

# THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE

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EE465/EE463 Project Evaluation

Semester 2/2014

Based on Chapter 10 of *Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice*, Boardman et al., 2011.

# Topics

- Social discount rate: Introduction
- Does the choice of discount rate matter?
- The theory behind the appropriate SDR
- Alternatives in deriving SDR from market rates
- The shadow price of capital

# Social Discount Rate (1)

- When evaluating government policies or projects, analysts must decide on the appropriate weights to apply to policy impacts that occur in different years.
- Given these weights, denoted by  $w_t$ , and estimates of the real annual net social benefits,  $NB_t$ , the estimated net present value (NPV) of a project is given by

$$NPV = \sum_{t=0}^n w_t NB_t$$

- Selection of the appropriate **social discount rate (SDR)** is equivalent to deciding on the appropriate *set of weights* for the above problem.
- These weights are sometimes referred to as *social discount factors*.

## Social Discount Rate (2)

- Discounting reflects the idea that a given amount of real resources in the future is worth less today than the same amount is worth now because:
  - 1) Via investment, one can transform resources that are currently available into a greater amount in the future.
  - 2) People prefer to consume a given amount of resources now, rather than in the future.
- Thus, it is generally accepted that the social discount weights *decline over time*:

$$0 \leq w_n \leq w_{n-1} \leq \dots \leq w_1 \leq w_0 = 1.$$

# Social Discount Rate (3)

- Three unresolved issues:
  - 1) Whether market interest rates can be used to determine the weights.
  - 2) Whether to include unborn future generations in determining the weights and, if so, what weight they should have.
  - 3) Whether society values a unit of investment the same as a unit of consumption.
- Different assumptions about these issues lead to different approaches towards determining the SDR, which, in turn, lead to different discount weights

# Does the Choice of Discount rate Matter?

Example: Annual Net Benefits and NPV for 3 Alternative Projects

| <i>Year</i>                     | <i>Project A</i> | <i>Project B</i> | <i>Project C</i> |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| 0                               | −80,000          | −80,000          | −80,000          |
| 1                               | 25,000           | 80,000           | 0                |
| 2                               | 25,000           | 10,000           | 0                |
| 3                               | 25,000           | 10,000           | 0                |
| 4                               | 25,000           | 10,000           | 0                |
| 5                               | 25,000           | 10,000           | 140,000          |
| <i>NPV</i><br>( <i>i</i> = 2%)  | 37,836           | 35,762           | 46,802           |
| <i>NPV</i><br>( <i>i</i> = 10%) | 14,770           | 21,544           | 6,929            |

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In general,

- Low SDRs favor projects with the highest total benefits,
- High SDRs favor projects where the benefits are front-end loaded.

# THE THEORY BEHIND THE APPROPRIATE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE (SDR)

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# An Individual's Marginal Rate of Time Preference (MRTP)

- An individual's MRTP is the proportion of additional consumption that an individual requires in order to be willing to postpone (a small amount of) consumption for one year.

Example:

- Your rich grandma offers to give you either \$1000 this year or \$1200 next year.
- Suppose you are indifferent between the two options.
  - ➔ Your MRTP is \_\_\_\_\_

# Equality of Discount Rates in Perfect Markets


- In a perfectly competitive capital market, an individual's MRTP ( $p$ ) equals the market interest rate ( $i$ ).
- This result is obtained from solving consumer's U-max problem:

$$\max_{C_1, C_2} U(C_1, C_2)$$

$$\text{subject to } C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+i} = T$$

➔ Rewrite BC:  $C_2 =$  \_\_\_\_\_

# MRTP in a Two-Period Model



Consumption is maximized at A  
where:  $MRS = \text{slope of BC}$

$MRS = -(1+p)$  &  
 $\text{slope of BC} = -(1+i)$ .




Here, the market interest rate can be used as the social discount rate.

# A Simple Two-Period Model with Production

- Consider a more general, multi-individual, two-period model with production of a hypothetical country.
- Assume: no tax, no transaction cost, no market failures, etc.
- Trade-off between current and future consumptions are represented by consumption possibility frontier (CPF), which is a concave curve.
- Society's preference is represented by social indifference curve (SIC), and its slope is the *social marginal rate of time preference (SMRTP)*.
- SMRTP is the extra amount of future consumption that society requires as a compensation for giving up one unit of current consumption.

