remove the unit effects. In addition, the aid terms are explicitly treated as endogenous, meaning that internal instrumental variables are used for identification. So, these estimates provide a further guard against endogeneity concerns. To avoid over-fitting, we restrict the number of lags used as internal instruments to two (see Roodman, 2009). Also, following the Monte Carlo evidence of Soto (2009), we rely on the conservative one-step estimator and report robust standard errors. As recommended elsewhere (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; McKinnish, 2008; Sen et al., 2007), the use of alternative estimators and time periods helps validate whether our results are robust to alternative methodological choices and identifying assumptions.

4. Data

4.1. Metrics of institutions

Alongside such notions as 'government quality' or 'governance', the term 'institutions' is often used to refer to a range of facets. These include political accountability, the rule of law, government effectiveness and perceptions of corruption. While all these facets essentially speak to the extent to which public authority is exercised impartially (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), no single metric of impartiality can be deemed unproblematic. We do not seek to resolve this issue here. Rather, we simply note that a useful distinction between different indices is whether they refer primarily to institutional inputs or rules of the game (e.g., democracy, rule of law), versus institutional outputs such as bureaucratic efficiency, regulatory capacity and corruption. Data on these latter aspects (outputs) tends to be patchy across developing countries and is often only available in recent years. In contrast, data on inputs is more comprehensive – e.g., as per the Polity IV dataset (see below). For this practical reason we focus on such measures, which we refer to as metrics of political institutions. Nonetheless, we take comfort from other analysts who note a correlation across many different facets of government quality (Holmberg et al., 2009).

To measure political institutions we use five alternative indexes. These are all taken from the Quality of Government (QoG) database, which is a repository of metrics collated from multiple sources (Teorell et al., 2013). We use a range of measures not only to verify the consistency of our results, but also to examine whether specific aspects of institutions are more (less) responsive to foreign aid, which may be pertinent where donors pay attention to specific institutional outcomes. To minimize correlation between the five measures, as well as possible sample selection bias, each is taken from a separate external source (included in the QoG database). The chosen measures are: (i) democracy; (ii) the number of veto players over political decisions (denoted 'checks'); (iii) executive constraints; (iv) political terror; and (v) judicial independence. Appendix A provides a more detailed overview of these indicators, their respective raw scales and original sources. Throughout, positive values indicate 'better' outcomes, meaning that the raw political terror measure has been reversed.⁸

All of the chosen metrics have featured in previous studies, though rarely in conjunction. The first two measures are the main focus of Djankov et al. (2008). Both executive constraints and judicial

independence (the rule of law) have been considered vital to the stability of nascent democracies (Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Savun and Tirone, 2011). Moreover, they are often a particular focus of donor funding (Tiede, 2006). The absence of political terror reflects the degree of protection of human rights and is another domain that has often concerned donors, partly for domestic legal reasons (Forsythe, 1987).

Appendix Table B1(a) reports raw averages for these measures by geographic region. The table also reports their synthetic mean, which is used as an overall measure of institutions in our analysis. To assist interpretation and to exclude the effect of different underlying scales, all outcome measures are entered in the regression analysis in standardized form, taking a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 100.⁹ Consequently, estimated regression coefficients represent percentages of a standard deviation. Appendix Fig. B1 illustrates the uneven and varied behavior of the synthetic average metric of institutions, and its component sub-measures, for the South Asia region and sub-Saharan Africa.

The period covered by the analysis is 1983–2010. The termination date is the latest available in the aid database (see below). Earlier years are excluded for two reasons. First, the quality and coverage of information on both institutions and aid values are increasingly patchy as one reaches further back in time. Second, we must be sensitive to changes in donor behavior over time. Fleck and Kilby (2010), among others, document that the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror were associated with important shifts in aid allocations and interests. Studies that focus predominantly on the period before the 1990s may largely capture Cold War aid dynamics, which offer a poor guide to events of the last two decades. In contrast, the period 1983–2010 can be seen as containing a reasonable balance between 'older' and 'newer' aid regimes.

4.2. Explanatory variables

Data on foreign aid is taken from the current (static) research release of the AidData database (version 2.1; see Tierney et al., 2011).¹⁰ Compared to the standard OECD-DAC creditor reporting system (CRS), which is integrated into the AidData records, the latter has the advantage of providing a more comprehensive view of aid across all types of donors over time, including project-specific information from multilateral organizations and information from non-DAC members. A main reason for using this data is that allocation of aid by purpose is coded in a consistent format, allowing a more disaggregated analysis to take place.

The definition of aid used here is commitments of Official Development Assistance loans and grants from all donors, including multilateral agencies. This excludes all non-concessional funding, loan guarantees and any equity participations. We use data on aid commitments because, historically, purpose-related information on aid has only been available for commitments, not actual disbursements. While this constitutes a limitation, commitments provide a signal to recipients regarding the primary interests and intentions of donors. To the extent that aid funding comes with attached conditions, such commitments thus may map more consistently to changes in recipient behavior than (lumpy) disbursements. In any case, to address possible bias from any systematic discrepancies between commitments and disbursements, our estimates include recipient and period fixed effects (see Eq. (1)). Also, we use averages of data over multiple years, which should reduce stochastic discrepancies between commitments and disbursements.

⁹ The synthetic mean is calculated *after* standardization of the five respective sub-measures. It is informative – Cronbach's alpha for the same five variables takes a value of 0.77, which implies a relatively high degree of internal consistency across the measures. Also, the correlation coefficient between the mean and the score generated from the first principal components of the same variables is equal to 0.99.

¹⁰ See the AidData website: <http://aiddata.org>.

⁸ With the exception of the correlation between democracy and executive constraints (equal to 0.90), pairwise correlations between the remaining chosen measures range from 0.06 to 0.58 (on an annual basis).

Using the AidData codes, we divide total aid commitments to a given recipient in each period into three broad categories: ‘governance’, ‘economic’ and ‘other’ aid.¹¹ The former captures aid for (inter alia) the strengthening of government policies and plans, public sector and civil society institutional development, as well as human rights and conflict prevention activities. These flows are expected to be most closely associated with institutional performance requirements or reflect greater attention by donors to governance outcomes (see Section 2). Economic aid primarily encompasses support to production sectors, including support to the private sector (e.g., banking sector), agriculture, industry and infrastructure, as well as trade-related activities. Outcomes in these domains typically are hard to verify and, arguably, provide greater scope for misuse of funds – e.g., to buttress the interests of political leaders. Other aid is the remainder, which predominantly consists of social sector funding, humanitarian relief and debt-related actions.

Appendix C gives full details of the aid classification used.¹² All aid values are expressed as a share of GDP in constant international dollars (as per Djankov et al. 2008). Panel (b) of Table B1 summarizes average values of each type of aid (as a share of GDP) for each region; and panel (c) shows the composition of total aid in percent. The latter indicates that governance aid has frequently been the smallest component of aid (around 10%, on average), while the remainder category (other) has consistently been the largest. Bilateral aid constitutes the majority of aid in all regions.

