



**COMMUNITY-BASED
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**



Type of Goods

		Subtractability of Use	
		High	Low
Difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries	High	<i>Common-pool resources:</i> groundwater basins, lakes, irrigation systems, fisheries, forests, etc.	<i>Public goods:</i> peace and security of a community, national defense, knowledge, fire protection, weather forecasts, etc.
	Low	<i>Private goods:</i> food, clothing, automobiles, etc.	<i>Toll goods:</i> theaters, private clubs, daycare centers


Natural Resources?

- Most natural resources → “Common-pool resources”
- Non-excludable & Non-rivalrous
- Forest, Fish stocks, Open water → Renewable resources
- Global CPR → Ocean, Ozone layer

Governance regime

- Who is allowed to appropriate resource units
- Timing, quantity, location, and technology of appropriation
- Who is obligated to contribute resources to provide or maintain the resource system itself
- How appropriation and obligation activities are to be monitored and enforced
- How conflicted over appropriation and obligation activities are to be resolved
- How the rules affecting the above will be changed over time with changes in the performance of the resource system and the strategies of participants

Governance mechanism



“Self-governance (Collective choice)”

Market-based management



- Market Failure
- Open access → over-exploitation/ pollution
- No management incentives
- “Tragedies of the Commons” by Garrett Hardin in 1968

Market-based management

- Graze land → Open Access to All
- Shepherders → free access but future cost from land degradation
- Equal share of this cost
- If shepherders are rational → maximize benefits today before degradation

Market-based management

- Game with Prisoner Dilemma (PD)
- 2 herders with their own sheep
- Land carrying capacity \rightarrow L sheep
- If each herders bring $L/2$ sheep, each gains 10 units of benefit
- But if one of them increases the number of sheep, both tend to maximize number of their sheep,
- Then, over-exploitation \rightarrow both gain nothing
- Other example: over-fishery

		Herdsman 1	
		1	2
Herdsman 2	No. of animals		
	1		5, 5
2		3, 6	4, 4

Market-based management

The Tragedy of the Commons		Family A	
		No New Sheep	Graze More Sheep
All Other Families	No New Sheep	Remain Poor	Become Wealthy
	Graze More Sheep	Remain Poor	Over-Graze Land Destitution

The diagram illustrates the strategic choices for Family A and all other families in a commons management scenario.

 - **Family A's Choice:** The cell "Graze More Sheep" is circled, indicating it is the chosen strategy.

 - **Outcomes for Family A:**

- If Family A chooses "No New Sheep" and all other families also choose "No New Sheep", Family A remains poor.
- If Family A chooses "Graze More Sheep" and all other families choose "No New Sheep", Family A becomes wealthy.
- If Family A chooses "No New Sheep" and all other families choose "Graze More Sheep", Family A remains poor.
- If Family A chooses "Graze More Sheep" and all other families choose "Graze More Sheep", Family A experiences destitution due to over-grazing.

 Dashed arrows indicate the transition from the "Remain Poor" outcomes to the "Become Wealthy" outcome when Family A chooses to graze more sheep.

Management by state

- Market-failure → well-defined property rights
- Policy makers → No common-pooled resources should be left 'open', but state-owned
- State-owned property → with cost privatization through taxes or other mechanism

Management by state



1. Direct governance

- Protected areas, public irrigation, world heritages
- Assumption: government have better information and have perfect enforcement

2. Concession

- Assumption: Private sector has good incentives in resource management

Management by state



- **Government failure**
- **Lack of efficiency**
 - Limited capacity: human resources/ budgets
 - Rent-seeking behavior/ conflict of interest
 - **No incentives for monitoring the performance of concession contract**

Management by state

Khao lam, Karnchanaburi



Tublan, Korat



Management by state

Sirinath, Phuket



Phrae

Management by state

- Sand exploitation, Kalasin



Community-based management

- Elinor Ostrom : “Governing the Commons” (1990)



Community rights can successfully manage the ‘**Common-pooled resources**’ without the centrally-controlling government or resource privatization

Community-based management

□ Why community?

- More knowledge
- Norms! → members' behaviors
- Monitoring and Social Sanction with relatively low enforcement costs
- 'Learning' from actions/experiences → more information on costs/outcomes from actions → better alternatives



Community-based management



Laboratory & field experiments

- more communication → more collaboration
- The samples are willing to pay some costs for monitoring & enforcement
- The enforcement from outside → reduce the level of voluntary cooperation

Community-based management

- Community rules: 3 levels

- 1) Operational Rules

- When/how many resources to be utilized / by which mean

- 2) Collective-Choice Rules

- how the resources be manage

- 3) Constitutional Rules

- who have rights to participate the rules-making

Community-based management

Making change?

$$D_i = B_{Ni} - B_{Oi}$$

If $D_i > (C1_i + C2_i + C3_i) \rightarrow$ Change occurs!

C1 : Costs of time and efforts spent devising and agreeing upon new rules

C2 : Short-term costs of adopting new appropriation strategies

C3 : Long-term costs of monitoring and maintaining a self-governed system over time

$$D_k > (C1_k + C2_k + C3_k)$$

Community-based management

- Some common factors
 - **Salience**: Appropriators are dependent on the resource system for a major portion of their livelihoods
 - **Common understanding**: Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource system operates and how their actions affect each other and the resource system
 - **Discount rate**: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to future benefits
 - **Distribution of interests**: Appropriators are similarly affected by a lack of coordinative patterns

Community-based management

- Some common factors
 - ▣ **Norms of trust, reciprocity, and punishment:**
Appropriators trust one another to keep promises and relate to one another with reciprocity
 - ▣ **Autonomy:** Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external authorities countermanding them
 - ▣ **Local leadership and prior organizational experience:**
Appropriators have learned at least minimal skills of organization through participation in other local associations

Community-based management



- Institutional designs
 - Clearly defined boundaries
 - Fair distribution of benefits
 - Collective-choice arrangement
 - Monitoring
 - Sanction
 - Conflict resolution mechanism
 - Minimal recognition of rights to organize

Community-based management



- Community failures
 - ▣ Market forces
 - ▣ Rent-seeking behaviors
 - ▣ Population growths
 - ▣ Inappropriate rules