# The Optimal Levels of Consumption and Investment in a Two-Period Model



Let  $p = SMRTP$  and  $r_x$  be the marginal rate of return on investment, at point X.

At X,


- slope of CPF = \_\_\_\_\_
- slope of SIC = \_\_\_\_\_



# The First-Best Solution in the Two-Period Model

- From previous slide, society achieves its first-best solution when the SMRTP will equal the marginal rate of return on investment (i.e.  $p_x = r_x$ ).
- These rates would also equal the economy-wide market interest rate,  $i$  ( $= r$ ).
- This implies that all individuals will have the same MRTP because if their  $MRTP > i$  they would borrow at  $i$  and consume more in the current period until their  $MRTP = i$ ; if  $MRTP < i$  they would invest until their  $MRTP = i$ .
- Since everyone's MRTP equals  $i$ , it should be the unanimous choice for the social discount rate.

# Problems with Real Economies: The Second Best



- An actual economy (with taxes, risk and transaction costs) would not operate at the optimal point  $X$ , but at a point such as  $Z$ , which is a **second-best outcome**. Here, society would *underinvest* and  $r_x > p_x$ .
- Also, different people have different preferences, face different tax rates, numerous values exist for both MRTPs and  $1+r$ .
- **No obvious choice for SDR.**

# DERIVING THE SDR FROM THE MARKET

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
# Alternative SDRs

- Assume for now that the social discount weights are constant over time.
- Four potential social discounting rates that are derived from rates observable in markets.
  1. Using the marginal rate of return on private investment ( $r_z$ )
  2. Using the Marginal Social Rate of Time Preference ( $p_z$ ) method
  3. Using the government's borrowing rate ( $i$ )
  4. Using the weighted average approach

# I. Marginal Rate of Return on Private Investment ( $r_z$ )

- Argument: Society should receive an equal rate of return in the public sector to what it would have received had the resources remained in the private sector.
- Arnold Harberger's paper:
  - Assume that a government project would be financed entirely by borrowing in a closed domestic financial market, which results in higher market rate of interest.
  - 2 effects:
    1. Private-sector investment falls ( $\Delta I$ ).
    2. Private savings increase  $\sim$  Private consumption falls ( $\Delta C$ ).
  - i.e. the project would "crowd-out" both investment and consumption

# The Effects of Taxes and Government Borrowing on Savings and Investment



# Marginal Rate of Return on Private Investment (cont'd)

- Harberger suggests that the social discount rate should be obtained by weighting  $r_z$  and  $p_z$  by the relative contributions that I and C would make toward funding the project.
- Hence, SDR should be computed using the weighted average cost of capital:

$$WSOC = ar_z + bp_z$$

where  $a = \Delta I / (\Delta I + \Delta C)$  and  $b = \Delta C / (\Delta I + \Delta C)$

- Moreover, Harberger claims that savings are not very responsive to changes in interest rates, and hence  $\Delta C \approx 0$ . Thus,  $r_z$  is a good approximation of the SDR.
- Numerical value of  $r_z$  – the best proxy of  $r_z$  is the real, before-tax rate of return on corporate bonds.

## II. Marginal Social Rate of Time Preference ( $p_z$ )

- Argument: SDR should be thought of as the rate at which individuals in society are willing to postpone a small amount of current consumption in exchange for additional future consumption (and vice versa).
- In principle,  $p_z$  represents this rate.
- Numerical Values of  $p_z$  - In practice, the best return that most people can earn in exchange for postponing consumption is the real after-tax return on savings.
- Example: Suppose the nominal, pre-tax interest rate on government bonds and adjusting for taxes on savings and inflation yields estimates of  $p_z$  between 0.00 and 0.04.
  - This method suggests using a real SDR = \_\_\_\_ with sensitivity analysis at 0% and 4%.

### III. Government's Borrowing Rate ( $i$ )

- Argument: the government should discount projects using its long-term borrowing rate,  $i$ , it reflects the actual cost of financing a project.
- Numerical Values of  $i$  – the real rate of return on 10-year Treasury bonds (Adjusted by inflation)
- Example:
- The average monthly yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the period between April 1953 and December 2001 was 6.71% and CPI during that period is 3.89%.
  - A value for  $i$  of \_\_\_\_\_, with a plausible range for sensitivity analysis of 1.7% to 3.7%.