As noted in Section 2, a relevant aspect of aid effectiveness concerns its volatility. To categorize aid according to its (perceived) permanence, one might also rely on the stated objectives of aid (e.g., emergency aid versus capital investment). This is not straightforward, however, since project life-cycles can differ considerably even within economic sectors. Consequently, we adopt a data-driven approach. Specifically, we apply the lag operator frequency decomposition to distinguish between aid commitments at lower and higher frequencies (i.e., stable versus more volatile). This is given by:

$$\text{Aid}_t = 0.5(\text{Aid}_t - \text{Aid}_{t-1}) + 0.5(\text{Aid}_t + \text{Aid}_{t-1}) \quad (2)$$

The first difference component captures movements in aid occurring at a relatively high frequency. The second component is the lower frequency or moving average component. In the case of panel data collapsed into (say) six year periods, the second term would represent average aid inflows over a full 12 years. This decomposition has been applied in different contexts and appears to perform well relative to other, more elaborate time series filters (see Baker et al., 1999; Gray and Qiu, 2010). Moreover, it provides a bridge between static or longer-run estimates and those that focus on shorter-run dynamics.

The remaining control variables used in the model are similar to those used in previous studies. They include GDP per capita (log.), population size (log.), life expectancy, the share of trade in GDP (a proxy for openness), the share of population resident in urban areas, and a dummy variable indicating whether the recipient is a net oil or gas exporter (capturing possible resource curse effects).

5. Results

We present our results in sequence. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 address our first question and focus on the relationship between total aid commitments and the synthetic measure of institutions, using both static and dynamic panel models. In Section 5.3 we rely primarily on the dynamic panel estimators and disaggregate aid according to its frequency domain and stated objectives. Section 6 separately explores the robustness of our findings to sub-measures of institutions, as well as potential

heterogeneity in the results. This section also explores whether the results are driven by latent trends in institutional development, which would be a form of omitted variables bias.

5.1. Cross-section estimates

Table 1 reports selected coefficients from our main cross-section results, covering 104 countries. All models include regional dummies and control for the number of years for which we have valid observations in each country. Columns (I) is the between regression corresponding to Eq. (1), in which all variables represent the full period averages for each country. Column (II) retains the same RHS specification but replaces the outcome variable with the mean for the most recent six year period (2005–2010). Column (III) essentially replicates the specification of Knack (2004), which involves subtracting the initial observation for the outcome from both sides of the specification used in column (II). The initial observation is defined as the mean for the first six years in the data; thus, the dependent variable is the long difference (change). Column (IV) repeats column (III) but replaces all control variables excluding Aid/GDP with their most recent observations (six year means). Finally, columns (V) and (VI) represent a long difference specification in which all variables are specified as the difference between the last and first period means.

Identification in these models is taken from variation between countries. The estimated coefficients on Aid/GDP, which are marginal effects, indicate whether these flows provide additional (predictive) information about the expected value of the outcome variable, after controlling for observed country characteristics. All specifications in which Aid/GDP enters in mean form indicate a moderate and statistically significant association (columns I to IV). These estimates also are highly similar in magnitude, ranging from around 3.3 to 6.8. Column (III) is equivalent to the specification of column (II) with a lagged dependent variable added. Changes in the coefficients here thus reflect the inclusion of this lag, which enters without restriction. Indeed, the estimated coefficient on this term is significantly different from minus one, suggesting that column (II) may be misspecified. This supports our hypothesis that institutional development displays some state dependence. Column (IV) represents a more conservative specification than column (III) since it controls for all contemporaneous associations between the outcome and the additional explanatory variable, such as per capita income. Put differently, it controls for any indirect pathways connecting aid to institutional changes via these variables. As expected, the coefficient on mean Aid/GDP declines relative to that of column (III).¹³

Two other findings are noteworthy. First, the long difference results (columns V and VI) are least similar to those of the other models. The point to note here, however, is the substantial reduction in the R-squared metric (increase in the RMSE) relative to the specifications in columns (III) and (IV). This indicates a loss of information in the former models, reflecting the fact that data is only taken from the first and last periods. Second, the direction and magnitude of the control variables are broadly consistent across models (especially columns I to IV). As expected, countries with higher incomes tend to have better political institutions. However, consistent with the resource curse literature (Altınçekic and Bearce, 2014; McGuirk, 2013), oil and gas exporters show significantly lower quality political institutions *ceteris paribus*.

The previous estimates do not correct for the potential endogeneity of aid. Reverse causality could be present if institutional improvements achieved in earlier years are rewarded by higher aid in later years (and thus a larger mean value of aid). To address this concern, we follow the procedures employed by Kersting and Kilby (2014); also Knack (2004). Table 2 reports our results, in which the specification of Table 1 column III is used as a reference (reported again in column I) and only adjustments for the Aid/GDP term are implemented. Specifically, in column

¹¹ Zero-valued aid observations are treated as zeroes, rather than missing (for discussion see Arndt et al., 2010). Countries are excluded from the analysis only if they receive no aid, as defined above, over the entire period.

¹² Note that AidData purpose codes and OECD-DAC CRS codes are complementary.

¹³ The alternative is to use initial observations for the controls, which represents a reduced form. This yields a larger coefficient on mean Aid/GDP. Details available on request.

Table 1

Cross-section regressions for aggregate aid (1983–2010).

	Mean levels		Difference levels		Long differences	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Aid/GDP	3.33** (1.58)	6.85*** (2.14)	6.54*** (1.81)	6.07*** (1.67)	0.76 (0.94)	0.87 (0.96)
GDP p.c. (log.)	53.93*** (13.97)	65.88*** (16.66)	46.94*** (15.76)	38.37** (14.76)	–10.24 (35.21)	–8.14 (34.78)
Total trade (% GDP)	–0.05 (0.24)	0.08 (0.28)	0.17 (0.26)	0.14 (0.23)	0.75* (0.40)	0.84* (0.42)
Life expectancy	2.59* (1.46)	1.45 (1.78)	0.60 (1.67)	0.20 (1.47)	1.17 (1.79)	1.38 (1.85)
Urbanization	–0.24 (0.51)	–0.51 (0.60)	–0.31 (0.60)	0.03 (0.55)	1.13 (1.35)	1.10 (1.38)
Oil/gas exporter	–61.63*** (17.60)	–79.41*** (19.05)	–71.30*** (18.09)	–66.24*** (16.23)	–52.35* (31.14)	–46.64 (30.20)
Institutions (initial)	–	–	–0.67*** (0.11)	–0.66*** (0.11)	–	0.13 (0.11)
Outcome spec.	Mean	Last	Diff.	Diff.	Diff.	Diff.
Aid spec.	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Diff.	Diff.
Control specs.	Mean	Mean	Mean	Last	Diff.	Diff.
Obs.	104	104	104	104	104	104
R2 (adjusted)	0.50	0.45	0.42	0.40	0.01	0.01
RMSE	58.05	67.63	63.56	64.30	82.87	82.82

Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; second panel indicates the specification of the outcome, aid and control variables — 'Mean' indicates the long run (full period) mean, 'Last' indicates the most recent 6-year period mean, 'Diff.' is the difference between the last and first (initial) 6-year period means; all models include a full set of regional fixed effects; selected coefficients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

(II) we instrument for Aid/GDP using a dummy variable for whether the recipient was ever a colony, as well as the initial period observations for life expectancy and log. population. As an alternative, in column (III) we use an alternative instrument set, which includes the same colony dummy plus additional dummy variables for the corresponding colonial

power (Britain, Spain, France, Portugal). Lastly, to avert reverse causality, we restrict the (endogenous) Aid/GDP variable to the mean from the first period only. Using this definition of aid we run the same estimates, with and without instrumental variables (IVs); these are found in columns (IV)–(VI).

Table 2

Difference level regressions for aggregate aid, with external instruments (1983–2010).

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Aid/GDP	6.54*** (1.81)	11.03* (6.11)	6.56** (3.17)	4.19** (1.72)	14.13 (10.82)	5.07** (2.47)
GDP p.c. (log.)	46.94*** (15.76)	65.06** (26.23)	47.04*** (17.58)	31.52** (15.58)	57.47* (33.70)	33.84** (16.16)
Total trade (% GDP)	0.17 (0.26)	0.24 (0.26)	0.17 (0.24)	0.12 (0.25)	0.21 (0.27)	0.13 (0.23)
Life expectancy	0.60 (1.67)	1.13 (1.73)	0.61 (1.62)	–0.13 (1.52)	–0.05 (1.64)	–0.12 (1.37)
Urbanization	–0.31 (0.60)	–0.49 (0.60)	–0.31 (0.56)	–0.05 (0.62)	–0.08 (0.71)	–0.05 (0.58)
Oil/gas exporter	–71.30*** (18.09)	–68.70*** (17.04)	–71.28*** (16.69)	–72.17*** (18.30)	–65.24*** (19.20)	–71.55*** (16.68)
Institutions (initial)	–0.67*** (0.11)	–0.68*** (0.10)	–0.67*** (0.10)	–0.69*** (0.11)	–0.75*** (0.14)	–0.69*** (0.11)
Aid spec.	Mean	Mean-IV	Mean-IV	First	First-IV	First-IV
Instrument set	–	A	B	–	A	B
Obs.	104	104	104	104	104	104
R2 (adjusted)	0.42	0.38	0.42	0.38	0.17	0.38
RMSE	63.56	60.23	58.47	65.61	69.79	60.43
Endogeneity (prob.)	–	0.40	0.86	–	0.15	0.51
Under-id. (prob.)	–	0.05	0.08	–	0.15	0.39
Hansen J (prob.)	–	0.48	0.70	–	0.56	0.41

Notes: dependent variable is the difference of the synthetic metric of institutions between the last and first 6-year periods; column I replicates column III of [Table 1](#); second panel indicates the specification of Aid/GDP — 'Mean' indicates the long run (full period) mean, 'First' indicates the initial 6-year mean (1983–1988), suffix 'IV' means that the variable has been instrumented; instrument set A is a dummy for whether the country was ever colonized, initial period life expectancy and initial log. population size; instrument set B is a dummy for whether the country was ever colonized and dummies for the corresponding colonial power (Britain, France, Spain, Portugal); the final panel reports probabilities associated with tests for the endogeneity of Aid/GDP, instrument relevance and validity (see text); IV estimates use the LIML estimator; all models include a full set of regional fixed effects; selected coefficients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

The results of this exercise support those of Table 1. All estimates for Aid/GDP remain in the positive domain and four of the five new estimates are significant at the 10 percent level (or below). The estimated effect of aid on institutional development is of a broadly similar magnitude to earlier results; however, as is often the case when using instrumental variables, the precision of estimates for the endogenous explanatory variable is lower. The broad similarity of these results reflects, in part, the auxiliary finding that concerns regarding the endogeneity of aid appear insubstantial, after inclusion of other covariates. As shown in the final panel of the table, tests for the endogeneity of the aid term fail to reject the null hypothesis that aid can be treated as exogenous. We also note that the instrument sets perform reasonably. In all cases Hansen J tests for instrument validity cannot be rejected. However, tests for under-identification using the Kleibergen–Paap statistic suggest that the instruments are weak, especially in the case where aid is defined as the first period mean only.¹⁴

5.2. Dynamic panel estimates

The dynamic panel estimates extend the model in column (IV) of Table 1 to a panel data context. Rather than considering differences between the first and last periods, we now consider adjacent periods. Summary results for a range of estimators are reported in Table 3, which focuses on panels of four years, meaning that the data is collapsed into a maximum of seven observations per country. Again, to avert reverse causality, Aid/GDP is lagged one panel period but all other control variables are contemporaneous, which represents a conservative specification. For practical purposes, we do not specify the dependent variable in difference terms; however, as per the equivalence between autoregressive distributed lag and error correction models, results are identical (e.g., De Boef and Keele, 2008).

Columns (I) to (III) impose restrictions on the unit fixed effects terms of Eq. (1), taking identification from both the time and cross-section components. The OLS model (column I) is a simple pooled panel estimator. As the data is strongly balanced, this yields equivalent coefficient estimates to that of the RE model (column II). Columns (IV) to (VI) address the role of unit fixed effects using either a within-transformation (FE) or first differencing (GMM) procedure. In turn, identification is only taken from variation within countries over time. Regardless of the estimator, we find highly consistent results for the lagged Aid/GDP marginal effect. These indicate that a one percentage point increase in the share of Aid/GDP in the previous (four year) period is associated with an increase in political institutional quality of around two percent of a standard deviation in the present period. The long-run multiplier associated with these same estimates is reported in the footer. This takes into account the persistent nature of the outcome: $LRM = \hat{\beta} / (1 - \hat{\rho})$ and approximates the cumulative expected impact (over the long run) of a change in Aid/GDP. The magnitude of these LRM estimates is consistent with the direct long run estimates of Table 1, ranging between around 5 and 8 (ignoring the FE estimates).

Results for other variables are also broadly consistent across the different estimators. In keeping with theory, the fixed effects estimator (column IV) yields a downwards biased coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable. Nonetheless, consistent with Monte Carlo evidence (e.g., Bun and Carree, 2005), estimates for all other coefficients appear less severely affected. The simple bias correction (column V) seems adequate and yields highly similar but somewhat less precise coefficient estimates.¹⁵ Indeed, a Hausman test of the RE and BCFE

estimates indicates that there are no systematic differences between the two sets of results (overall). Lastly, as noted in Section 3, the system GMM results provide an additional safeguard against endogeneity concerns. These results are even less precise, but provide no grounds to question the estimates from alternative approaches. In sum, the dynamic panel estimates confirm the findings of the previous section.

