

HEURISTICS & BIASES

The Original Three Heuristics

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Heuristics and biases is where Kahneman and Tversky's research collaboration began.



Tversky and Kahneman (1974)

Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of
thinking under uncertainty.

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman

Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as "I think that . . .," "chances are . . .," "it is unlikely that . . .," and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity? This article shows that people rely on a

limited number of heuristics, or rules of thumb, for making judgments. One such heuristic is representativeness. When visibility is good because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity as an indication of distance leads to common biases. Such biases are also found in the intuitive judgment of probability. This article describes three heuristics that are employed to assess probabilities and to predict values. Biases to which these heuristics lead are enumerated, and the applied and theoretical implications of these observations are discussed.

Representativeness

occupation from a list of possibilities (for example, farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, or physician)? How do people order these occupations from most to least likely? In the representativeness heuristic, the probability that Steve is a librarian, for example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of, or similar to, the stereotype of a librarian. Indeed, research with problems of this type has shown that people order the occupations by probability and by similarity in exactly the same way (1). This approach to the judgment of probability leads to serious errors, because similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments of probability.

Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes. One of the factors that have no effect on representativeness but should have a major effect on probability is the prior probability, or base-rate frequency, of the outcomes. In the case of Steve, for example, the fact that there are many more farmers than librarians in the population should enter into any reasonable estimate of the probability that Steve is a librarian rather than a farmer. Considerations of base-rate frequency, however, do not affect the similarity of Steve to the stereotypes of librarians and farmers.

The lecture


- In 1968-1969, in Daniel Kahneman's grad class, Amos Tversky gave a guest lecture about judgement and decision-making.
- Kahneman and Tversky began to collaborate on a research program to identify **the psychological processes, the presumably-simple heuristics that actually generated judgments.**
- The research program has two steps:
 - **Biases:** Identify systematic biases relative to the normative model.
 - **Heuristics:** Hypothesize (and test) a heuristic that can explain the biases.

The original three heuristics



The Representativeness Heuristics

The Availability Heuristics



The Anchoring & Adjustment Heuristics

The Original Three Heuristics

Representativeness: People draw inferences based on **the degree of similarity** between features of a sample and features of a population from which it might have been drawn.

Availability: People judge the probability of an event by **the ease with which instances can be brought to mind.**

Anchoring-and-adjustment: People make estimates by **starting from an initial value** (perhaps suggested by the problem, or a partial computation) **and then adjusting,** often insufficiently in the direction of the correct answer.


Why not taking the mental shortcut?

Possible result of using heuristics is susceptible to **probability judgment error**: thinking some event is more (or less) likely than it actually is.

if \hat{p} is the judged / estimated / assessed probability & p is the objective probability

, then with heuristics

- $\hat{p} = p$
 - $\hat{p} < p$
 - $\hat{p} > p$
- } systematic biases



Many financial decisions are based on probability assessment.

- How likely is it that a particular company will continue to post earnings increases?
- What is the probability that interest rates will rise by 100 basis points over the next quarter?
- How likely is it that some firm's current round of R&D will bear fruit?



The problem is that many people have great difficulty understanding probability.





The Representativeness Heuristics

Linda



Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.

What is more probable for Linda?

- (1.) She is a bank teller.
- (2.) She is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement.





Linda Problem



Nearly 90% of respondents chose (2.). (N = 86)

But, (1.) must be more likely because (2.) is a subset of (1.).



Conjunction Fallacy

- One difficulty with understanding probability is with the difference between **simple probabilities** (probability of A) and **joint probabilities** (probability of both A and B).



Conjunction Fallacy

Suppose that:


A denotes the event of being bank teller

B denotes the event of being feminist.

The corresponding probabilities are $P(A)$ and $P(B)$.

$P(A \cap B) \leq P(A)$

Conjunction fallacy is judging that $P(A \cap B) > P(A)$, instead of following a fact that $P(A \cap B) \leq P(A)$



The Representativeness Heuristics

➤ Definition: "Probabilities are evaluated ^{judged} by the degree to which X is representative of Y."

➤ Being **representative of** means:

- being resemble;
- being similar in essential properties to;
- reflecting the salient features of.

descriptive data
e.g. Linda explanation

engineer
feminist

X can be "sample",
Y can be "population" from which the sample might have been drawn.

