


1. a)



$$\text{Budget} = 10,000$$

$$\text{Thailand} = x \quad P_x = 3,000$$

$$\text{Maldives} = y \quad P_y = 5,000$$

$$\text{Slope of Budget line} = \frac{P_x}{P_y} = \frac{3000}{5000} = \frac{3}{5}$$

$$\text{Budget} = P_x \cdot x + P_y \cdot y$$

$$10000 = 3,000x + 5,000y$$

$$\text{Slope of IC} : MU_x = MU_y \quad \therefore = \frac{2x}{y}$$

$$2x = y$$

$$\text{Budget} : 10,000 = 3000(0.3y) + 5000y$$

$$10,000 = 900y + 5000y$$

$$10,000 = 5900y$$



$$y = \frac{100}{59} = 1.69$$

$$x = \frac{30}{59} = 0.51$$

$\therefore$ Neo will choose to go to Maldives 2 times

and go to Thailand 0 time because he will get higher utility from travelling to Maldives than to Thailand

1. b) If budget = 20,000

Income Demand (Thailand) = undefined (slope = $-\infty$)

2. a) $MRTS = \frac{-MP_L}{MP_K} = -\frac{6}{8} = -0.75$

Minimum cost: $\frac{MP_L}{w} = \frac{w}{r}$

$\frac{MP_L}{w} = \frac{MP_K}{r}$

$\frac{6}{3} = \frac{8}{r}$



$\therefore r = 4$

2. b) $w = 4 \quad r = 4$

Isocost slope = -1

$K = \frac{TC}{4}$

$L = 0$



Maximize profit: $MC = MR$

Price is 150 at the equilibrium and $P = MR$ because perfect competition.

Therefore, the marginal cost is 150 baht.

3. b) $P = 150 \quad Q = 20 \quad AC = 180 \quad AFC = 60$



Average variable cost: $AC - AFC = 180 - 60 = 120$ baht //

Total Revenue: $P \cdot Q = 150 \cdot 20 = 3000$ baht //

Total cost: $AC \cdot Q = 180 \cdot 20 = 3600$ baht //

Profit: $(P - AC) \cdot Q = (150 - 180) \cdot 20 = -600$ baht //

3. c) The firm should stay in the market in the short run. This is because the total revenue can cover some fixed cost and all variable cost as $P > AVC$. Therefore, the firm will lose only some of the fixed cost.




$\rightarrow D$ and P decrease from 150 to 120

$\rightarrow MR = 120 \quad MC \rightarrow q$ decrease from 20 to q_2

$\rightarrow P = 120 > \min AVC$

Therefore, firm operates //



4. b)

$$MC = MR \quad \therefore P = 60 - 0.6(30)$$

$$24 = 60 - 1.2Q \quad P = 42$$

$$1.2Q = 36$$

$$Q = 30$$



$$\pi = TR - TC$$

$$\pi = P \cdot Q - ATC \cdot Q$$

$$\pi = (P - ATC) Q$$

$$\pi = (48 - 24) 30$$

$$\pi = 720$$



Question (5) Consider this payoff matrix for Mook and Mix, they are competitors in an oligopoly sweetened product. Mook's payoff (bold) and Mix's payoff (regular) in this table is in thousand(s) baht unit. Discuss how you figure out a Nash equilibrium in this game.

		Mix		
		Boba tea (B)	Ice-cream (C)	Donut (D)
Mook	Boba tea (B)	1, 2	3, 5	2, 1
	Ice-cream (C)	0, 4	2, 1	3, 0
	Donut (D)	-1, 1	4, 3	0, 2

If Mix choose B Mook will choose B

" " " " " " " "

" " " " " " " "

If Mook choose B Mix will choose C

" " " " " " " "

" " " " " " " "

$\therefore$ Nash equilibrium = (D, C)