5.3. Disaggregating aid

Turning to our second question, we consider whether the estimates of the marginal effect of aid on the synthetic measure of political institutions depend on the type of aid inflow. In light of the consistency between the dynamic panel and long run cross-section estimates, as well as the specific relevance of a dynamic specification to distinguish between transitory and more permanent flows, we rely on the former. Specifically, we report results for the RE, BCFE and GMM estimators and consider panels of varying lengths.¹⁶ Panel (1) of Table 4 replicates the previous results for aggregate aid (lagged), covering panels of different lengths. For brevity, only estimated coefficients on the relevant Aid/GDP terms are reported.¹⁷ Panel (2) replaces the total Aid/GDP term with the low and high frequency components (entered together). These are derived as per Eq. (2) and are denoted LR and SR (long run, short run). As before, in order to reduce potential reverse causality, we continue to include aid on a lagged basis. As such, the SR component captures the (first) difference in aid commitments between periods $t - 1$ and $t - 2$; and the LR component captures average Aid/GDP over both periods.

Two results stand out from panels (1) and (2). First, the finding of a small positive effect running from aggregate aid to political institutions is supported across panels of different durations. These estimates also are statistically significant in most cases. The absolute values of the coefficients in Aid/GDP (panel 1) vary across panel lengths, reflecting implicit differences in dynamics. Critically, the corresponding LRMs are located in a similar range to previous estimates. For instance, the LRMs for the RE estimates equal 5.8 and 8.0 over two and six year panels respectively. Second, the results of panel (2) indicate this is driven by the low frequency (more permanent) component of aid. Coefficient estimates on the LR term are generally larger than for aggregate aid; in turn, they point to moderately higher LRMs associated with this component of aid.

Panels (3) and (4) take into account differing objectives of aid. Panel (3) applies the three-way classification of total aid described in Section 4. Panel (4) further decomposes governance aid into lower and higher frequency components. This represents the most extensive disaggregation of aid we consider here.¹⁸ The main result from these specifications is that longer-term flows of governance aid (normalized by GDP) display a highly robust and consistent positive association with political institutions. Compared to the relatively small magnitude of the marginal effects (and LRMs) associated with aggregate aid, the marginal effects (LRMs) associated with governance aid are much more substantial. Taking the RE estimates, the LRMs on the low frequency component of governance aid range from 20–50% of a standard deviation (depending on the panel length), which is more than four times the estimates in panel (1). An effect of this magnitude is supported by long run cross-section estimates on the form of Table 1, using the disaggregated measures of aid (see Appendix Table B2, columns I–IV).

In addition to these core findings, Table 4 hints at additional patterns in the data. These are less robust to the choice of panel length or estimator, but merit note. First, the marginal effect associated with economic aid is often negative and is significantly less than zero in some models. Moreover, the LRMs calculated from these terms are larger in

¹⁴ Our IV estimates use the LIML estimator and are implemented in Stata via the `ivreg2` user-written command. Further details on the accompanying tests can be found in Baum et al. (2003).

¹⁵ To implement the BCFE we use the estimates in column (IV) to calculate a corrected coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. This is given by: $\hat{\rho}_{BC} = [1 + T + \hat{\rho}_{FE}(T^2 + T)] / (T^2 - T + 1)^{-1}$. Next, the same FE model is run, now restricting the relevant coefficient to its corrected value. Standard errors on this term are estimated via a bootstrap procedure.

¹⁶ All specifications include the same control variables as before (e.g., Table 3), plus a full set of time effects.

¹⁷ Full estimates are available on request.

¹⁸ Both economic and other aid can be decomposed into low and high frequency components. We do not do so here just for clarity of exposition.

Table 3

Alternative dynamic panel estimates for aggregate aid (4 year panels).

	OLS	RE	MLE	FE	BCFE	GMM
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Institutions (lag)	0.78*** (0.03)	0.78*** (0.03)	0.75*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)	0.77*** (0.05)	0.74*** (0.06)
Aid/GDP (lag)	1.71*** (0.34)	1.71*** (0.34)	1.70*** (0.39)	1.52*** (0.37)	1.29** (0.49)	2.18*** (0.62)
GDP p.c. (log.)	7.85 (4.22)	7.85 (4.22)	8.45 (4.55)	5.50 (13.91)	−1.80 (15.29)	−12.27 (9.73)
Total trade (% GDP)	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.29 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)	0.56*** (0.12)
Life expectancy	0.43 (0.41)	0.43 (0.41)	0.50 (0.40)	0.32 (1.07)	0.58 (1.08)	1.17 (0.76)
Urbanization	0.19 (0.17)	0.19 (0.17)	0.21 (0.17)	1.42 (0.87)	1.60 (0.94)	0.91 (0.53)
Oil/gas exporter	−18.87*** (4.74)	−18.87*** (4.74)	−19.94*** (5.22)	−3.88 (9.57)	−4.90 (13.02)	−23.02* (10.84)
N	587	587	587	587	587	587
RMSE	43.42	43.42	42.75	35.59	42.28	48.51
LRM	7.80	7.80	6.92	2.77	5.65	8.28

Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; specification follows Eq. (1); column headers indicate estimator — OLS is pooled ordinary least squares, RE is panel random effects, MLE is a maximum likelihood random effects estimator, FE is panel fixed effects, BCFE applies an asymptotic bias correction to the former model, GMM is Blundell–Bond system GMM; all models include a full set of panel (time) effects; columns I–III include regional fixed effects; only selected coefficients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the recipient level; LRM is a long run multiplier estimated from estimates in the first two rows (see text).

Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

magnitude, giving less credence to the null hypothesis of no effect. Secondly, 'other aid' appears to hold a small positive association with political institutions, especially when viewed over longer time periods. There are two main candidate explanations for this finding. On the one hand, it may reflect spillovers from aid-financed expenditure in social sectors, such as on training and education. On the other hand, it may be capturing the contribution of multi-sector programmes (such as budget support), which fall into this category (see Appendix C) but are often associated with explicit governance performance conditions.

6. Robustness

6.1. Sub-measures of institutions

The previous section relied on the synthetic (mean) measure of political institutions. This begs the question whether the positive association between aid, and specific types of aid, holds over the constituent sub-measures. This question is investigated in Table 5, which separately runs the same models reported in panels (1) to (3) of Table 5 for each of the five sub-measures. A main finding is that there is a generally

Table 4

Estimates for alternative types of aid.