## IV. Weighted Average Approach (WSOC)

- Argument: SDR should be calculated in terms of the social opportunity cost of the different sources weighted according to the relative contribution of each source.
- If  $a$  is the proportion of  $t_a$  project's resources that displaces private domestic investment,  $b$  is the proportion financed by borrowing from foreigners, and  $1-a-b$  is the proportion that displaces domestic consumption, then **SDR is the weighted social opportunity cost of capital (WSOC)** :

$$WSOC = ar_z + bi + (1 - a - b)p_z$$

where  $i$  = the government's real, long-term borrowing rate.

Note that: As  $p_z < i < r_z$ , it follows that \_\_\_\_\_.

# SHADOW PRICE OF CAPITAL

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# Shadow Price of Capital (SPC)

Argument:

- Due to market distortions, the rate at which individuals are willing to trade present for future consumption,  $p_z$ , differs from the rate of return on private investment,  $r_z$ .
- Thus, flows of investment should be treated differently from flows of consumption; i.e. investment flows should be weighted by some parameters.
- The **shadow price of capital (SPC)**, denoted by  $\theta$ , is a parameter that converts investment gains or losses into *consumption equivalents*.
- In SPC discounting method, these consumption equivalents, like consumption flows themselves, are then discounted at  $p_z$ .

# Shadow Price of Capital Method (1)

The shadow price of capital method requires that discounting be done in four steps:

- 1) Costs and benefits in each period are divided into those that affect consumption and those that affect investment.
- 2) Flows into and out of investment are multiplied by the SPC to convert them into consumption equivalents.
- 3) Changes in consumption are added to changes in consumption equivalents.
- 4) Resulting amounts are discounted at  $p_z$ .

## Shadow Price of Capital Method (2)

- A general expression for the shadow price of capital is:

$$\theta = \frac{(r_z + \delta)(1 - f)}{p_z - r_z f + \delta(1 - f)}$$

where  $r_z$  is the net return on capital after depreciation,  
 $\delta$  is the depreciation rate of the capital invested,  
 $f$  is the fraction of the gross return on capital reinvested,  
and  $p_z$  is the marginal social rate of time preference.

- Note: In the absence of reinvestment and depreciation, SPC becomes:  $\theta = \dots$

## Example: Shadow Price of Capital (2)

Example: Let  $r_z=2\%$  ,  $p_z=1.5\%$ .  $\rightarrow \theta = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$ .

- Consider a project that is financed by a bond issue of \$3 million.
- Assume the bond yields real interest rate of 4% per year through five equal annual installments of \$673,854.
- The estimated benefits from the project are \$700,000 per year for five years.
- Assume the entire amount borrowed would displace private-sector investment (Harberger's crowd-out assumption).

## Example: Shadow Price of Capital (2)

| Year | Principal | Annual Installment | Interests | Loan Repayment | Loan Balance |
|------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|----------------|--------------|
| 1    | 3,000,000 | 673,854            | 120,000   | 553,854        | 2,446,146    |
| 2    | 2,446,146 | 673,854            | 97,846    | 576,008        | 1,870,138    |
| 3    | 1,870,138 | 673,854            | 74,806    | 599,048        | 1,271,089    |
| 4    | 1,271,089 | 673,854            | 50,844    | 623,010        | 648,080      |
| 5    | 648,080   | 673,854            | 25,923    | 648,080        | 0            |

Assume also:

- the full amount of each loan repayment will be reinvested.
- changes in consumption in each period include the project benefits, loan repayment, and interest on the loan.

## Example: Shadow Price of Capital (2)

|              |            |
|--------------|------------|
| $\Delta I_0$ | -3,000,000 |
| $\Delta I_1$ | 553,854    |
| $\Delta I_2$ | 576,008    |
| $\Delta I_3$ | 599,048    |
| $\Delta I_4$ | 623,010    |
| $\Delta I_5$ | 648,080    |

|              |                                 |         |
|--------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| $\Delta C_0$ | =                               | 0       |
| $\Delta C_1$ | $700,000 - 673,854 + 120,000 =$ | 146,146 |
| $\Delta C_2$ | $700,000 - 673,854 + 97,846 =$  | 123,992 |
| $\Delta C_3$ | $700,000 - 673,854 + 74,806 =$  | 100,952 |
| $\Delta C_4$ | $700,000 - 673,854 + 50,844 =$  | 76,146  |
| $\Delta C_5$ | $700,000 - 673,854 + 25,923 =$  | 52,146  |

- With SPC, NPV =
- Without SPC, NPV =