X can be a possible consequence or realization coming from a system or a process,
Y can be the system or the process.

The Representativeness Heuristics

The representativeness heuristics can be used to explain:

- The conjunction fallacy
The description of Linda is more representative of/similar to B.
- Base rate neglect
- The law of small ^{number}~~number~~
- The gambler's fallacy
- The hot hand fallacy



Base Rate Neglect

- In a study by Kahneman&Tversky(1973) "On the psychology of prediction", subjects were shown personality sketches, allegedly from a group of professionals made up of engineers and lawyers.
- In one treatment, subjects were told that 70% of the professionals were engineers and 30% were lawyers; in another, they were told that 30% were engineers and 70% were lawyers.

①

70% engineers
30% lawyers

|

30% engineers
70% lawyers

"Base rate"

Consider the following profile sketch

②

Diego is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children.

was designed to be

neutral

A man of high ability and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.

What is the likelihood that ^{Diego}~~Dick~~ is one of the engineers?

← judged probability

$$\hat{p}(\text{Diego is an engineer}) = ?$$

Base Rate Neglect

- This sketch was designed to be neutral and unlikely to push subjects in one direction or the other.
- Subjects saw this description as neutral.
- Median response is 50%, regardless of whether they had been previously told that 70% of the sample were engineers or 70% of the sample were lawyers.
- Subjects were ignoring the base rate, hence the term “base rate neglect”.

Base Rate Neglect

- In terms of representativeness, the description appears representative of a random (50/50) process, so we believe this is indeed the process, ignoring what we know about prior probabilities.
- Base rate can be neglected or insufficiently paid attention.



challenge?

The rational benchmark: Bayesian Updating

The optimal use of prior and sample information is through using Bayes' rule:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|A')P(A')}$$

Handwritten notes: "learning" above the fraction, "prior probability (≡ base rate)" with an arrow pointing to P(A), and a box around the denominator.

The Bayes' rule is regarded as an optimal way to update the probability of an event (A) based on knowing that evidence (B) is true.

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|A')P(A')}$$

Handwritten notes: "evidence" with an arrow pointing to B in the first term, and "law of total probability" written below the denominator.

Bayesian Updating: Example

- The probabilities of a rainy day and of a dry day (based on historical frequencies for this time of the year) are as follows: $P(\text{rain}) = 40\%$ and $P(\text{dry}) = 60\%$. These are the base rates.
- Suppose we also know that:
 - (1.) conditional on the fact that it did rain, rain was predicted by weather forecasting 90% of the time : $P(\text{rain predicted} | \text{rain}) = 90\%$ } new info.
 - (2.) conditional on the fact that it turned out to be dry, rain was predicted by weather forecasting 2.5% of the time: $P(\text{rain predicted} | \text{dry}) = 2.5\%$.
- How should the base rate of 40% chance of rain be adjusted if we know that a weather forecast (sample) is predicting rain?

$$P(\text{rain} | \text{predicted rain}) = ?$$

Bayesian Updating: Example

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$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|A')P(A')}$$

$$P(\text{rain}|\text{rain predicted}) = \frac{P(\overset{B}{\text{rain predicted}}|\overset{A}{\text{rain}})P(\text{rain})}{P(\text{rain predicted})} = \frac{90\% \times 40\%}{90\% \times 40\% + 2.5\% \times 60\%} = \frac{36\%}{36\% + 1.5\%} = 96\%$$

ANS: if we know that a weather forecast is predicting rain, there is a 96% chance that it will rain, versus only a 40% chance if we don't know the reading.

The Law of Small Numbers

LLN

large sample \sim population

- The law of large numbers states that a large random sample from a population will have a distribution that closely resembles the population distribution.
- The "law of small numbers" is an incorrect belief such that people exaggerate how likely a small sample will resemble the population distribution.
 - The sample, however small, should look like the population, in the sense that essential features should be shared.
 - For this to make sense, we need to have a fairly strong sense of what the distribution should look like.

$$P(\text{HHT}) = P(\text{TTT})$$

The Gambler's Fallacy



predicting reverse in streaks

$$P(\text{H} | \text{T T T T T T T}) = 50\%$$

coin toss is iid

- People expect random sequences to even themselves out, even in a "small" sample.