		2 year panels			4 year panels			6 year panels		
		RE	BCFE	GMM	RE	BCFE	GMM	RE	BCFE	GMM
(1)	Aid/GDP	0.84*** (0.18)	0.62*** (0.22)	0.50 (0.31)	1.71*** (0.34)	1.29*** (0.49)	2.18*** (0.62)	2.67*** (0.53)	2.26*** (0.74)	1.87** (0.94)
(2)	Aid/GDP (LR)	0.94*** (0.23)	0.70** (0.29)	0.26 (0.33)	1.80*** (0.44)	1.48 (0.93)	1.31 (0.99)	2.67*** (0.71)	1.05 (1.98)	3.12* (1.70)
	Aid/GDP (SR)	0.26 (0.49)	0.18 (0.54)	−0.42 (0.81)	1.34 (0.94)	0.47 (0.92)	1.76 (1.26)	3.87*** (1.02)	2.84*** (0.97)	1.78 (2.22)
(3)	Govern. aid/GDP	2.88*** (0.64)	2.99*** (0.81)	2.90*** (0.83)	7.44*** (1.47)	7.32*** (1.89)	7.12*** (2.71)	12.09*** (2.29)	11.54*** (2.91)	14.04*** (5.00)
	Economic aid/GDP	−0.81 (0.54)	−1.95*** (0.64)	−1.29 (1.42)	0.17 (1.24)	−2.09 (1.73)	2.85 (2.80)	0.99 (1.90)	−0.37 (3.23)	−2.55 (3.50)
	Other aid/GDP	0.84*** (0.26)	0.72** (0.28)	0.65 (0.48)	1.07* (0.59)	0.64 (0.77)	0.97 (1.10)	1.45* (0.83)	0.89 (1.11)	1.23 (1.74)
(4)	Govern. aid/GDP (LR)	2.83*** (1.04)	2.94** (1.20)	2.72** (1.12)	11.82*** (3.31)	13.10*** (4.98)	10.33** (4.59)	14.51** (6.38)	9.07 (7.97)	6.59 (9.08)
	Govern. aid/GDP (SR)	3.25 (2.82)	2.65 (2.71)	3.72 (3.35)	2.44 (3.51)	0.95 (4.60)	2.36 (5.20)	10.85 (7.34)	12.04 (8.38)	20.50* (10.77)
	Economic aid/GDP	−1.03* (0.58)	−2.56*** (0.67)	−1.45 (1.48)	0.23 (1.37)	−2.73 (1.86)	1.61 (3.18)	0.51 (2.16)	−0.84 (3.66)	−2.42 (4.83)
	Other aid/GDP	0.78*** (0.25)	0.68** (0.29)	0.32 (0.44)	0.72 (0.62)	−0.01 (0.89)	0.43 (1.13)	1.49* (0.88)	0.35 (1.44)	0.64 (2.32)

Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; separate regression models are indicated by row numbers (1–4) and column headings; columns indicate the combination of estimator (see Table 3) and panel period length applied; specification follows Eq. (1), with aggregate aid replaced by disaggregate components in row models (2)–(4); RE models include regional fixed effects; only coefficients on aid terms shown; aggregate aid terms are lagged one period; LR and SR indicate permanent and transitory components of aid (see Eq. (2)); standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the recipient level.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

consistent positive relationship between low frequency flows of aggregate aid and each sub-measure. That is, our earlier findings do not appear to be driven by a single sub-measure. At the same time, the relationship between governance aid and political institutions appears most robust for the 'checks' and 'political terror' metrics. In contrast the same results (panel 3) are least robust for executive constraints, judicial independence and democracy. We do not wish to interpret these findings beyond the scope of the analysis. While this may be capturing important nuances in how aid may affect institutional development, it may also reflect differences in data quality and/or in the granularity of the underlying institutional measures. Indeed, it is notable that the scales of executive constraints and judicial independence are the narrowest of the chosen sub-measures.

6.2. Heterogeneity

The discussion in Section 2 suggested that the effect of aid on institutions may vary across different contexts. This view finds support in previous empirical studies. These point to variation in aid effectiveness driven by existing institutional conditions (Wright, 2009), the geopolitical considerations of donors (Dunning, 2004; Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Jones, 2015) and membership of a specific geographic region (e.g., neighborhood spillover effects). A simple means to investigate the relevance of these factors is to interact them with aid. Focusing on aggregate aid (for simplicity), Appendix Table B3 reports summary results from separate dynamic panel models incorporating different interaction terms. The interactions with Aid/GDP (lagged) included in each panel refer to: (1) a set of regional dummy variables; (2) log GDP per capita; (3) the initial (earliest) observation of the outcome

variable; and a dummy variable for the post-Cold War period (defined as 1993 onwards).

Results from this exercise are not precise, but they do suggest that some response heterogeneity is present. In particular, the response of institutions to aid seems to be more stronger where initial institutions are better. Also, we note that a positive relation between Aid/GDP and political institutions appears more robust since the mid-1990s. This accords with the findings of Dunning (2004) and helps account for the distinctive nature of the present results relative to previous studies, which place greater reliance on data from earlier periods.

6.3. Latent trends

An outstanding concern with our empirical strategy is that the results may reflect a latent or pre-existing trend through which institutional developments and aid commitments are spuriously correlated. While we have attempted to address this – e.g., by including a lag of the outcome variable, specifying aid with a one period lag, using the system GMM estimator, and by using different temporal data structures – these methods may not be foolproof. For example, a spurious correlation may remain if donors have private knowledge that enables them to correctly forecast the evolution of political institutions and they allocate aid accordingly. A means to ascertain whether this is driving our results is to include additional controls for temporal trends in the outcome variable (for a similar procedure see Guriev et al. 2011). These can be estimated from past and future observations at different levels of aggregation.

We use annual data to separately estimate linear and quadratic time trends, at both the country- and regional-levels, for each outcome variable (i.e., the synthetic mean and its sub-measures). These are

Table 5
Dynamic panel results for sub-measures of institutions.

Outcome	Model/covariate	2 year panels			4 year panels		
		RE	BCFE	GMM	RE	BCFE	GMM
Checks	(1) Aid/GDP	0.94***	0.55*	0.53	2.14***	2.45***	2.36***
	(2) Aid/GDP (LR)	1.20***	1.11***	0.72	1.88***	4.12**	1.93*
	Aid/GDP (SR)	−0.13	−0.22	−1.50	2.66*	1.37	1.96
	(3) Govern. aid/GDP	6.02***	4.91***	8.48***	13.04***	12.47***	15.38***
	Economic aid/GDP	−1.26	−1.33*	−1.74	−1.67	−2.57	−1.12
	Other aid/GDP	0.48	0.13	−0.65	1.13	0.99	0.76
Political terror (−)	(1) Aid/GDP	0.55**	0.61*	0.14	0.65	0.36	0.49
	(2) Aid/GDP (LR)	0.54*	0.45	−0.02	1.48***	1.82	2.41**
	Aid/GDP (SR)	0.60	0.58	0.49	−0.12	−0.26	−2.96**
	(3) Govern. aid/GDP	1.65***	2.39***	−0.08	5.49***	6.35***	3.79
	Economic aid/GDP	0.13	−1.77*	−0.11	2.74*	−0.50	3.34
	Other aid/GDP	0.44	0.76	0.73	−0.85	−0.98	−0.41
Exec. constraints	(1) Aid/GDP	0.78***	0.58**	0.41	1.55***	1.39**	2.70***
	(2) Aid/GDP (LR)	0.81***	0.64**	0.31	1.33***	1.25	1.07
	Aid/GDP (SR)	0.51	0.37	−0.75	1.55	1.37	2.04
	(3) Govern. aid/GDP	1.64	1.13	1.13	4.81	3.91	1.96
	Economic aid/GDP	0.04	−0.60	−0.65	0.71	−0.81	2.22
	Other aid/GDP	0.78**	0.74**	0.81	1.16	1.33	2.64**
Democracy	(1) Aid/GDP	0.50***	0.24	0.29	1.04***	0.38	1.81***
	(2) Aid/GDP (LR)	0.45**	0.01	−0.00	1.14***	−0.15	−0.11
	Aid/GDP (SR)	0.46	0.45	0.61	0.13	−0.07	1.22
	(3) Govern. aid/GDP	0.51	0.46	−0.20	1.78	1.58	0.44
	Economic aid/GDP	−0.59	−1.56**	−1.37	0.95	−0.61	4.07
	Other aid/GDP	0.75***	0.59***	0.89**	0.93*	0.36	1.18
Judicial indep.	(1) Aid/GDP	0.50**	0.35	0.05	1.03**	0.47	0.95
	(2) Aid/GDP (LR)	0.75***	0.62*	0.03	1.10*	−0.75	−0.31
	Aid/GDP (SR)	−0.40	−0.30	−1.41	−0.04	−0.60	1.88
	(3) Govern. aid/GDP	1.54*	2.08	2.18*	1.68	2.05	4.01
	Economic aid/GDP	−0.15	−1.05	3.51*	−0.43	−1.92	1.82
	Other aid/GDP	0.45	0.33	−1.04	1.31**	0.73	−0.54

Notes: dependent variable is indicated in column 'Outcome'; regression models (1–3) follow those of Table 4; columns indicate the combination of estimator and panel period length applied; only coefficients on aid terms shown; aggregate aid terms are lagged one period; LR and SR indicate permanent and transitory components of aid (see Eq. (2)); standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the recipient level.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

denoted as RL, RQ (for regional linear and quadratic trends) and CL, CQ (country-specific trends). These terms are then added (individually) to the baseline dynamic panel models reported in panel (1) of Table 4. Summary results are reported in Appendix Table B3. As expected, the coefficients on the included trend terms (not reported) are consistently positive and highly significant. Even so, the marginal effects associated with aid remain positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in most cases, regardless of the filter applied. Results appear to be most robust for the synthetic measure of institutions, as well as for executive constraints, checks and democracy. In contrast, results for judicial independence and political terror, while in the positive domain, are often not significantly different from zero. The former result is in line with results from Table 5. Again, and without wishing to stretch the analysis too far, one reading of these results is that aid may have a (more) positive effect on the formal legal structure of political institutions, but less impact on effective changes in the behavior (outcomes) of such institutions.

7. Conclusion

This study used recent extensive data on foreign aid to shed new light on the relationship between aid and political institutions. We began by describing some of the primary theoretical mechanisms through which aid may influence institutional outcomes. This suggested there is unlikely to be a simple, monotonic relationship between the two. Rather, aid flows are likely to enter a complex domestic political calculus and interact with donor preferences regarding recipient institutions. The discussion also highlighted that different types of aid can be expected to hold different implications for governance. In turn, the empirical impact of aid on institutions should be considered a net effect, whose direction is ambiguous a priori. It follows that simple assertions about the impact of aid, which lack a robust empirical basis, are unlikely to be helpful.

The first question we addressed in our empirical analysis concerned the relationship between aggregate aid and political institutions. To answer this, we used both long run cross-section and dynamic panel approaches. Based on a wide range of estimators and alternative dynamic structures (panels of different lengths), we found a small positive net effect of aggregate aid (as a share of GDP) on a synthetic measure of political institutions. Second, we asked whether this relationship varies across different types of aid – namely, aid given according to different objectives and aid provided at different frequencies (transitory versus

more permanent). Applying a simple frequency decomposition, we found that the positive association between aggregate aid and political institutions was driven by more stable flows of aid. This accords with existing research regarding how institutions respond to different kinds of income shocks (Brückner et al., 2012).

Extending the analysis, we found that low frequency (stable) flows of governance aid display the largest positive association with political institutions (on average). Both economic and ‘other’ aid commitments show a much less systematic relationship with political institutions. However, under some specifications, the direction of their effects appeared to be negative and positive respectively. Overall, this provides support for the thesis that different types of aid have differential impacts (Dietrich and Wright, 2012, 2015). Alongside the relatively small share of aid provided explicitly for governance purposes, this explains why the estimated aggregate effect of aid is small but positive. That is, the estimated aggregate effect nets out aid given for diverse objectives and at different frequencies.

The main results appear robust to endogeneity concerns. Specifically, re-running the long run cross-section estimates with instrumental variables yields highly consistent results. Also, even when we combine a system GMM estimator, that treats aid as endogenous, with additional controls for region- and country-specific trends in the outcome variables, a statistically significant positive relationship between aid and institutions remains in the data.

We examined whether the same results hold over sub-measures of institutions. Overall, we found no reason to suggest that our results are driven by any one specific metric of institutions. Nonetheless, the relationship between (governance) aid appears least robust for judicial independence. Lastly, we found evidence for heterogeneity both between regions and over time. Indeed, the positive association between aid and political institutions is more apparent in the post-Cold War period. These results confirm the thesis that we can reasonably expect aid to be associated with heterogeneous political economy dynamics in individual countries.

Overall, our main results hold across a wide range of alternative empirical strategies. While we do not go so far as to conclude that our findings are definitively causal, they certainly provide no grounds to claim that aid has had a systematic negative net effect on institutions, on average. Rather, the opposite view finds support. In conclusion, evidence from individual cases suggesting that aid has had a negative impact on institutions is unlikely to be representative.

Appendix A. Data sources and description

The tables below indicate the sources and definitions of the variables used in the analysis. All variables, unless otherwise indicated, are measured at the recipient level. ‘Primary’ indicates the original source of the variable; ‘secondary’ indicates where the aggregate Quality of Government (QoG) database (Teorell et al., 2013) that has been used in lieu of a primary source. DPI refers to the 2012 update of the Database of Political Institutions introduced by Beck et al. (2001); Polity IV is outlined in Jagers and Marshall (2011); WG10 refers to Wood and Gibney (2010), which introduces the political terror measure; and CR10 refers to the CIRI dataset described in Cingranelli and Richards (2010); WDI is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (also integrated into the QoG database).