- Individuals are subject to gambler's fallacy see chance as a self-correcting process.

$$P(\text{T} | \text{H H H H H H H H}) > 50\%$$

- People predict that the longer a streak of heads, the more likely a tail because it is due.

Sample

ex. 10 fair coin tosses,

expect to see
50% of the time to be tail
50% " _____ " head

Population

ex. Fair coin toss 10 million times


Random

$$P(\text{H}) = P(\text{T}) = 50\%$$

The Hot Hand Fallacy



- People perceive independent random signals as having too many streaks for randomness, and invent hot-hand stories to explain the pattern (due to the law of small numbers).



- Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky(1985) surveyed 100 basketball fans at Cornell and Stanford.
 - 91% believe that a player has a better chance of making a shot after having just made his last two or three shots than he does after having just missed his last two or three shots.
 - The successful rate in the long-term (base rate) is not fully considered, when judging the probability of future success.



Let's think about:



expect reversal in streak

Gambler fallacy



expect continuation in streak

Hot hand fallacy

[Flipping a coin:](https://www.random.org/coins/?num=10&cur=60-chf.1franc)

<https://www.random.org/coins/?num=10&cur=60-chf.1franc>



The Availability Heuristics

Available, Recent, and Salient

- ❑ Sample data are often given undue importance relative to population parameters.
- ❑ This tendency is accentuated when the data are **easy to obtain and process**, that is, when they are **"available."**
- ❑ This is especially so when the events in question have occurred **recently** and are **salient**.

orange orange orange ^{salient} APPLE orange orange

The Availability Heuristics

- ❑ With the availability heuristic, people judge the probability of an event by the ease with which instances can be brought to mind.
- ❑ Events that are called to mind easily are believed to have a greater likelihood of occurring.

The Availability Heuristics

❑ Events that are **called to mind easily** because they are:

❑ **familiar**

❑ **salient**

❑ **vivid**

❑ **recent**



❑ Also, some events are **easier to imagine**.

❑ People tended to remember their own behaviors better (egocentric judgement), since it is easier to recall what we did.

The Availability Heuristics: Example

- The overestimation of the probability of a plane crash might follow the recent incidence of plane crash and the horrifying news about the crash.
- The overestimation of the probability of future flood might follow recent experience of flood.





The Anchoring & Adjustment Heuristics



Anchor & Adjust

- In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value and adjusting it to generate a final estimate.
- Often the adjustment is insufficient.
- The initial value often naturally comes from the frame of the problem.

The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic

①

40,320
anchor

What is $8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1$?

$\approx 2,000$

②

anchor

What is $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 \times 7 \times 8$?

≈ 500

The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic

- In both cases, correct answer is 40,320.
- Median estimate for the first is 2,250.
- Median estimate for the second is 512.
- Most people will unconsciously multiply the first few numbers in the sequence before providing the answer.
- The use of the product of the first few numbers as an anchor—without regard to the length of the sequence— led to insufficient adjustment.

The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic

- Anchoring can occur with obviously meaningless irrelevant numbers that appear in the problem frame.
- Anchors can be self-generated.

Why does adjustment tend to be insufficient?

- Lack of cognitive effort, i.e. cognitive laziness
 - While focusing on the anchor is easy, movement away from the anchor is effortful, so for this reason people will often stop too early.
- Decision-makers move their answer away from the anchoring value only until they enter a plausible range of the truth, which they don't know.
 - The greater is the uncertainty, the greater is the plausible range.
- The anchor inherent in the problem frame might act as a kind of conscious or subconscious suggestion by way of primed memory.

\$100
↕
\$50



**Heuristics, good or bad?:
Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics**

"sometimes"

Heuristics, good or bad?

- From a perspective, a "heuristic" is both a good thing and a bad thing.
- It can provide fast, close to optimal, answers when time or cognitive capabilities are limited, but it also can violate logical principles and leads to errors in some situations.

Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics

- **Simplicity and frugality** have also inspired models of cognition.
- The fast and frugal models are justified by their psychological plausibility and adaptedness to natural environments.
 - The real world **provides only scarce information,**
 - The real world **forces us to rush when gathering and processing information,**
 - The real world **does not cut itself up into variables whose errors are conveniently independently normally distributed.**



THANKS!

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