Table A1
Summary of institutional variables.

Variables	Primary	Secondary	QoG id.	Notes
Democracy	Freedom House	QoG	<i>fh_ipolity2</i>	Captures the extent of democracy. Original data, taken directly from the QoG database, ranges from: 0 = “least democratic”; to 10 = “most democratic”. Following (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005) this variable is calculated as the average of the Freedom House polity measure (the mean of political rights and civil liberty indexes, <i>fh_pr</i> and <i>fh_cl</i>) and the Polity IV revised combined polity score (<i>p_polity2</i>), both converted to a 0–10 scale.
Checks	DPI	QoG	<i>dpi_checks</i>	Reflects the number of veto players over political decisions, which is the number actors whose approval is necessary for a shift in policy. Original data ranges from 1 (lowest) to 18 (highest).
Executive constraints	Polity IV	QoG	<i>p_xconst</i>	Captures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief (political) executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Original data ranges from: 1 = “unlimited authority”; to 7 = “executive parity or subordination”.
Political terror (–)	WG10	QoG	<i>gd_ptss</i>	A reverse scale of political terror. Original data is collated from annual reports on human rights published by the U.S. State Department and ranges from: 1 = “countries under a secure rule of law”; to 5 = “terror has expanded to the whole population”. This original scale is reversed for the present analysis.
Judicial independence	CR10	QoG	<i>ciri_injud</i>	Indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. Original data ranges from: 0 = “not independent”; to 2 = “generally independent”.

Table A2
Summary of explanatory variables.

Variables	Primary	Secondary	QoG id.	Notes
Aid/GDP (%)	AidData/WDI	QoG	–	Current aid flows (ODA loans and grants in USD) to each recipient (per year) are aggregated as described in the text. These are converted to real values, using a price index calculated from the ratio of current to constant GDP (PPP) from the WDI series. Real aid is divided by constant GDP (PPP) and multiplied by 100.
GDP per capita (log.)	WDI	QoG	<i>wdi_gdppc</i>	GDP per capita (log.) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.
Population (log.)	WDI	QoG	<i>wdi_pop</i>	Log. of total population.
Life expectancy	WDI	QoG	<i>wdi_lifexp</i>	Life expectancy at birth (years).
Total trade (% GDP)	WDI	QoG	<i>wdi_ttr</i>	Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP.
Urban population (%)	WDI	QoG	<i>wdi_urban</i>	Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices.
Oil/gas net exporter (dummy)	R13	QoG	<i>ross_oil_netexp</i> , <i>ross_gas_netexp</i>	Takes a value of one if either oil or gas net exports (per capita) is greater than zero.

Appendix B. Additional tables and figures

Table B1
Summary statistics, by region (1983–2010).

		EAP	ECA	LAC	MENA	SAS	SSA	Mean a
(a)	Checks	2.91	2.52	3.18	1.25	3.50	1.98	2.56
	Democracy	5.13	5.04	7.44	2.58	5.34	4.31	4.97
	Exec. constraints	4.59	4.33	5.55	2.51	4.35	3.36	4.11
	Judicial indep.	0.95	0.65	1.09	0.66	1.06	0.88	0.88
	Political terror (–)	3.42	3.14	3.23	2.79	2.54	3.20	3.05
	Synthetic metric	18.98	– 3.46	46.45	– 58.68	10.68	– 15.57	– 0.27
(b)	Governance aid/GDP	0.96	0.27	0.22	0.15	0.18	0.60	0.40
	Economic aid/GDP	1.52	0.58	0.54	0.64	1.80	2.07	1.19
	Other aid/GDP	2.11	1.16	1.64	1.83	1.70	5.91	2.39
	Total aid/GDP	4.60	2.00	2.40	2.63	3.68	8.57	3.98
(c)	Governance aid (% total)	20.98	13.39	9.34	5.88	4.94	6.96	10.01
	Economic aid (% total)	33.08	28.77	22.50	24.36	48.97	24.10	29.92
	Other aid (% total)	45.93	57.84	68.16	69.75	46.09	68.94	60.07
	Bilateral aid (% total)	92.64	77.23	90.88	88.19	94.45	79.13	87.09

Notes: institutional outcomes are as described in [Appendix A](#); the ‘synthetic’ (mean) measure is 100 times the mean of the five separate measures of institutions calculated after each one has been normalized; aid components are as described in the text; regions are abbreviated as follows: East Asia & Pacific = EAP, Europe & Central Asia = ECA, Latin America & Caribbean = LAC, Middle East & North Africa = MENA, South Asia = SAS, Sub-Saharan Africa = SAS. |a = means are calculated over regions.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

Table B2

Cross-section regressions for disaggregated aid (1983–2010).

	Mean levels		Difference levels		Long differences	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Governance aid/GDP	20.84** (7.93)	28.71*** (7.68)	20.03*** (7.29)	22.24*** (7.79)	1.36 (2.65)	0.09 (2.88)
Economic aid/GDP	7.81 (9.38)	13.61 (9.88)	17.33* (8.99)	13.74 (8.87)	−7.67 (7.67)	−8.65 (7.47)
Other aid/GDP	−0.38 (3.67)	1.88 (4.05)	1.60 (3.81)	1.63 (3.71)	2.49 (1.82)	3.49* (1.94)
GDP p.c. (log.)	48.17*** (14.23)	58.50*** (17.04)	41.73** (17.19)	35.86** (15.87)	−6.12 (35.85)	−2.81 (35.34)
Total trade (% GDP)	0.07 (0.25)	0.23 (0.30)	0.32 (0.27)	0.26 (0.25)	0.72* (0.42)	0.79* (0.43)
Life expectancy	2.87* (1.53)	1.78 (1.79)	0.73 (1.67)	0.38 (1.43)	1.15 (1.72)	1.42 (1.82)
Urbanization	−0.01 (0.58)	−0.21 (0.68)	−0.07 (0.66)	0.20 (0.61)	1.31 (1.38)	1.29 (1.42)
Oil/gas exporter	−62.08*** (17.98)	−79.97*** (19.43)	−71.87*** (18.65)	−67.53*** (16.94)	−47.75 (31.71)	−39.52 (30.94)
Institutions (lag)	—	—	−0.68*** (0.11)	−0.68*** (0.12)	—	0.16 (0.13)
Outcome	Mean	Last	Diff.	Diff.	Diff.	Diff.
Aid variable	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Diff.	Diff.
Control variables	Mean	Mean	Mean	Last	Diff.	Diff.
Obs.	104	104	104	104	104	104
R2 (adjusted)	0.50	0.46	0.42	0.41	0.00	0.01
RMSE	57.71	67.06	63.50	64.22	83.15	82.88

Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; second panel indicates the specification of the outcome, aid and control variables — 'Mean' indicates the long run (full period) mean, 'Last' indicates the most recent 6-year mean, 'Diff.' is the difference between the last and first (initial) 6-year means; all models include a full set of regional fixed effects; selected coefficients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

Table B3

Estimates including interaction terms with aggregate aid.

Panel	Variable	2 year panels			4 year panels		
		RE	BCFE	GMM	RE	BCFE	GMM
(1)	Aid/GDP	0.15 (0.65)	0.75 (1.20)	−0.60 (1.67)	−0.18 (1.23)	0.63 (2.69)	−2.35 (3.33)
	SSA × Aid	0.72 (0.64)	−0.05 (1.22)	1.01 (1.62)	1.78 (1.22)	0.50 (2.73)	3.82 (3.31)
	Asia × Aid	0.91 (0.72)	−0.31 (1.35)	1.96 (1.69)	3.22** (1.43)	1.19 (3.18)	7.06** (3.54)
	LAC × Aid	0.15 (0.70)	−0.58 (1.46)	1.20 (1.82)	1.40 (1.27)	1.49 (3.04)	9.70** (4.63)
(2)	Aid/GDP	0.61** (0.29)	0.24 (0.36)	1.07* (0.51)	1.60*** (0.52)	1.25 (0.89)	2.62*** (0.94)
	GDP × Aid	−0.21 (0.18)	−0.35 (0.23)	0.31 (0.30)	−0.11 (0.31)	−0.03 (0.52)	0.55 (0.75)
(3)	Aid/GDP	1.00*** (0.18)	0.74*** (0.20)	0.86*** (0.26)	2.01*** (0.36)	1.50*** (0.40)	2.30*** (0.51)
	Initial instits. × Aid	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
(4)	Aid/GDP	0.28 (0.32)	−0.10 (0.39)	−0.23 (0.56)	1.08* (0.63)	0.60 (0.89)	2.38** (1.16)
	(Year > 1992) × Aid	0.71** (0.32)	0.90** (0.37)	0.93 (0.57)	0.88 (0.75)	0.94 (0.92)	−0.38 (1.13)

Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; all aid terms are lagged one period; rows (1–4) indicate separate models on the form of row (1) of [Table 4](#), augmented by interactions of the (lagged) aid term with additional control variables; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.

Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

Table B4

Estimates including trends estimated from time series filters.

Outcome	Filter	2 year panels			4 year panels		
		RE	BCFE	GMM	RE	BCFE	GMM
Synthetic	RL	0.84***	0.61***	0.52*	1.71***	1.27**	2.22***
	RQ	0.84***	0.62***	0.51	1.71***	1.29***	2.21***
	CL	0.68***	0.66***	0.68**	0.99***	1.18***	2.04***
	CQ	0.30**	0.33*	0.39	0.26*	0.40	0.85*
Checks	RL	0.94***	0.56*	0.63	2.14***	2.44***	2.56***
	RQ	0.93***	0.55*	0.53	2.14***	2.41***	2.42***
	CL	0.64**	0.68*	0.74*	1.13**	2.05**	2.41***
	CQ	0.15	0.10	−0.09	0.38*	0.92**	0.81*
Political terror (−)	RL	0.56**	0.62*	0.35	0.66	0.37	0.71
	RQ	0.56**	0.62*	0.31	0.67	0.38	0.63
	CL	0.63***	0.72**	0.51	0.38	0.50	0.61
	CQ	0.25	0.26	0.19	−0.16	−0.55	−0.62
Exec. constraints	RL	0.80***	0.58**	0.43	1.58***	1.42**	2.71***
	RQ	0.78***	0.58**	0.43	1.56***	1.41**	2.77***
	CL	0.56***	0.66***	0.44	0.78***	1.36***	2.31***
	CQ	0.35***	0.46**	0.28	0.35*	0.70*	1.60***
Democracy	RL	0.50***	0.23	0.29	1.04***	0.37	1.85***
	RQ	0.50***	0.23	0.28	1.04***	0.38	1.83***
	CL	0.37***	0.31**	0.32	0.45**	0.40	1.40***
	CQ	0.26***	0.27**	0.32	0.25	0.39	0.96**
Judicial indep.	RL	0.48*	0.32	−0.01	1.03**	0.50	0.87
	RQ	0.47*	0.31	−0.04	1.02**	0.48	0.95
	CL	0.23	0.14	0.35	0.33	0.08	0.82
	CQ	−0.11	−0.12	0.06	−0.07	−0.13	0.11

Notes: dependent variable is indicated in the first column; cells report coefficient on aggregate Aid/GDP (lagged one period), augmented by estimates of trends in the outcome variable; trends are regional linear (RL), regional quadratic (RQ), country-specific linear (CL), country-specific quadratic (CQ); standard errors (not shown) are robust.


Source: authors' calculations from data described in [Appendix A](#).

* 0.1.

** 0.05.

*** 0.01.

(a) South Asia



(b) Sub-Saharan Africa




Fig. B1. Regional means for synthetic and sub-measures of institutions. Note: all measures are standardized, taking a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Sources: see [Appendix A](#).

Appendix C. Description of aid data classification

Table C3

Summary of aid classifications.

AidData classification/information			
Group	2-digit code	Purpose codes	Description
A	15	15000–15261	Government and civil society
	92	92000–92030	Support to NGOs
B	21	21005–21081	Transport and storage
	22	22000–22081	Communications
	23	23000–23082	Energy generation and supply
	24	24000–24081	Banking and financial services
	25	25010–25081	Business and other services
	31	31000–31391	Agriculture, forestry and fishing
	32	32000–32310	Industry, mining & construction
C	33	33100–33210	Trade policy, regulations and tourism
	11	11000–11430	Education
	12	12000–12281	General/basic health
	13	13000–13801	Population policy and reproductive health
	14	14000–14082	Water supply and sanitation
	16	16010–16081	Other social infrastructure and services
	41	41000–41082	General environmental protection
	42	42010	Women
	43	43010–43082	Other cross-cutting
	51	51010	General budget support
	52	52010	Development aid/food security assistance
	53	53030–53050	Other commodity assistance
	60	60010–60040	Action related to debt
	70	70000	Humanitarian aid
	72	72000–72050	Emergency response
	73	73010	Reconstruction relief
	74	74010	Disaster response and preparedness
	91	91010	Administrative costs of donors
	93	93010	Refugees in donor countries
	99	99810–99820	Unspecified

Notes: groups refer to the aid categories employed in this study; A is governance aid; B is economic aid; and C is all other aid.

Source: authors' summary from AidData v2.1 User Guide; see Tierney et al., 2011.

Appendix D. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.004>.

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